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Abstract 
Mexico has undergone a drastic reform in financial markets that transformed the 
system from financial repression to financial liberalisation and yet, a large 
percentage of enterprising households, particularly at the bottom-end of the income 
distribution, remain excluded from institutional financing. In 2001, the Mexican 
government launched the National Programme for Financing the 
Microentrepreneur with the explicit objective of expanding access of poor 
households to credit, through capital subsidisation of microfinance organisations. 
The intervention was based on the proposition that the impacts of credit on income 
and well-being are positive and significant. In this thesis we test such a proposition 
in the context of urban poverty. 
One of the main challenges in analysing the impacts of credit emerges from the 
problems of self-selection and endogeneity that are related to the choice of 
borrowing. The very few studies that control for these estimation constraints 
employ methodologies that are restricted to rural areas. We propose an alternative 
quasi-experimental research methodology specifically designed to work in the 
urban context, where a large percentage of microfinance organisations in the 
developing world actually operate. We collected primary data from 148 households, 
members of three microfinance organisations that operate in shantytowns located to 
the Eastern periphery of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City. 
Although we find that credit has positive impacts on income poverty, the 
magnitude of the impacts is marginal and only significant at the upper thresholds of 
human deprivation, where the moderate poor are located. We find no evidence of 
impacts on extreme poverty. The empirical evidence reveals that rigid screening, 
incentive and enforcement devices that microfinance organisations exploit to 
mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection, generate a significant and increasing 
utility cost of borrowing that undermine the potential effects on poverty and well- 
being. We also find that these devices exacerbate micro-rationing in credit markets, 
leading to constrained Pareto inefficiency. In this sense, government interventions 
that go beyond the objective of expanding access to credit, and facilitate, through 
temporal subsidisation, technological and financial innovations, could improve 
market efficiency and benefit both lenders and borrowers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Context 
This thesis is the outcome of a long intellectual journey that began in the aftermath 
of the Peso crisis of December 1994, when I was a brand new Economics graduate 
from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. At that time, the symptoms of 
the crisis had begun to be visible in the form of an increasing unemployment rate 
that quickly filled the streets around the cities with vendors that were desperately 
trying to make a living. Prior to the crisis, Mexico had been involved in a rapid 
macroeconomic reform, following the Washington Consensus' that transformed the 
country from a highly centralised economy, dominated by stated-owned 
enterprises, including development banks, to a market-led liberalised economy. In 
that process, the orthodoxy of financial liberalisation was the mainstream in the 
policy arena, and economic growth, per se, was expected, following the Kuznets's 
hypothesis, to trickle-down to the poor2. The expectations about the country, 
domestically as well as internationally, were high and optimistic after a long period 
of economic recession following the Oil crisis of 1982. 
It is important to point to the fact that during the period in which market 
liberalisation was fully implemented, i. e. from 1989 to 1994, the real GDP grew at 
the very modest average rate of 3%, and mostly benefiting the exporting 
manufacturing sector (Banco de Mexico 1995), and when the Peso crisis began, it put 
in evidence the structural disequilibria in the economy. The setback of -6.9% in real 
GDP in 1995 vanished the insignificant effects of the market liberalisation on the 
economy, leaving many workers unemployed, with no sources of funding to start a 
business, and with a collapsed local market that was increasingly invaded with 
cheap imported goods from abroad. The results from the promising economic 
reform, in terms of economic growth, employment, and well-being were truly 
disappointing, reflected in the incidence of poverty that soared from 29.4% just 
before the crisis in 1994 to 45.3% in 1996 (see Chapter 4 for a discussion). 
1 The Washington Consensus was a list of recommendations that included fiscal policy discipline; tax 
reform; financial and capital markets liberalisation; market-based interest rates; trade liberalisation 
and competitive exchange rates; privatisation of state enterprises; and deregulation. See Williamson 
(2002) for a discussion. 
2 The Kuznets's hypothesis is based on the proposition that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between economic growth and income inequality. For an exposition see Kuznets (1955), and also 
Galbraith (1996) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) for a critic. 
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The collapse of the banking and non-banking system, and the increasing number of 
impoverished households engaged in income generating activities, forced the 
government to turn the attention to an embryonic microfinance sector that included 
at the time a handful of organisations such as Financiera Compartamos, Servicios 
Financieros Comunitarios (Fincomun), and the Centro de Apoyo al 
Microempresario (CAME). Some development banking institutions, in particular the 
National Development Bank (Nafin) also introduced a pilot project, the Micro- 
entrepreneurial Development Programme (or Programa Global de Apoyo a la 
Microempresa in Spanish), aimed to improve the access of poor enterprising 
communities to credit, but without interest rate subsidisation. In that context, an 
event happened to be the turning point for the future expansion of the microfinance 
industry in Mexico. In early 1997, Vicente Fox, who was at that time governor of the 
State of Guanajuato, in central Mexico, came into contact with Mohamed Yunus 
who explained the way Grameen Bank operates. Highly impressed, Fox ordered a 
complete study of the Grameen model, and one year later, a credit programme, 
Santa Fe de Guanajuato, was established on the principles of group lending, and 
where organisational management and governance was independent from the local 
government. Three years later, in December 2000, Fox was elected President and 
with the advise of Yunus, the National Programme for Financing the 
Microentrepreneur (PRONAFIM), a revolving fund of US$ 100 million, was 
launched in 2001 with the aim of supporting, with subsidised capital, the expansion of 
the microfinance industry in Mexico. 
1.2 The statement of the problem 
Government interventions in credit markets have a long history in Mexico, from 
institutional ownership (like in the case of development banks) to the 
nationalisation of the banking system (like in 1982). In fact, charging below-market 
interest rate was an important component of these interventions that were pursued 
on the grounds of selective targeting at industries, regions and sectors which were 
considered "strategic" for economic growth, employment and in general, the 
process of development (Solis 1971). Credit allocation was to a large extent based on 
direct subsidisation of interest rates, what Vogel and Adams refer to as the direct 
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credit paradigm, which often caused fiscal outlays and led to market inefficiency 
and financial repression (see McKinnon 1973 for a critic). 
This type of intervention came under severe criticism from the Ohio School (see e. g. 
Adams et al 1994, and Adams and von Pischke 1992) on the basis of two key 
problems: 1) the rates of loan default were very high; and 2) most of the recipients 
were not the intended beneficiaries, causing rent-seeking behaviour and political 
patronage3. These criticisms led, during the process of financial liberalisation in 
Mexico, to a drastic reform that restricted government intervention to a very few 
cases where market failure was clearly identified, perhaps the most obvious case in 
the context of rural credit markets, and on the basis of a distributional mechanism4. 
However, the role of institutional lenders goes beyond their distributional function 
of capital assets, and by expanding poor people's opportunities for productive and 
self-employment activities, they may well improve their living conditions by 
enhancing human capital for future generations through investments in children's 
education, or accumulating physical capital in the form of household and business 
assets. 
Nonetheless, fragmented credit markets are not exclusive of rural areas, and in the 
urban context, the inaccessibility to institutional credit can be striking. A recent 
survey (Casley et al 2004) reports that only 1.8% of the population in the 
Metropolitan area of Mexico City has borrowed from institutional lenders. To a 
large extent this situation emerges due to the extensive use of collateral in 
traditional financial intermediation that highly restricts the access of low-income 
households to credit. This constraint can, as pointed out by Banerjee and Newman 
(1993), and Galor and Zeira (1993), perpetuate the poverty trap. Thus, temporal 
government interventions aimed to reduce the effects of externalities coming from 
incomplete information could facilitate the expansion of the microfinance industry, 
and improve the access to credit of those excluded from institutional financing 
3 Vogel and Adams (1997: 5) have also included six additional issues: 1) transaction costs for both 
borrowers and lenders were boosted; 2) subsidised credit was regressively distributed; deposit 
mobilisation was discouraged; financial structure was weakened; insignificant impact on production 
and investment decisions, and 6) evaluations of direct credit programmes were flawed. 
This was explicitly recognised by the inclusion of a credit component within a social safety net 
(initially known as Solidaridad) that became available to poor households living in rural communities. 
Under the President Zedillo's administration this programme was renamed as Progresa, and later on, 
as Oportunidades, under the Fox's administration. 
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(Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986). This could ultimately break down the poverty trap 
and foster, contrary to the mainstream orthodoxy of a trade-off between equity and 
efficiency5, the development process (Bardhan and Undry 1999). 
13 The aims of the study 
In that perspective, PRONAFIM was launched to help microfinance organisations to 
absorb these externalities and expand the scope and outreach of the sector, through 
the provision of temporal cheap capital, assuming that access to credit, per se 
translates into poverty reduction. This assumption is based on two theoretical 
propositions that need to be tested to justify the intervention: 1) in fragmented 
credit markets, the demand for credit is rationed by the lender, and 2) credit is a 
significant determinant of increasing incomes and improving well-being. The former 
proposition appears to be true at least from an institutional point of view (see e. g. 
Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, and Braverman and Stiglitz 1989); however, the extent of 
the rationing may be less when indigenous financial agents such as moneylenders 
and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAS) actively operate in local 
markets (see e. g. Kochar 1997). Very few attempts (e. g. Diagne and Zeller 2001) have 
been made to examine the relationship between these agents and microfinance 
organisations, whilst controlling for their effects on well-being, what it is known as 
the attribution problem (see Hulme 2000). In Chapter 7 we present an econometric 
estimation procedure, which by including a vector of credit market characteristics, 
controls for the effects of informal credit agents on the outcomes of interest. In 
addition, we present narrative evidence from qualitative data in order to address 
the reasons of using such informal mechanisms when having access to credit from 
microfinance organisations. 
In relation to the latter proposition, although there is an increasing consensus 
regarding the positive effect of credit on household income and well-being, the 
magnitude and significance of the impact remains inconclusive and 
methodologically contested, especially when considering the bottom-end of the 
income distribution. Most of the impact studies that we reviewed, and which are 
discussed in Chapter 2, focus on the rural context and suffer, with a few exceptions, 
5 For a classic analysis of the equity-efficiency trade-off, see Okun (1975) 
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from endogeneity and selectivity problems, and those studies that successfully 
control for endogeneity and selection bias (e. g. Pitt and Khandker 1998a; 1998b; 
Coleman 1999) use methodological approaches that are difficult to replicate in the 
urban context, where many microfinance organisations in developing countries 
actually operate. For that reason, and with the purpose of addressing the selectivity 
and endogeneity constraints, we propose in Chapter 6a quasi-experimental research 
methodology specifically designed to work in deprived and densely populated 
urban areas. We collected primary data at the household level (to reduce the 
fungibility problem), and from households participating at three microfinance 
organisations that employ different lending technologies: 
1) Community Financial Services (Fincomun) employing a minimalistic credit-only 
individual lending approach, and operating in San Miguel Teotongo, a settlement of 
the Iztapalapa District, located to the Eastern periphery of Mexico City. 
2) Centre for the Assistance of the Microenterpreneur (CAME) employing a 
minimalistic credit-only village banking approach, and operating in the Chalco Valley, 
one of the poorest municipalities of the State of Mexico, located to the Eastern 
periphery of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City. 
3) Programs for women Mexico (Promujer) employing a holistic credit-plus village 
banking approach that combines credit with training, and operating in Tula City, an 
hour from Mexico City. 
The econometric estimation procedure discussed in Chapter 7 enables us to test for 
the underlying assumptions of no selectivity bias and endogeneity problems. It is 
important to point out here that our analysis primarily focuses on credit as the 
impact variable despite the fact that the case-study organisations offer other services 
such as voluntary savings (like in the case of Fincomun), loan insurance (like in the 
case of CAME) and training programmes (like in the case of Promujer). 
The structural nature of microfinance demands the use of several screening, 
incentive and enforcement devices that in substitution of collateral, deal with the 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, and reduce the informational costs 
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implicitly related to the process of lending to the poor (see Chapter 5 for a detailed 
discussion). However, these devices generate transaction and opportunity costs that 
are transferred to the borrower through the various mechanisms that characterise 
group-lending and individual-lending contracts (Stiglitz 1990). These costs can 
substantially increase the utility cost of borrowing and consequently, reduce the 
magnitude of the poverty impacts. This thesis documents the effects of the utility 
cost of borrowing in relation to household income and well-being, especially when 
group-lending and individual-lending models are compared, challenging the view 
that low rates of loan default is a sufficient indicator of programme effectiveness 
(see e. g. Remenyi 1991). 
Microfinance organisations in Mexico and in the developing world commonly use, 
either due to organisational goals or donor conditionality, several indirect 
mechanisms such as interest rates above the market rate; the provision of small-size 
loans; and compulsory attendance to periodical group meetings, to reach the poor. 
However, in order measure the extent of the outreach and avoid under- or over- 
estimations of the magnitude and significance of the poverty impacts, it was crucial 
to identify appropriate thresholds of human deprivation for urban areas. In Chapter 
4 we follow three poverty lines, derived from the Secretariat of Social 
Development's work (2002), which were adjusted by three equivalence scales, in 
order to take into account intra-household distribution of welfare. The results from 
the poverty impact analysis are presented in Chapter 7. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
In the chapters, which follow we present the way forward to investigate the 
objectives of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the recent empirical evidence, based on 
rigorous and scientific studies, of the impacts of credit on income poverty, labour 
and well-being, paying particular attention to the methodological constraints faced 
in impact evaluations and the research gaps found in the field. Chapter 3 briefly 
discuss the characteristics of the credit markets in Mexico in the context of the 
institutional reform that moved the system from financial repression to financial 
liberalisation, looking in particular at the recent expansion of the microfinance 
sector in the country. Since we are interested in examining the effects of credit on 
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poverty reduction, we need to answer the question of who is poor in the context of 
urban Mexico. We devote Chapter 4 to answer this question. In Chapter 5 we 
present the analytical framework that seeks to set up the theoretical foundations for 
the investigation of the impacts of credit. We introduce the notion of household 
capital endowments that are integrated by three separated but interrelated factors 
that are critical to access the labour and credit markets: human capital; physical 
capital, and social capital. In the same Chapter, we present the theoretical 
propositions that are tested in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Chapter 6 presents the methodology and research design that we propose to control 
for the problems of selection bias and endogeneity in the impact study. Chapter 7 
discuss the econometric estimation procedure that tests the underlying assumptions 
of no selection bias and endogeneity in the impact analysis. We also present in that 
chapter the empirical results regarding income and poverty impacts in connection 
with the utility cost of borrowing. In Chapter 8, we investigate other impacts 
beyond the income variable, looking in particular at business performance, physical 
capital accumulation, human capital enhancements, and labour. Chapter 9 
summaries the main findings of the study, and concludes by identifying some 
policy recommendations for improving practice and increasing impact. 
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Chapter 2 
Microfinance and impact 
assessments. An overview 
Introduction 
The implicit nature of fragmented credit markets, plagued with problems of 
imperfect information, has made it very difficult for institutional lenders such as 
banks to reduce the informational costs that are related to the process of lending to 
the poor, and the strong dependency on the use of conventional screening devices 
such as collateral has exacerbated the incidence of credit rationing in the market, 
particularly at the bottom-end of the income distribution, where households have 
low levels of physical capital endowments to back loan applications (see Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981 and also chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on this issue). 
In this Chapter we discuss the emergence of microfinance, which by the use of 
several screening, incentive and enforcement devices, has successfully reduced the 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, leaving the door of credit open to 
an important number of low-income households in the developing world. In that 
context, microfinance has become an instrument of social and economic 
development based on the general proposition that credit (as well as other financial 
services such as savings and insurance) have positive impacts on the poor. But to 
what extent does the empirical evidence confirm this proposition? What is the 
magnitude and significance of these impacts? What are the research gaps in the 
field? We conducted a review of the existing empirical evidence to answer these 
questions. Our attention primarily focuses on rigorous and scientific studies that 
often employ econometric techniques to assess poverty impacts, although we also 
refer to qualitative studies that have revealed important information for the purpose 
of our investigation. 
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 2.1 we discuss different lending 
technologies used by microfinance organisations, which are divided for analytical 
purposes into three general models: group lending; village banking and individual 
lending. In the same section we discuss the role of indigenous agents such as 
moneylenders and rotating savings and credit associations in fragmented credit 
markets. In section 2.2 we examine the controversial issues of subsidisation and 
financial sustainability in the context of poverty impacts before moving onto section 
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2.3 that reviews the empirical evidence of the impacts of microfinance at the micro- 
level, looking in particular at the impacts on poverty and well-being; women; labour, 
and vulnerability. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.1 The emergence of microfinance in fragmented credit markets 
The microfinance movement emerged in the early 1980s as a combination of 
screening, incentive and enforcement devices that increase lenders' ability to deal 
with the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in the provision of 
financial services to the poor. Regularly, these devices take the form of direct and 
indirect mechanisms such as compulsory savings; periodical repayment schedules in 
compulsory meetings; social collateral in the form of joint liability in group-lending 
contracts; progressive lending; targeting at women, and trade-credit linkages' (see 
Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; Udry 1990; Bell 1990; Aleem 1990, and Stiglitz 1990). The 
structural characteristics and informational advantages of microfinance attracted the 
interest of the international development community, in a period when the direct 
credit paradigm, represented by a large number of credit projects that usually 
targeted agricultural and industrial sectors2 under quasi-Keynesian principles of 
financial intermediation, were under severe criticisms from the Ohio School for 
failing to reach the intended beneficiaries. For example, Adams et al (1984) reported 
that loan repayment rates from direct credit programmes were below 50 percent, the 
costs of subsidies were frequently inflated, and credits were diverted to politically 
favoured groups. Nagarajan et al (1995) have also criticised credit schemes for 
allocating inefficiencies in credit markets and eroding indigenous lending practices 
such as moneylending (see also Shaw 1973; McKinnon 1973, and Adams and von 
Pischke 1992 for a critic against subsidised credit schemes). 
Since the emergence of Grameen Bank in the 1983, more than 400 organisations 
operating in 66 countries in Africa, Asia, America and Europe have entirely or 
partially employed the principles of solidarity groups to reach low-income 
households (Latifee 2001). The Foundation for International Community Assistance 
t In Chapter 5 we discuss in more detail the characteristics of these mechanisms. 
2 Vogel and Adams (1997: 14) have pointed out the fact that "since the first agricultural credit project 
in Peru in 1955, the World Bank has financed about 700 other projects with major agricultural credit 
components in 94 countries, [.... ] involving more than US $16 billion". 
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(FINCA) and its village banking subsidiaries are operating in more than 20 countries, 
with more than 500 thousand borrowers (FINCA 2006), whereas another village 
banking operator, Opportunity international (2005), has reported to work in 28 
developing countries with more than 810 thousand active members, and an 
outstanding loan balance of almost 130 million US dollars. Similarly, ACCION 
International, one of the largest microfinance networks worldwide, reported to have 
reached in 2006 around 2.5 million households in 28 countries, 19 of which were in 
the Latin American region. The outstanding loan balance was in the order of 2 
billion dollars with a portfolio of loans in arrears of just 3%. The largest 
microfinance organisations in Latin America (e. g. the Banco Solidario in Ecuador, 
BancoSol in Bolivia, MiBanco in Peru, and Compartamos in Mexico, the latter the 
largest microfinance bank in the Western hemisphere) are affiliates of the ACCION 
network (ACCION International 2006). The Women's World Banking Global 
Network has also reported to support 50 affiliates in 43 countries around the world 
that together have served over 23 million borrowers (WWB 2006). 
One of the leading organisations in the cooperativist movement that embraces the 
individual-lending model is the Canadian Developpement International Desjardins. This 
corporation has provided technical assistance to organisations that reached in 2006 
over 3.2 million households in 29 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and 
Eastern Europe. The network also reported an average loan size in the order of US 
$900 and an average savings on deposits of US $200 (DID 2006). Over the years, the 
microfinance industry has considerably expanded its outreach in the developing 
world. The Microcredit Summit campaigners have reported that 3164 organisations 
were reaching almost 92.3 million households, 68% of whom were below the World 
Bank's US $1 a day poverty line (see Daley-Harris 2005); even though they 
acknowledge, alike to what the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1997) 
has pointed out, that despite of the important progress in scaling up the 
microfinance sector, only a small percentage (about 7.7%) of the 1.2 billion people in 
poverty worldwide have access to credit. 
Although the concept of microfinance may include the provision of financial services 
such as voluntary savings, insurance and remittances, a wider portfolio of services 
beyond credit remains restricted to a small group of fully regulated organisations in 
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the developing world3. For this particular reason, the empirical impact analysis 
discussed later in Chapters 7 and 8 primarily focuses on credit as the main product 
offered by the case-study organisations that participated in our study. Nonetheless, 
the microfinance sector has become a complex network of organisations embracing 
a wide range of lending technology5, which for analytical purposes, we divide into 
three general models: 1) solidarity groups; 2) village banking, and 3) individual 
lending. Within each model, there are variations in technology and services, ranging 
from minimalistic credit-only programmes to holistic credit-plus organisations, 
whereas within organisations, there is an increasing tendency to employ more than 
one model to reach different market niches (see table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Distribution of microfinance organisations by lendine model 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
23 23 21 25 63 66 63 
Individual 24% 38% 35% 27% 32% 33% 32% 
Individual/Solidarity 17 22 26 43 81 89 102 
groups 17% 37% 43% 47% 41% 45% 51% 
9 7 4 7 31 23 17 
Solidarity groups 9% 12% 7% 8% 16% 12% 9% 
8 8 9 16 25 22 18 
Village Banking 8% 13% 15% 18% 13% 11% 9% 
Total surveyed 97 60 60 91 200 200 200 
organisations 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MicroBanking Bulletin, various years 
2.1.1 Solidarity groups 
Solidarity groups are often related to the Grameen Bank's lending model in which 
loans are given to groups of 5 to 7 individuals that are clustered voluntarily. 
Although loans are received individually, the group is collectively responsible for 
loan repayment. Several groups meet on a weekly or fortnightly basis with credit 
officers to repay the loan over a period of 16 to 24 weeks. Some credit programmes 
3 In the particular context of our impact study, only one organisation (Fincomun) out of three case- 
study organisations was authorised to receive deposits, although restricted to offer other financial 
products. For more details about the institutional characteristics of the case-study organisations, see 
Chapter 6. 
4 It is important to point out here the fact that 92.2% of treatment households interviewed said to have 
joined a credit programme in the first place with the purpose of getting a loan. For further details, see 
table A6.12 in the Appendix to Chapter 6. 
' We refer to the concept of lending technology as the collection of techniques, methods, processes 
and skills that in the form of knowledge are used to satisfy market needs and solve existing 
constraints. For a theoretical discussion of the concept of technology, see Franklin (1989). 
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may offer longer periodical repayment schedules. By meeting regularly, the lender 
substantially reduces the probability of loan default, although as pointed out by 
Stiglitz (1990), increase the transaction costs to the borrower. Solidarity groups take 
advantage of local information disseminated through social interactions and peer 
monitoring, just as moneylenders and rotating savings and credit associations do (see 
Besley and Coate 1995), and where the homogeneity of group formation, through 
peer-selection, facilitates the enforcement process of loan repayment (see Ghatak 
1999). 
During compulsory meetings, loan instalments are made, and if a group member 
defaults the loan, the group as a whole will need to cover the missing instalment to 
avoid cancellation of subsequent loans and other sanctions. Groups with good 
records, on the contrary, are rewarded with the access to larger loans that 
progressively increase overtime. Progressive lending acts here as an incentive device 
that reduces the probability of loan default (see Morduch 1999; Hulme and Mosley 
1996, and also chapter 5 for a detailed discussion). The model of solidarity groups 
has been replicated by many organisations worldwide, embracing either a 
minimalistic credit-only approach (e. g. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh; BancoSol in 
Bolivia, and Finamerica in Colombia) or a holistic credit-plus approach (e. g. BRAC 
and PROSHIKA in Bangadesh)6. Another model widely used in the provision of 
financial services to the poor is village banking. 
2.1.2 Village banking 
Village banking is often linked to the lending model developed by Foundation for 
International Community Assistance (FINCA) in the 1980s, in which a sponsoring 
agency makes an initial loan to a group of 30 to 50 members that previously met to 
deposit compulsory savings in a collective fund. The loan is then distributed to the 
members of the village bank conditional upon a minimum level of deposits of 10% 
of the loan size. Compulsory savings act as both a screening device, and an internal 
6 Whilst the minimalistic credit-only approach refers to organisations relying their operations on 
credit, and using compulsory savings and other services as complementary incentive and enforcement 
mechanisms, the holistic credit-plus approach refers to programmes that offer credit as part of a 
broader portfolio of services including basic education, health care, and training for productive 
activities. 
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fund for extra loans. Although interests on deposits are usually not paid, members 
are entitled to receive a share of the revenues generated from lending activities. The 
bank is managed by its members and controlled by rules that are voted collectively. 
As in solidarity groups, joint-liability applies in this case; however, in village 
banking, the group as a whole is responsible for loan repayment. To reduce the 
probability of loan default, loans are initially made on small amounts although they 
progressively increase. 
Village banks, as well as solidarity groups, employ periodical repayment schedules 
as a screening device, which usually take place on a weekly basis over a period of 16 
weeks. During those meetings, loan repayments and deposits to the internal fund 
are made. The initial loan from the sponsoring institution is kept in an external 
account (usually in a banking institution) whereas savings deposits to the village 
bank are held in an internal fund that can be withdrawn on weekly basis7. 
The village-banking model has been embraced by organisations working in Central 
America; Sub-Sahara Africa and Central Asia, employing either a minimalistic 
approach (e. g. FINCA; CAME and Compartamos), or a holistic perspective (e. g. 
Promujer and Freedom from Hunger). Armendariz de Aghion and Collier (2000), 
and Morduch (1999) suggest that group-lending contracts, including solidarity 
groups and village banking, have a comparative advantage vis-ä-vis individual 
lending contracts specially when targeting the poor, since the former models, 
particularly in rural credit markets, are better positioned to mitigate informational 
constraints emerging from the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard . 
2.1.3 Individual lending 
However, individual lending organisations have proved that high levels of loan 
repayment can be achieved amongst the poor, through the combination of 
screening, enforcement and in particular, incentive devices such as progressive 
lending and refunds for on-time repayments that reduce the probability of loan 
default. Amongst the best-known individual-lending organisations are the Unit 
7 For a detailed discussion on the village banking model see Morduch (1999), and the information 
available at www. villagcbanking. org 
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Desa System of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI); the Canadian Developpement 
International Desjardins, and the credit unions movement in Latin America and 
Africa, which unlike group-lending programmes, require physical collateral and 
guarantees. As in solidarity groups and village banking, loans are made in small 
amounts conditional upon minimum savings, and often repaid periodically on a 
weekly basis for period that ranges from 4 to 12 months. However, in individual 
lending contracts, credit officers play a fundamental role in screening loan 
applications and monitoring borrowers that progressively receive larger loans based 
on good records of loan repayment. Individual lending organisations normally 
embrace a minimalistic credit-only approach, keeping interest rates at levels needed 
to achieve financial self-sufficiency (Otero and Rhyne 1994). McGuire (1998) and 
Yaron et al (1998) have also drawn attention to the ability of individual lending 
programmes such as the BRI to maintain high loan repayment rates, even during the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
Several of the pioneering organisations in microfinance (e. g. Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh; BancoSol in Bolivia, Bank Rakyat in Indonesia and FINCA in Central 
America) have proved that credit, savings and other financial services can be offered 
to households at the bottom-end of the income distribution, under a market- 
oriented approach, and achieve at the same time, high rates of loan repayment (see 
e. g. Morduch 1999; Hulme and Mosley 1996). In practice, microfinance 
organisations have taken advantage of economies of scale, just as banking 
organisations do, in combination with mechanisms widely used by indigenous 
agents such as moneylenders and rotating savings and credit associations, to reduce 
the informational costs found in fragmented credit markets. Keeping interest rates 
low relative to moneylenders (although high relative to banks) is critical for 
microfinance organisations, not only to justify a social mission (and then to be 
eligible to receive donations), but more importantly, to be able to compete with local 
moneylenders and ROSCAS. Moneylenders, in particular, have been widely 
criticised for using interest rates and other enforcement and "exploitative" 
mechanisms to induce default to take over borrowers' undervalued assets that play 
the role of collateral (see e. g. Bhaduri 1977 and also the critic to Bhaduri's model in 
Chose 1980 and Mojan Rao 1980). 
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2.1.4 The role of moneylenders in fragmented credit markets 
The view of usury as an exploitative practice, with repugnant distributional 
consequences, can be traced back to 12th Century Europe. In the oldest-recorded 
Spanish epic sonnet, the Cantar del Mio Cid, moneylenders represented by Raquel 
and Vidas, are portrayed as two wealthy, avaricious and dishonest individuals who 
tried to take advantage of the honest and heroic Cid Campeador (see Aizenberg 1980, 
and Dunn 1970). William Shakespeare also unsympathetically portrayed, in the 
Merchant of Venice, the role of moneylenders during the Renaissance, a period of high 
economic development in Europe. Shylock, the wealthy usurer, is the depicted 
subject of hatred shading and humiliation for his "immoral" behaviour (Draper 
1935). The question of moral and legal validation of moneylending has been under 
scrutiny ever since, but it became increasingly evident during the transition from 
feudal societies to modem capitalism8 (see also Mannan 1970, and Mawdudi 1961, 
in the context of Islamic societies). 
Nevertheless, it was perhaps this entrepreneurial spirit and financial ability to take 
risks under adverse environments that helped moneylenders (many of them Jews, 
as in the case of Shylock, Raquel and Vidas) to take important steps towards the 
emergence of the banking system in countries such as England9. Malcolm Harper 
(1987: 3) has actually pointed out that this risk-taking and hard-working behaviour is 
often characteristic of communities that have faced "hardship and the need to start 
again". However, the high interest rates and the monopolistic role of traditional 
moneylenders came under scrutiny by governments of many developing countries 
as they became independent during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (for the case of India, 
see Bell 1990), and established state-led organisations explicitly designed to sideline 
moneylenders. 
This critical view of moneylenders has also been developed from an academic 
perspective. Bolnick (1992) for example, has suggested that high interest rates 
charged by moneylenders relative to the cost of lending are the immediate outcome 
of monopolistic practices in rural markets. As a result, new entries could improve 
8 In the 1540s England, all former legislation against usury was abolished, and in 1570 Queen 
Elizabeth legalised a 10 per cent interest rate. 
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market competition and reduce the price of capital. High interest rates have also 
been linked to the risk hypothesis associated to the process of lending to the poor (see 
Bottomley 1975), and to the endogenous informational-costs hypothesis, which is related 
to screening, incentive and enforcement activities (see e. g. Aleem 1990; Williamson 
1987, and Stiglitz 1990). Under the latter hypothesis, Hoff and Stiglitz (1998) argue 
that subsidised credit from donors may actually have adverse effects in the form of 
increasing interest rates, given the characteristics of monopolistically competitive 
credit markets where moneylenders usually operate. Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996) 
have also argued that inefficiencies in subsidised credit schemes, which often 
appear in loan delays, can potentially increase the equilibrium interest rate through 
bribing and other corrupting practices. 
Nonetheless, the World Bank (1983) even in the 1980s pointed out that the role of 
institutional lenders in fragmented credit markets should be seen as complementary 
rather than a substitute to moneylenders. More recently, it has become increasingly 
clear that there are aspects of moneylenders' practices, especially the low cost and 
the knowledge of the borrower, which microfinance organisations could, with 
advantage, emulate. Varghese (2005) also argue that in the context of market 
liberalisation, institutional lenders could reduce the informational constraints 
through the linkage with local moneylenders. In that process, borrowers could 
obtain loans from a moneylender, where the latter would act as an intermediary, 
improving the accessibility to credit. Whilst moneylenders have primarily exploited 
their informational advantage to operate in local credit markets, rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAS) have exploited, as microfinance organisations do, 
screening and monitoring devices to make possible group formation. 
2.1.5 Rotating savings and credit associations 
A rotating savings and credit association (ROSCAS) is usually organised by a group 
of individuals who voluntary agree to contribute to a fund, which is created with 
periodical and fixed instalments collected by the fund organiser. The instalments, 
which are usually made on weekly or fortnightly basis, last for a period that is 
determined by the number of participants. In Mexico, for instance, ROSCAS usually 
9 See Richards (1929) for a historical discussion on the early financial system in England. 
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last for 16 weeks after 15 group members and the fund organiser have received the 
fund in turn, in accordance with a predetermined list or lottery. Once group 
members have received the fund, the group is dispersed or regroup to repeat the 
process. Group size is usually small in order to reduce monitoring costs, and 
deposits are rarely made on long-period intervals, to reduce the risks of non- 
payments, particularly in the last rounds when most of the group members have 
already received the collective fund. 
A fundamental factor that helps the formation of ROSCAS, similar to the process 
observed in group-lending contracts in microfinance, is the level of homogeneity 
amongst group members (see Nagarajan et al 1999). However, it is the process of 
self-selection that leads to a homogenous matching within the group, which 
increases the probability of loan repayment (see Ghatak 1999). But because self- 
selection acts as a screening device, it may also exclude the poorest members of the 
community from group participation. Variations in the characteristics and functions 
of ROSCAS as well as the level of participation have been reported to be high across 
the developing world (see e. g. Bouman 1995). The role of ROSCAS has been 
examined from different perspectives. For example, as a random and bidding 
mechanism to allocate indivisible goods in fragmented credit markets (Besley et al 
1993; 1994); and as a form of insurance in that bidding process (Calomiris and 
Rajaraman 1998). 
ROSCAS have also been analysed as a form of insurance that works as an ex-ante 
protective and ex-post risk-coping mechanism against events associated to both 
idiosyncratic income variability and transitory external shocks (see e. g. Besley 1995, 
and Dercon 2000). It is due to the active participation of these indigenous 
mechanisms that we decided to include in the econometric estimation (see Chapters 
7 and 8), a vector of credit market characteristics that controls for the effects of 
moneylenders and ROSCAS in the analysis of the impact of microfinance. This 
enables us, as briefly discussed in section 2.3 and in greater detail in Chapter 6, to 
reduce the potential problems of attribution in the impact analysis, and to examine, 
as it is discussed in section 7.3, the interaction between these indigenous agents and 
the selected case-study organisations participating in our study. 
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2.2 Subsidisation of microfinance through cheap capital 
To a certain extent, what it has made microfinance such an important instrument for 
social and economic development, is the general proposition that credit, savings and 
other financial products such as insurance have positive impacts on people's well- 
being. In that context, although cheap credit is no longer seen as a good practice, the 
provision of cheap capital for scaling up microfinance organisations is still a widely 
used practicer. Hulme and Mosley (1996: 5) have pointed out that cheap capital is 
valid 'for paying an equal in value to externalities, which would bring the rate of 
investment to its socially optimal level". A subsidy, they argue, "is only valid during the 
period when a lending institution's costs are falling sharply, during which period the benefit 
generated by financing additional good projects (... ) is likely to outweigh the costs incurred 
by taking on new projects which are not socially beneficial". Morduch (1999b) has also 
suggested that subsidies could be justified if they target the bottom-end of the 
income distribution where the poorest households are clustered. 
Multilateral donors such as the World Bank through the Consultative Group to Aid 
the Poorest (CGAP) and national governmental agencies such as the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID); the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA) have played an important role in expanding the microfinance 
industry, which is often seen as a powerful instrument and a preferred vehicle, in 
substitution of state governments, to put into operation developmental programmes 
in the developing world. In that process, non-governmental organisations, and in 
general the civil society movement has been, perhaps, the greatest beneficiary (see e. g. 
Edwards and Hulme 1998; Toye 1987; Bebbington and Mitlin 1996). 
In the context of impact analysis, Hulme (2000) has identified two major schools of 
thoughts that embrace different analytical frameworks: 1) the intended beneficiary 
school, and 2) the intermediary school. One the one hand, the intended beneficiary 
school is built on the assumptions that the impacts of programme interventions are 
observed at different levels (e. g. individual, household, enterprise, village, country, 
'0 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the provision of cheap capital in Mexico, through the 
National Programme for Financing the Microenterpreneur (PRONAFIM). 
20 
etc), and can vary according to both endogenous factors such individual abilities, 
effort, entrepreneurship, attitudes towards risks, etc, and exogenous elements that 
are related to the lending technology, market characteristics, local infrastructure, 
costs of inputs; security, etc. Consequently, impact analysis under the intended 
beneficiary school investigates the impacts of credit programmes as far as possible, 
paying special attention to the demand side, although a linkage to the supply side is 
always desirable if improving practice is a goal in the analysis. 
On the other hand, the intermediary school, which is linked in the Hulme's paper to 
the Ohio School, focuses on the supply side, looking in particular at two main 
institutional indicators that measure the effectiveness of credit programmes: 
financial self-sufficiency and outreach. Financial self-sufficiency is achieved through 
the generation of sufficient revenues (excluding subsidies) to cover operational 
costs, including payments of interest on deposits and borrowed capital. In addition, 
a self-sufficient institution must be able to honour its contractual obligations and 
adopt a structure of incentives to guarantee the full execution of these obligations 
overtime (see Gonzalez-Vega et al 1997). There are other measures of financial 
performance such as the Financial Self-sufficiency Index used by the MicroBanking 
Bulletin and the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI)11 introduced by Yaron (1992a; 
1992b). 
Yaron et al (1997) have proposed the concept of outreach to assess the extent to which 
credit programmes reach the target group, i. e. the poor and poorest. Outreach can be 
measured by indicators such as the average loan size and the number of borrowers 
whose income is below the poverty line. The range of services offered to the poor, 
the level of transaction costs transferred to poor, and the client satisfaction with 
respect to the financial services can be used to assess the quality of outreach (Gozalez- 
Vega et al 1997). Schreiner (2002) has also proposed a framework that measures six 
aspects of outreach: worth, costs, depth, breadth, length and scope. Under the 
intermediary approach, if both financial self-sufficiency and outreach are achieved, 
then positive impacts are implicitly assumed, based on the general proposition that 
11 The SDI measures the extent to which the lending interest rate would have to be raised to cover all 
operating costs if all subsidies received by a credit programme were stripped away. 
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expanding people's choices in fragmented credit markets lead to improvements in 
household well-being (see e. g. Yaron et al 1998 and Gonzalez-Vega et at 1997). 
Savings deposits play a fundamental role in helping microfinance organisations to 
be financially sustainable. In fact, savings-led organisations such as the Bank Rakyat 
in Indonesia and the cooperative and credit union sectors in South Asia, and Latin 
America have shown that the demand curve for savings often exceeds the one for 
credit (see e. g. Robinson 2001, and Richardson 2000). Additionally, secure and 
flexible voluntary savings products can be powerful instruments that help the poor 
to deal in a better position with external shocks (Rutherford 1999). A major 
constraint arises through the restrictions that financial regulatory authorities impose 
on savings deposits. Meeting these regulations can be very costly for a large 
percentage of credit programmes in the developing world, which often choose to 
continue operating as subsidy recipients than become fully regulated intermediaries 
(Morduch 1999b). A recent survey (see Balkenhol 2005) reports that 100% of a 
sample of 45 microfinance organisations was receiving donor subsidies ranging 
from less than 10% to 100%, measured as a percentage of total liabilities. 
The MicroBanking Bulletin (2007) has recently reported that in 2005, about 70% of 200 
microfinance organisations that participated in a survey were financially self- 
sufficient, relative to 63% in 2003. This result has improved the expectations of an 
increasing number of organisations that could eventually achieve financial self- 
sufficiency, including those programmes that target at the low-end of the credit 
market12. However, those 200 credit programmes represent only 6.3% of the overall 
microfinance industry, estimated in more than 3160 organisations worldwide 
(Daley-Harris 2005). Morduch (2000) has actually suggested that only a very small 
percentage of all credit programmes (about 5%) will become self-sufficient. In order 
to do so, many organisations would need to raise interest rates as high as needed to 
cover operational costs. However, this could only exacerbate the problems of credit 
rationing in fragmented credit markets. 
12 The MicroBanking Bulletin (2007) refers to microfinance organisations that target at the low-end of 
the credit market as those organisations that report an average loan balance equal to US $150 or <20% 
of the Gross National Income per capita 
22 
2.2.1 Financial self-sufficiency vs. poverty impact 
Since many credit programmes are actually subsidised on the grounds of achieving 
a great outreach amongst the poor, they may actually compromise the objective of 
achieving financial self-sufficiency. Hulme and Mosley (1996: 206) have pointed out 
that credit programmes working with the poorest would experience a trade-off with 
the goal of achieving financial self-sufficiency. They argue that "at a given point in 
time [microfinance organisations] can either go for growth and put their resources into 
underpinning the success of established and rapidly growing institutions, or go for poverty 
impact f... 1 and put their resources into poverty focused operations with a higher risk of 
failure and a lower expected return". The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest 
(2000) has also suggested that lending to the poorest involves lending very small 
loans and higher costs, making it more difficult to achieve financial self-sufficiency. 
In contrast to this view, Gibbons (1998) and Gibbons and Meehan (2000) argue that 
there is no necessarily a trade off between reaching the poor and achieving financial 
self-sufficiency in the long run, as even the poorest borrowers take advantage of 
progressive lending to increase the average loan size overtime. Others (e. g. Christen 
1997; Christen et al 1995; Gulli 1998) also argue that this trade-off could be avoided 
by the use of well-designed lending technology. Balkenhol (2005) and the latest 
survey data from the MicroBanking Bulletin (2007) suggest that there is not clear 
evidence to support the proposition of an inverse relationship between reaching the 
poor and financial self-sufficiency; however there is still an ongoing debate on this 
issue. 
The ability to achieve financial self-sufficiency has also been linked to the type of 
lending technology, i. e. solidarity groups, village banking, or individual lending as 
well as to the approach embraced by the organisation, e. g. a minimalistic credit-only 
versus a holistic credit-plus approach (Hulme and Mosley 1996). We are particularly 
interested in examining the potential links between poverty impacts and lending 
technology, taking into account the transaction costs for the borrower. We discuss 
this issue in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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2.2.2 Beyond financial self-sufficiency and outreach 
Although achieving financial self-sufficiency and great outreach amongst the poor 
has its own merit, it neither directly translates into positive impacts nor provides 
information on the interaction between credit programmes and other indigenous 
agents operating in credit markets. For example, Mayoux (1999; 2000) has reported 
marginal women impacts from credit programmes with good records in terms of 
outreach and financial self-sufficiency, and in some cases, women actually ended up 
disempowered. From the beginning of the expansion of microfinance, sceptics (e. g. 
Wood and Sharif 1997; Rahman 1999) have questioned the effectiveness of 
microfinance as an instrument of poverty reduction, given that investment 
opportunities for the poor are usually exhausted after a short period of time, and the 
scope for further expansions is therefore very limited. The assumption of financial 
self-sufficiency, as a precondition for a sustainable financial system, can be also 
questioned, as discussed earlier in section 2.1, on the grounds of informational 
asymmetries that cause credit rationing in fragmented credit markets (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981). 
But even non self-sufficient credit programmes that reach the poor could potentially 
generate social benefits that could exceed the costs of programme subsidisation 
(Hulme and Mosley 1996). Morduch (2000) has also pointed out that too much 
emphasis on financial sustainability could compromise long-run development 
patterns, by pushing borrowers into activities with high profit margins that facilitate 
loan repayment, but produce low added value. Furthermore, organisations that 
achieve financial self-sufficiency and report a great outreach may still report 
insignificant poverty impacts due to e. g. high transaction costs to the borrower 
coming from rigid screening and monitoring devices such as periodical repayment 
schedules. 
Although microfinance institutions have become one of the preferred subsidy- 
recipients of donors and governmental agencies, the hypothesis that they achieve 
impacts on poverty reduction and well-being has not been adequately tested in 
most of the cases, particularly in the urban context where our study was conducted, 
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with a few exceptions in rural credit markets (see e. g. Hulme and Mosley 1996; Pitt 
and Khandker 1998a and 1998b, and Coleman 1999, see also the reviews by 
Morduch and Haley 2002; Goldberg 2005, and Weiss et al 2003). In our view, it is 
essential to examine the impacts of microfinance on various dimensions, but linking 
the analysis to the supply side, through the analysis of e. g. the screening, incentive 
and enforcement devices that are exploited by credit programmes, and the 
transaction costs that such devices cause to the borrower. In this way, we believe 
impact analyses can be beneficial for both the lender and borrower. 
However, in order to test the hypothesis of positive impacts of credit, we need to 
answer first the following questions: what methodological problems do threaten the 
internal validity of impacts studies? and how can we control for such constraints? 
We devote Chapter 6 to answer these questions, where we propose a 
methodological research strategy designed to control for the problems of selection 
bias; non-random programme placement; attribution, and fungibility. 
Due to analytical complexities, impact studies that control for these potential 
methodological problems remain limited to a very few cases, and largely 
concentrated in the rural context. Most of these studies look at the micro-level, i. e. 
individuals, enterprises and households (see e. g. Remenyi and Quinones (2000) for 
empirical evidence reported from several impact studies conducted in 11 countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region), although some attempts have been made to examine the 
impacts of microfinance at the macro-level (see e. g. Marconi and Mosley 2006). 
Zeller and Meyer (2002) have recently pointed out that the empirical evidence of 
poverty impacts of microfinance remains inconclusive and often methodologically 
contested. Nonetheless, credit is more likely to report significant increases in 
welfare when basic infrastructure and access to inputs and local markets is available 
(Sharma 2000). Since the scope of our research primarily focuses at the household 
level we concentrate in the following section on empirical studies that are based on 
micro data. 
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2.3 Empirical evidence of the impact of microfinance at the micro-level 
Sebstad and Chen (1996) have reviewed more than 30 impact reports, most of them 
of a descriptive nature that suffer from selection bias. For example, MkNelly and 
Watertip (1993) report evidence from a study in rural Thailand that use as control 
groups, households living in villages that do not have access to credit. This 
methodological approach suffers from problems of self-selection and programme 
placement that can potentially bias the results. Similarly, the study conducted in 
Guatemala by Wydick (1995) has not paid sufficient attention to the problems of 
selection bias, reducing the internal validity of the study. Amongst other studies 
suffering from methodological problems are Hossain (1988); Barnes et al (1998), 
Mustafa et al (1996), and some of the impact evaluations sponsored by the USAID, 
using the Assessing the Impacts of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) methodological 
toolS13. 
For example, Copestake et al (2001) interview borrowers from the Peri-Urban 
Lusaka Small Enterprise Project (PULSE) operating in Zambia, and as control 
groups, borrowers that had just joined a credit programme by the time the study 
was conducted. Although the authors were able to control for self-selection, they 
may still encounter problems coming from unobservable factors related to non- 
programme placement. Disappointedly, no hypothesis testing was conducted for 
the underlining assumption of no-selectivity. The authors, however, combined 
quantitative data with qualitative questioning to strengthen the validity of the 
findings. The authors report, similarly to our findings reported in Chapter 7, a 
negative relationship between the rigidity of group lending methodologies and 
poverty impacts. 
In most quantitative impact studies, a positive change in income or consumption 
expenditure amongst the poor is used as an indicator of poverty reduction although 
other indicators such as asset accumulation, children schooling and labour intensity 
are used as proxies of household well-being. For example, the Pitt and Khandker 
(1998a; 1998b) study is perhaps the first attempt to systematically control for the 
problems of selection bias and non-random programme placement, through the 
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design of a quasi-experiment, in which interviews were conducted with borrowers 
and non-borrowers from the same village, and randomly selected households from 
villages without accessibility to a credit programme. In the econometric estimation 
procedure, the authors employ a village fixed effects estimation procedure to 
control for unobserved differences between villages, and using as a proxy of 
programme eligibility, an upper limit of land-holding. 
Notice that this methodological approach is more likely to work in the rural context 
where land-holding is a reliable indicator of well-being; however, most credit 
programmes, in particular those operating in the urban context, do not use land as 
eligibility criteria, making difficult to replicate this approach. In the subsections to 
follow, we review the existing empirical evidence of the impact of programme 
participation on poverty, well-being; women; labour and vulnerability. 
2.3.1 Impacts on poverty and well-being 
Pitt and Khandker use household expenditure to estimate the effects of credit on 
poverty reduction. In the study, which includes three major credit programmes in 
Bangladesh (Grameen Bank; Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAG), 
and Rural Development RD-12 Programme of the Bangladesh Rural Development 
Board), Pitt and Khandker report significant and higher impacts from female 
borrowers than from male borrowers. They found that households headed by 
women had a higher propensity to participate in a credit programmes relative to 
households headed by men. Khandker et al (1998) also report positive credit impacts 
on income, production and employment amongst rural households engaged in non- 
farming activities. Using the same data, Morduch (1998) has challenged the Pitt and 
Khandker results on the grounds of the instrument used to separate the poor from 
the non-poor, although he confirms significant and positive effects on consumption- 
smoothing across seasons that could potentially reduce household vulnerability. 
More recently, Pitt et al (2003) have reported that credit to women (unlike to men) 
has a large and statistically significant impact on two out of three measures of 
children health status in Bangladesh: arm circumference and height for the 
13 For a critic of the AIMS tools, see Alexander-Tedeschi and Karlan (2006) 
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corresponding age for both girls and boys. They did not find though evidence of 
significant impacts on the Body Mass Index. In a similar way, Marcus et al (1999) 
report from a study in Mali, Vietnam and Honduras, positive impacts of credit, 
particularly on children's well-being, by reducing the propensity of children to 
work. 
In the context of rural Bangladesh, but using a sample survey collected from 
programme participants at the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) and 
BRAC, Zeller et al (2001) found significant and strong impacts of credit on income; 
health status; children's education, and on the quantity and quality of food 
consumption. In the econometric estimation procedure, the authors measure not 
only the impact of the actual levels of borrowing, as it is done by Pitt and Khandker 
(1998a; 1998b) and Khandker et al (1998), but also the impact of the accessibility to 
credit, even if a household is not currently borrowing from the credit programme. 
They found significant effects on a decrease in distress sales, and an increase in risk- 
bearing capacity. 
In perhaps one of the most influential impact studies, Hulme and Mosley (1996) 
surveyed two types of households participating in 12 microfinance organisations 
and operating in 7 developing countries, to estimate poverty impacts: 1) households 
actively borrowing from credit programmes, as treatment groups, 2) households 
that were accepted by the lender (or group) but still waiting to receive the first loan, 
as control groups. By following this approach, the authors assumed to control for 
the self-selection problem (but not the programme placement problem), although no 
hypothesis testing was conducted to confirm this assumption. The study reports 
that credit programmes were more likely to achieve positive and significant poverty 
impacts amongst households loser to, and above the poverty line, with the poorest 
being more likely to report insignificant and even negative effects from borrowing. 
This was in part, Hulme and Mosley argue, due to low human and physical capital 
endowments, as well as risk-averse behaviour that restricted the poorest from 
taking advantage of business opportunities that could potentially yield high returns. 
These results are confirmed by Mosley (2001) in another study that follows a similar 
methodological approach, involving 4 credit programmes operating in Bolivia. 
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Mosley reports positive impacts on income and household assets, although 
negatively correlating with low-risk investments, particularly amongst the poorest, 
and because poorer households are highly restricted in their coping strategies, 
microfinance is argued to augment poor households vulnerability. 
Coleman (1999) has proposed an alternative methodological approach to control for 
selection bias and non-programme random placement in the context of rural 
Thailand, by sampling households members and non-members of credit 
programmes four times over a period of one year. The author uses as control groups 
villages that were about to receive support from a credit programme, allowing 
households to self-select, and employs a village fixed effects estimation procedure to 
control for potential problems of endogeneity. In the study, Coleman finds no 
evidence of positive effects from programme participation, challenging the 
widespread proposition of positive impacts from microfinance. 
The highly time-demanding methodological approach as well as the need for prior 
and detailed information from credit programmes, in terms of future geographical 
expansions, restricts the replication of the Coleman's study in other countries, 
particularly in the context of urban markets, where organisations usually exhaust 
large local markets before exploring other areas. 
Other empirical studies have also reported insignificant poverty impacts from 
microfinance. For example, Diagne and Zeller (2001) report in the context of rural 
credit markets in Malawi, a negative impact (although statistically insignificant) of 
credit on household welfare measured by net crop income; food security and 
nutritional status. They argue that this is in part due to an ineffective institutional 
design that fails to include important determinants of credit coming from external 
factors such as seasonality. 
2.3.2 Impacts on women 
Many credit programmes target women under the assumption that women are 
more reliable borrowers than men. This could help; it is argued, to achieve the 
objective of financial self-sufficiency (Morduch 1999; Hulme and Mosley 1996). 
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Some scholars (see e. g. Amin et al 1998) suggest that by improving women's social 
interaction and networking, credit programme participation has become an effective 
mechanism to empower women and change gender relations in traditional societies. 
Pitt and Khandker (1998b) have also reported significant effects of targeting women 
on non-land assets accumulation; calories intake for both girls and boys, and 
children schooling (especially for boys), although they report no significant effects 
on labour supply. In the same way, Schuler and Hashemi (1994) find significant 
impacts of credit on the use of contraceptive methods as a proxy of women's 
empowerment, although Khandker (1998) report a decline in this practice. 
In contrast, Goetz and Gupta (1996) and Hashemi et al (1996) point out that although 
women may receive loans, men are actually in control of investment decisions, and 
this situation could potentially cause adverse effects such as intra-household 
violence. Goetz and Gupta, and also Osmani (1998), and Rahman (1999) also argue 
that many credit programmes are de facto exploiting the disadvantage position of 
women in traditional socio-cultural environments to reduce the enforcement 
problem in the process of lending. In Bangladesh, for instance, the patriarchal 
system or purdah14 interacts in a way that confines women to the homestead or to the 
area immediately surrounding, and the contacts they have with the world outside of 
the family are extremely limited. 
It appears, as pointed out by Kabeer (2001) that the primary source of controversy 
amongst gender studies comes from important differences in the analytical 
frameworks employed in the examination of intra-household power relations. In 
our view, intra-household relations should be seen in the context of a cooperative 
process of resource allocation, where family members dynamically interact to 
achieve the best possible outcome, in the form of a Nash equilibrium (McElroy and 
Homey 1981). Clearly, the socio-cultural environment is an important determinant 
that should be included in the analysis, but only in exceptional circumstances e. g. 
imminent divorce or intra-household violence, the cooperative equilibrium can be 
threatened (see e. g. Manser and Brown 1980, and Lundberg and Pollak (1993). 
However, since we are primarily interested in examining the impacts of credit at the 
14 Purdah is the practice of secluding and protecting women to uphold social standards of modesty 
and morality. 
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household level, the analysis of gender relations and women's empowerment is 
beyond the scope of this study's. 
2.3.3 Impacts on labour 
The effects of credit on labour largely depend on the degree of technology and 
physical capital endowments involved in the production function. Pitt and 
Khandker (1998a) have actually pointed out that microfinance is unlikely to increase 
the level of capital intensity, at least in the short-run. Thus, if technology remains 
constant, then an overall increase in production, after an injection of capital from a 
microcredit, could lead to an increase in labour intensity. 
Khandker et al (1998) for example, report an increase in self-employment in rural 
markets in Bangladesh as a direct effect from programme participation, although 
they also find a reduction in waged employment. Wages remained unchanged, they 
argue, due to an excess supply of unemployed labourers that rapidly fill the gaps in 
the market. Many poor households are actually engaged in rudimentary income- 
generating activities that are labour intensive, and rarely involve workers outside 
the householdl6. 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) argue that this is because at low levels of income, 
enterprising households can only afford to hire unskilled and malnourished 
labourers with very low productivity. Informational constraints may also increase the 
cost of efficiency labour due to the lack of information about labourers' skills, 
behaviour or moral integrity. In the end, the enterprising household may simply 
decide to self-employ. However, if the supply of labour from household members 
reaches a maximum, then employment generation, in the form of labour-hiring, could 
be observed (see Chapter 5 for a theoretical discussion). Khandker (2005), for 
instance, reports that at the village level, the access to credit will have larger impacts 
15 It is important to draw attention to the fact that, unlike many rural traditional societies, women in 
urban Mexico actively participate in income generating activities, although in waged labour markets 
their participation (43%) is lower vis-ä-vis men (83%) (World Bank 2006). Consequently, self- 
employment has become, especially for women, as a fundamental source of household income. In 
fact, to go shopping to local markets in the metropolitan area of Mexico City means to buy, very 
often, from enterprising women. 
16 For a theoretical discussion on this issue see Chapter 5 
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on extreme poverty than on moderate poverty, given the spillover effects observed 
through labour markets. Mosley and Rock (2004) also report indirect impacts of credit 
on poor labourers who are hired by enterprising households borrowing from credit 
programmes operating in Africa, and since many of those households enjoyed 
income levels beyond the poverty line, the results show that targeting at the poorest 
may actually diminish the potential indirect poverty impacts from microfinance (see 
also Chapter 8 for a similar conclusion). 
2.3.4 Impacts on vulnerability 
Zaman (1999) has examined the effects of credit on consumption smoothing, asset 
accumulation and the use of loans in emergency situations as proxies of 
vulnerability in the context of Bangladesh. The study concludes that credit 
programmes are more likely to achieve a positive impact on vulnerability than on 
poverty reduction, although with a cross-sectional data survey, the study remains 
limited in the findings. However, when panel data is available, then the effects of 
credit on household vulnerability can be appropriately analysed. 
For example, Khandker (2005) has used data collected in 1991/92 and 1998/98 in 
rural Bangladesh to measure the long-term effects of credit on poverty, and 
aggregate impacts beyond participation. Khandker finds significant and positive 
impacts on consumption per capita (mainly on non-food items) that increase the 
probability for programme participants of getting out of poverty. Spillover effects 
were also found at the village level, where the poorest were more likely to be 
benefited from programme participation, perhaps through the labour markets. 
In contrast to Khandker's results, Amin et al (2003) have used a panel dataset 
collected from rural villages in Northern Bangladesh to find that although credit 
programmes achieve outreach amongst the poor, they often fail to reach the 
vulnerable poor that are more likely to suffer from idiosyncratic risks and external 
shocks, questioning the ability of microfinance as an antipoverty strategy. Although 
panel data offers important comparative advantages for econometric modelling, it 
remains highly restricted to a very small number of databases in the developing 
world. 
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Table 2.2 Selected impact studies in microfinance 
Outcomes of interest 
Demographic and 
Authors 
(dependent variables) 
geographical Main findings 
coverage 
Significant increases in profits and household incomes. 
Copestake Profitability; business Semi-urban areas in 
However, qualitative evidence revealed some 
et al (2001) 
diversification and Zambia borrowers made worse off as a result of the rigidity of household income screening and enforcement devices used by group 
lending programmes. 
Consumption 
Pitt and expenditure; Significant and higher impacts from female than male 
Khandker children's schooling Mainly rural areas in borrowers on household expenditure; boy's education, 
(1998a; and calories intake; Bangladesh and propensity to borrow. Male borrowers reported 
1998b) non-land assets, and higher impacts on labour supply. 
labour supply 
Khandker Household income; Non-farming rural Significant impacts on income per capita, production 
et al (1998) production and 
households in and employment amongst rural households engaged in 
employment Bangladesh non-farming activities 
Pitt et al 
Arm circumference 
and height of boys 
Credit to women has a large and significant impact on 
(2003) and girls as a proxy of 
Rural Bangladesh children health status, although insignificant impact on 
human capital 
the Body Mass hex 
Marcus et Child labour 
Rural areas in Mali, 
Vietnam and 
Significant and negative effects on the propensity for 
al (1999) Honduras children to work 
Income per capita, Significant and positive effects on household income; 
Zeller et al health status; 
' Rural 
Bangladesh 
health status; children's education and quality of food 
(2001) children s schooling intake. Also significant impacts on risk-bearing 
and calorie intake capacity. 
Rural and urban areas 
Significant effects on lowering monopolistic interest 
Hahne and 
Household income; in Bolivia Indonesia, rate 
from moneylenders. Positive effects on 
Mosley employment; poverty 
, India, Bangladesh, Sri employment and technology 
but varying according to 
(1996) reduction; Lanka, Kenya and 
income groups. Material and income poverty was 
vulnerability Malawi reduced although credit did not report significant 
effects on vulnerability. 
Mosley Household income Rural and semi-urban 
Significant and positive impacts on income and 
household assets, although negatively correlated with (2001) and assets areas of Bolivia the severity of poverty due to low-risk investments 
]Physical assets, Insignificant impacts on most of the dependent 
Coleman savings, debt, 
production, sales, Rural Thailand 
variables, except women's high interest debt; and 
(1999) 
expenses, labour, 
household medical expenses, in particular made for 
health and education men 
Diagne and Net crop income; food Negative although insignificant impacts on household 
Zeller security and Rural Malawi well-being due to ineffective institutional design that 
(2001) nutritional status fails to reduce the effects of seasonality. 
Khandker Household income At the village level, larger and significant impacts on 
(2003) and labour 
Rural Bangladesh extreme poverty than on moderate poverty, due to spill- 
over effects through labour markets. 
Rock and Household income, 
Rural areas in Kenya, 
Cameroon, Uganda, Significant impacts on poverty reduction on both Mosley labour expenditure, Zimbabwe, borrowers and low-income labourers (2004) education and health South Africa 
Consumption Credit is more likely to report positive impacts on Zaman 
(1999) 
expenditure, asset 
accumulation and the 
Rural Bangladesh vulnerability than on poverty reduction, through the 
use of loans 
use of loans in emergency situations 
With the use of panel data, it was reported positive and 
Khandker Consumption significant 
impacts on consumption per capita on non- 
(2005) expenditure, and Rural Bangladesh food items and spill-over effects at the village level labour being the poorest more likely to benefit, through labour 
markets, from programme intervention 
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
Although most of the empirical evidence discussed above, and which is 
summarised in table 2.2, leads to positive effects on households' well-being, the 
magnitude and significance of these effects remains inconclusive and often 
methodologically contested. Some of the research gaps that we identified in most of 
the impact studies are related to the strong theoretical assumption that the demand 
for credit is rationed by the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The validity of this 
assumption appears to be true, at least from an institutional point of view (see e. g. 
Eswaran and Kotwal 1989; and Braverman and Stiglitz, 1989) although the extent of 
the rationing may be less than what has been conventionally assumed, particularly 
when informal agents such moneylenders and rotating savings and credit 
associations actively compete in fragmented credit markets (see e. g. Kochar 1997 in 
the context of India). 
Surprisingly, very few attempts have been made to control for the potential effects 
of these indigenous agents in impact analysis (see Diagne and Zeller 2001 for an 
exceptional case). For that reason, and in attempt to fill this research gap, we include 
in the econometric estimation equation derived in Chapters 7 and 8, a vector of 
credit market characteristics, li , that controls 
for the effects of informal credit 
agents on the outcomes of interest. Additionally, we have analysed narrative 
evidence obtained from qualitative questioning to explore the reasons of using such 
informal mechanisms of funding when having access to credit from microfinance 
organisations. 
To our knowledge, there are very few attempts to examine the impacts of 
microfinance looking at different lending models (see e. g. Hulme and Mosley 1996 
for an exceptional case). This is particularly relevant under the theoretical 
assumption that the informational costs, substantially reduced by the use of 
screening, incentive and enforcement devices, are passed onto the borrower (Stiglitz 
1990). If for example, solidarity groups or village banking methodologies exacerbate 
the utility cost of borrowing, then the magnitude of the poverty impacts could be 
diminished. In order to investigate this issue, we have included in our impact study 
three organisations employing different lending technologies, but operating in 
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urban settlements with similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics. 
These organisations are: 1) Community Financial Services or Servicios Financieros 
Comunitarios, in Spanish (Fincomun) employing a minimalistic credit-only 
individual lending approach; 2) the Centre for the Assistance of the 
Microenterpreneur or Centro de Apoyo al Microempresario in Spanish (CAME) 
employing a minimalistic credit-only village banking approach, and 3) Programs for 
Women or Programas para la Mujer in Spanish (Promujer) employing a holistic 
credit-plus village banking approach that combines credit with training17. 
Perhaps the influential ability of some pioneering microfinance organisations to 
attract the interest of the international community has also contributed to the high 
concentration of impact studies that focus on a small number of countries, following 
methodological approaches that work in the rural context. This situation has made it 
very difficult to replicate these studies in the urban context, where many 
microfinance organisations actually operate. This is particularly important for 
Mexico and most of the Latin American countries, since 60% of the poor in the 
region (about 113 million people) live in urban settlements, and it is estimated that 
this proportion will increase up to two-thirds by 2015 (Fay 2005). 
For that reason, we propose a research methodology specifically designed to work 
in deprived and densely populated urban areas to address the potential 
endogeneity problems in impact evaluations. This research strategy (which is 
presented in Chapter 6) can be easily replicated by other microfinance organisations. 
We follow in Chapter 7 an appropriate econometric estimation procedure in order 
to test for the underlying assumptions of no selectivity bias. In the following 
Chapter 3, we analyse the characteristics of credit markets and the microfinance 
sector as a whole in the context of Mexico. 
17 In Chapter 6 we discuss in detail the institutional characteristics of these organisations. 
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Chapter 3 
Credit markets and financial 
institutions in Mexico 
Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss the characteristics of credit markets in Mexico, looking at 
recent institutional reforms that have moved the system from a framework of 
financial repression to another of financial liberalisation, into which the 
microfinance industry has been incorporated. Since the mid 1950s until early 1980s, 
financial policies were characterised by subsidised credit schemes that targeted at 
strategic sectors such as agriculture and large-scale industries. Under that direct credit 
paradigm (see e. g. Vogel and Adams 1997) development banks such as the National 
Bank for Rural Credit (Banrural); the National Development Bank (Nafin); and the 
National Bank for International Trade (Bancomext) were the main instruments of 
state interventions in credit markets. These policies created heavy fiscal outlays, 
estimated only for the agricultural sector in the order of US $28.5 billion in the 
period 1983-1992, that represented, on annual basis, 13% of agricultural Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 81% of which (about US $23 billion) was associated with 
subsidised interest rates (World Bank 2002). 
After the oil price crisis of 1982, the overall framework of financial intermediation 
began to move towards a more marked-based system. But it was not until the 1990s 
that the system began to transform into a free-market system. These reforms, which 
are analysed in section 3.1, included the privatisation of the banking sector, which 
had been nationalised in the 1980s; the elimination of price controls and subsidies; 
the liberalisation of interest rates and, in general, the abolition of financial 
repression. Later in sections 3.1.4,3.1.5 and 3.1.6 we discuss the immediate 
consequences of the financial liberalisation policies and the reforms that followed 
after the peso crisis of December of 1994. 
Section 3.2 analyses the structure of the non-banking sector that operates under a 
new legal framework (the Popular Savings and Credit Law), and which includes 
organisations such as savings and credit co-operatives and popular financial 
associations. These organisations potentially represent the main institutional 
competitors of microfinance organisations. It is in that particular context that we 
discuss in section 3.3 the process in which the microfinance industry has been 
incorporated into a wider framework of financial intermediation, paying particular 
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attention to characteristics of the market where these organisations operate, and the 
external factors that have contributed to the expansion of the system. Finally, section 
3.4 concludes. 
3.1 Historical background of the Mexican financial system 
The process of integrating what we refer here to as the Mexican Financial System 
goes back to 1925, a few years after the end of the Mexican Revolution, when a new 
law was passed by the Congress to establish the foundations of the actual financial 
system, which is integrated by the following institutions: 1) Banco de Mexico 
(Central Bank of Mexico); 2) commercial banks; 3) auxiliary financial institutions 
(e. g. insurance companies, warehouses, and financieras, investment banks that 
captured long-term savings), and 4) development banks (Ortiz-Mena 1947). 
The system began to be heavily and increasingly regulated between the 1930s and 
1970s, especially during the implementation of the Import Substitution 
Industrialisation model that was put into practice from 1956 to late 1970s. The 
Mexican government employed three instruments to control the system: 1) legal 
reserve requirements; 2) direct credit to strategic sectors, and 3) lending at interest 
rates that were fixed by the government. The stock market played a very limited 
role in the system, and monetary policies were carried out through public sector 
financing and fluctuations in reserve requirements. The principles of imposing such 
requirements were generally accepted by academics and policy makers as a 
precondition to develop regions and strategic sectors. Leopoldo Solis, an influential 
economist during that period summarised this view as follows: 
Some economic sectors that had not been considered attractive credit risks, despite 
being key sectors for development, can now obtain credit through the mediation of the 
monetary authorities, who have resorted to diverse mechanisms in order to facilitate 
their access to credit. The natural resistance of the commercial banking sector, which 
normally wants to invest in activities that constitute a low risk or of which it has 
previous knowledge, has thus been overcome (Solis 1971: 8). 
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Despite of the apparent financial repression, the system continued operating during 
the period of Stabilising Development (or Desarrollo Estabilizador), in part due to low 
levels of public sector dependency on monetary financing (Gonzalez-Anaya and 
Marrufo 2001). However, during the 1970s and after a series of legal reforms, banks 
were allowed to increase their range of operations with the aim of developing the 
capital and money markets. But in times of increasing inflation, this policy increased 
the vulnerability of the financial sector to external shocks, which became clear 
during the oil-prices crisis of 1982. 
As Gruben and McComb (1997) have pointed out, the deficit of the public sector 
reduced the margins to regulate the quantity of money, and a fixed exchange rate, 
with high levels of inflation, put pressure on the real exchange rate and the balance 
of payments. And because interest rates were not market-based, a significant capital 
outflow was registered. The process ended in September 1,1982 when President 
Lopez-Portillo announced the nationalisation of the banking system. The crisis of 
1982 was the first collapse of the economy since 1932. 
3.1.1 The nationalisation of the banking system 
Thus, Mexico became a classical case of financial repression: forcing banks to lend to 
the government, keeping interest rate ceilings, and dictating lending quotas to 
specific economic sectors that crowded out private investment (see Adams et al 
1984; Vogel and Adams 1997, and Von Pischke et al 1983, for a critic). The heavy 
reserve requirements on lending were reflected on more than 60 percent of the net 
banking credit going to the government by the end of 1986 (OECD 1992). 
In order to enforce the nationalisation of the banking system, President Lopez- 
Portillo issued a law as a constitutional mandate, and which was passed by the 
Congress, that included banking institutions as part of the nation's assets, although 
the system was suffering from instability in the exchange rate as a direct effect of the 
falling international oil prices. After a restructuring and capitalisation process, only 
18 out of the existing 58 banks remained in the system by the end of 1990 (Banco de 
Mexico 1992). 
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3.1.2 Financial liberalisation in the 1980s 
A critical move towards financial liberalisation, after President de la Madrid took 
office in the end of 1982, was the government's decision to increase the non-banking 
intermediation. The new government began to sell brokerage houses, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions, although leaving the newly nationalised 
banks intact, given the constitutional veto. In fact, the assets of financial institutions 
in relation to the assets of the financial system as a whole increased from 9.1 percent 
in 1982 to 32.1 percent in 1988 (Gruben and McComb 1997). That decision was the 
first step to end financial repression. Another crucial decision was to join the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, which put pressure on the 
government to initiate reforms to remove trade and investment barriers that led to 
the complete liberalisation of the banking system in the early 1990s (WTO 2002). 
Furthermore, a rapid development of securities markets in the country that was 
aimed to create a market for government's debt separated from the banking system, 
and which was reflected in the increasing volume of short-term government debt 
certificates or Cetes, relative to the US Treasury Bills, also contributed to the process 
of financial liberalisation. Cetes began to be issued in 1978, but it was not until the 
de la Madrid administration that these instruments became a major source of 
funding for the government. By the late 1980s, the money market became liquid, 
and in the early 1990s, the government no longer financially depended on banking 
institutions (Banco de Mexico 1992). 
Aspe (1993) has actually pointed out that the period 1988-89 was crucial for the 
process of financial liberalisation in Mexico. In that period, important policies were 
put in place; for example, the freeing of interest rates, the elimination of priority 
lending quotas, and the removal of both reserve requirements and liquidity 
coefficients. The role of development banking institutions also changed. For 
example, whilst in 1987 Nacional Financiera, the largest development bank in Mexico, 
allocated 94 percent of its credit portfolio to large-scale and state-owned enterprises, 
in 1991 the institution allocated to that sector only 6 percent of the total loan 
portfolio. 
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3.1.3 The privatisation of the banking system 
By the beginning of 1990s, and under the administration of President Salinas de 
Gortari, the Mexican Congress amended the Constitution to allow the privatisation 
of the banking system. The new law organised the system into a model of universal 
banking, which is common in Europe and Japan, but prohibited in the United States. 
In this model, a single financial group controls a bank, and insurance company, a 
brokerage house, a leasing company, a factoring company, a mutual funds 
management company, a currency exchange broker, and a warehousing company 
(see Canals 1997 for a discussion). 
The Mexican government sold 18 banks in fourteen months, from June 1991 to July 
1992, at a price 3.49 times the book value. Lopez de Silares and Zamarripa (1995) 
suggest that high prices were paid for the very limited competition in the market. In 
fact, the market was highly concentrated: three banking institutions controlled 60% 
of the overall market. Furthermore, the net returns on assets from Mexican banks 
were in the order of 1.45 percent, vis-ä-vis 0.91 percent from US banks. 
However, despite of the increasing ability to attract funds and generate profits, low 
efficiency persisted in the system. Gruben and McComb (1996) have reported that in 
the end of 1991, the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets was in the order of 5.3 
percent in Mexico compared with 3.6 percent in the United States. Moreover, the 
new banks showed no interest in improving the depth and coverage of the system. 
In 1991 Mexico had one bank branch per 18,000 inhabitants, and this figure slightly 
improved to 7760 inhabitants by the end of 2004. However, the penetration of the 
banking system remains very low relative to the progress reported in other 
countries. In fact, whilst about 75% of the payments in countries such as the US, 
Canada and France are made by means of cheques and credit cards, and 55% in the 
United Kingdom and Germany are made by electronic transfers, in Mexico 86% are 
made in cash (see table 3.1). 
Gelos and Werner (1999) have pointed out that given the obsolete lending 
technology during the process of financial liberalisation, the banking system made 
use of collateral as the main screening and enforcement devices to ensure loan 
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repayment, which reduced the ability of microenterprises and low-income 
households to access institutional financing. Gruben and McComb (1997) have 
shown that in particular this factor helps to explain the low degree of financial 
penetration in Mexico, measured by M4 as a percentage of the GDPI. By 1992, this 
percentage was in the order of 46.1 percent, relative to 97 percent in Canada, 93 
percent in the US and 71 percent in Italy. 
Before the privatisation of the banking system, the only foreign bank operating as a 
deposit taking and lending institution was Citibank However, in 1994, new banking 
regulations were introduced after Canada, the US and Mexico launched the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), allowing foreign-owned banks to 
operate in Mexico. The NAFTA put pressure on the domestic financial system that 
in combination of other structural factors triggered the peso crisis of 1994. We 
discuss these factors in the following sections. 
3.1.4 The prelude of the peso crisis of 1994 
As part of the efforts to reduce the hyperinflation of the 1980s, the government 
decided to follow an inflation stabilisation policy that was complemented with a 
crawling-peg regime, in which the depreciation of the peso against the dollar was 
lower than the differential between the two countries' inflation rates (see e. g. Aspe 
1993 and Gil-Diaz 1998). The consequences of such policies began to be evident, as 
pointed out by Gruben and McComb (1997), with an increasing real exchange rate 
that together with the opening up to international trade, discouraged producers of 
tradeable goods, that began to face foreign competition, from raising domestic 
prices. However, when those sectors with little foreign competition such as services, 
real state and construction-related industries raised their prices, they imposed a 
pressure between costs and selling prices of tradeable-goods producers in particular 
the manufacturing sector. 
The exchange rate policy had an impact on the Current Account of the Balance of 
Payments, and in order to maintain the levels of international reserves that 
I M4 is measured here as currency, checking accounts and other short-term deposits, 
bankers' acceptance, long-term bank deposits and government bonds held by the public. 
42 
supported the appreciation of the exchange rate, the central bank held the interest 
rates high enough to generate capital inflows to offset the outflows from increasing 
imports. But high real interest rates put a lot of pressure on domestic producers that 
had been borrowing from the newly privatised and inexperienced banks. There is 
strong evidence to suggest that after the privatisation of the banking system, credit 
institutions began to expand consumer credit despite the limited information on the 
creditworthiness of applicants. In fact, over the period 1991-1994, loan portfolio 
grew at an annual average rate of 23.7 percent, more than eight times the annual 
average rate of real GDP (Kalter and Ribas 1999). 
Furthermore, loans to the private sector were given under weak regulatory and 
supervisory standards2, and deficient screening and monitoring devices, which in a 
period of high expectations about the economy, made difficult to deal with the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems (see. e. g. Hausmann and Gavin 1995; 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al 1996; McKinnon and Pill 1996). This effect was observed 
afterwards in the portfolio of loans in arrears that jumped from 2% in 1990 to 8.7% 
in the end of 1994, just before the crisis began (see figure 3.1). 
Regarding the regulatory and supervisory standards, important problems emerged 
from the existing universal banking model, which surprisingly did not require 
consolidated accounting reports until 1995, making it difficult to establish limits on 
self-lending within financial groups. Additionally, regulations did not impose risk- 
sharing mechanisms to control the moral hazard problem. For example, banks' 
shareholders were allowed to retain equity interests after a merger or acquisition, 
and savings and other assets from the public were protected by a guarantee 
provided by the government in case of bankruptcy. The problem was that no limits 
on the value of such assets were dearly defined, and the government ended up 
protecting bankers and shareholders' assets, exacerbating the moral hazard problem 
(see e. g. Hufbauer and Schott 2005, and Lopez de Salines and Zamarripa 1995)3. 
2 Financial regulation and supervisory activities were based on 6 laws that controlled capital 
requirements and valuation, accounting and provision practices: 1) The Law of Credit 
Institutions; 2) the Law of Insurance Institutions; 3) The Law of Leasing Institutions; the Law 
of Auxiliary Credit Institutions; 5) the Law of the Stock Market, and 6) the Investment 
Banking Law. For further details, see DOF (1995). 
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Figure 3.1 Loan in arrears as a% of loan portfolio 
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3.1.4.1 Non-economic factors 
As discussed earlier, during the Salinas administration, the rationalisation of the 
Mexico's fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, together with high real interest rates 
relative to the rates in the United States, precipitated large inflows of foreign capital 
into the country. The government began to use the increasing reserves of foreign 
currency to back the appreciation of the peso. By the first quarter of 1994, foreign 
currency reserves were approaching US $30 billion, after having fallen below US $5 
billion in March 1990. 
International optimism about Mexico's policies was so high that when the Zapatista 
Army for National Liberation (or EZLN) occupied the town of San Cristobal de las 
Casas, in the southern state of Chiapas in January 1994, the markets although 
surprised by the event, continued pouring capital investment into the country. 
However, the euphoria for Mexico was coming to an end. The presidential election 
was going to take place in August 1994, but when the candidate of the official 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (or PRI in Spanish), Luis Donaldo Colosio, was 
assassinated in March, the killing triggered massive capital outflows. Foreign 
currency reserves fell from US $29.3 billion in February to US $16.5 billion in June 
(Banco de Mexico 1996). 
3 For a discussion of the inconsistencies of the regulatory system, see also Mackey (1999). 
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From June 1994, international reserves were reported with small fluctuations until 
October, when Carlos Francisco Ruiz Massieu, head of the official PRI was 
assassinated. International reserves began to fall rapidly from US $17.66 billion to 
12.88 billion by the end of November. After the election, and once the new 
administration came to office, the new Finance Secretary, Jaime Serra Puche, 
announced on December 20 that the peso would devalue from 3.47 pesos per dollar 
to 3.99. Serra Puche stated: "this was not a change in exchange rate regime, it was just an 
adjustment, and the crawling-peg regime would remain in place" (El Financiero, December 
21,1994). 
However, investors knew that the outstanding balance of tesobonos4 alone was in the 
order of US $28 billion, 17 billion of which were held by foreign mutual funds and 
other investors scheduled to mature in the first semester of 1995 (Wall street journal, 
13 January 1995). International reserves had not been that high for more than one 
month and market participants precipitated a run on the peso. Two days after, on 
December 22, the government announced that the peso would float. As a result, the 
peso was devalued by about 54 percent. Reserves fell from US $12.88 billion at the 
end of November to 6.27 billion by the end of December and to only 4.44 billion in 
the end of January 1995 (Banco de Mexico 1996). In that context, although the Peso 
crisis of December 1994 had a political trigger, it originated from financial 
disequilibria, including the maintenance of a fixed nominal exchange rate in the face 
of a boom in international transactions (see Gil-Diaz and Carstens 1996). 
3.1.5 The impact of the crisis on the financial system 
In order to reduce the inflationary pressures, the Central Bank of Mexico imposed 
restricting credit and monetary policies, having a significant impact on the credit 
markets. For example, interest rates on mortgages that had been in the order of 22 
percent in November 1994 raised up to 74 percent in early March 1995 whereas the 
interest rates on inter-bank loans jumped up to 114 percent. As a consequence, the 
rate of non-performing loans soared from an average rate of 8.7 in 1994 to 16.4% in 
4 Tesobonos were a Mexican government bond denominated in pesos, with coupons and 
principal indexed to US dollars in effect at issuance. 
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1995 and 21.4% in 1996 (Banco de Mexico 1996). These figures are reported using 
Mexican accounting standards. Using international accounting principles, the 
figures have been estimated as much as 10 percent higher (WTO 2002). 
With international support, Mexico was able to meet external obligations with 
investors and convert debt into long-term and more manageable debt. The Mexican 
financial rescue of 1995 actually represents the most extensive rescue ever 
undertaken by the international financial community. The US Treasurer made 
available a 20 billion dollar loan to Mexico through the Exchange Stabilization Fund, 
and Mexico's maximum drawings peaked at US $11.5 billion, all of which were paid 
by January 1997. 
The country's drawings under the standby agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) reached a maximum of US $13 billion in December 1995 
raising Mexico's total debt with the organisation to US$ 16 billion. Some advance 
repayments were made to reduce the outstanding balance to 8.4 billion in December 
1998. Separately, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank 
announced a credit line of 2.25 billion dollars to stabilise and strengthen the banking 
system in addition to another billion to support social sector programmes (see 
Maskooki 2002 for a detailed review of the rescue). 
Regarding the banking system, the Mexican government took steps forwards 
facilitating foreign investment in the system. In February 1995, a new law was 
passed by the Congress that allowed foreign banks to buy domestic institutions. 
This process contributed to increase the already highly concentrated market (see e. g. 
Gruben and McComb 1997). In 1994, the five largest banks in Mexico concentrated 
65 percent of the credit markets. By 2000, this percentage increased up to 76 percent. 
However, it has been estimated that this figure jumped to 82 percent after the 
largest Mexican-owned bank, National Bank of Mexico (Banamex), was acquired by 
the American Citicorp in 2001 (see IMF 2001 and Condusef 2004). 
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3.1.5.1 The rescue of the banking system 
In order to cope with the crisis in the banking system, the government designed a 
special re-capitalisation programme known as " PROCAPTE. Under PROCAPTE, 
troubled banks were allowed to raise capital by selling subordinated convertible 
debentures to the National Deposit Insurance Authority (FOBAPROA). The 
government set criteria to convert the debentures into equity, in cases of insolvency 
and poor management. These criteria transformed the government de facto into 
banks' shareholders. In March 1995, five banks received support from PROCAPTE 
and the value of convertible debentures reached 7 billion pesos (about 1.4 billion 
dollars) in May, although this amount was reduced to 3.2 billion pesos by the end of 
December, after some banks paid back the subordinated debt (see Banco de Mexico 
1996 and McQuerry 1999 for a detailed discussion). 
The Mexican government also introduced a programme, in which banks were 
allowed to transform past due private debt into a bond-like instrument known as 
UDIS (or Unidades de Inversion, in Spanish). An important characteristic of these 
instruments was that their nominal value was indexed to the inflation rate. In fact, 
the value of the UDIS reflected the movements in the Consumer Price Index, with a 
short lag (Banco de Mexico 1996). Consequently, once a credit was converted into 
UDIS, the value of both the principal and interest rate remained constant, in real 
terms. Although the programme was in a sense simply trade of two instruments, it 
spread the impact of currency losses over time. The plan permitted troubled banks 
to restructure short-term past due loans to a range of five to twelve years (see 
Gonzalez-Anaya and Marrufo 2001). Since 1995, FOBAPROA (today transformed by 
the Congress into the Institute for the Protection of Banks' Savings or IPAB) has 
purchased a large share of overdue loans in exchange of government certificates 
that represented in 2002 a fiscal cost of about 8.5 percent of the GDP (IPAB 2002). 
Although the international financial community initially linked the peso crisis of 
1994 to the oil crisis of 1982, important differences became evident. For example, the 
government rescued the troubled banks through the rescheduling and securitization 
of their loan portfolio, without nationalising the system; and with the agreement of 
the US Treasury, Mexico was also able, in contrast to the crisis of 1982, to return to 
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the international financial markets almost immediately. On 24 April 1995, for 
instance, Nafin was able to borrow US $170 million from a European bank at 6% 
points above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR), and by the end of that year, 
the Mexican government and its development banks had borrowed US $5 billion on 
the Eurobond market at maturities of 5 years (see Maskooki 2002). 
3.1.6 The impact of the crisis on the economy 
Although the devaluation of the Peso aggravated the crisis in the banking systems, it 
had a more positive effect on the exporting manufacturing sector. The devaluation 
increased the comparative advantage of large manufacturing enterprises that were 
already competing in international markets. However, the effects of the crisis 
severely hit the middle-income and low-income households that were engaged in 
domestic-market-related microenterprises and income-generating activities. With no 
funding from the banking system, and a collapsed local market with growing levels 
of unemployment, these enterprising households were forced to compete in an 
increasingly open market. 
Real GDP fell by more than 6 percent in 1995, and the rate of unemployment 
doubled to 7.4 percent. Average household income, measured in 1994 prices, fell 31 
percent between 1994 and 1996, and household consumption dropped 25 percent in 
the same period. Real wages in the manufacturing sector fell 13.5 percent in 1995 
and another 11 percent in 1996. By the end of 1996, real wages had fallen below 
levels of 1990 (Maskooki 2002). 
Baldacci et al (2002) have reported that the crisis hit urban households harder than 
rural communities, despite the fact that the incidence of poverty is higher in rural 
areas (see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on poverty in Mexico). The authors 
argue that this was because higher unemployment and soaring inflation had a 
stronger impact on the living conditions of the urban poor. The rural poor were less 
affected, partly because they had no links with the industrial and financial sectors, 
and were more dependent on self-production of food and other basic items. 
5 After reaching 40 percent of GDP in 1994 assets of the banking system amounted only to 24 
percent in 1999, a proportion lower than the international average of 52.6 percent. 
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Despite of the boom of credit flows to the private sector prior to the Peso crisis, 
loans actually went to the non-tradeable-goods sectors (Kalter and Ribas 1999). In 
fact, credits to tradeable-goods sectors fell from 55 percent of the total portfolio in 
1987 to 25 percent in 1994. The manufacturing sector, for example, represented 21 
percent of GDP in 1987 and accounted for more than 25 percent of the total 
outstanding loan portfolio. By the end of 1994, the contribution of manufacturing 
industries to the GDP remained at the same level but accounted for only 15 percent 
of the total loan portfolio. The credit to the private sector has remained hitherto very 
low, with levels just above 16%, in contrast with the levels reported in other 
countries that actively compete in the Mexican market, such as the US (249%) and 
Canada (69%) (see table 3.1). 
The high dependency of institutional lending on collateral also reduced the ability 
of microenterprises to access institutional financing (Gelos and Werner 1999). 
Moreover, real interest rates were much lower for the non-tradeable-goods sectors. 
The average real interest rate for the non-tradeable-goods sectors was about 6 
percent a year whereas that for the tradeable-goods sectors was about 15 percent 
(Glaessner and Oks 1998). 
The privatisation and internationalisation of the banking system did not bring more 
efficiency and competitiveness to the credit markets either. In fact, fee revenues as a 
percentage of the financial margin have increased since the financial liberalisation 
process, despite the fact that interest revenues as a percentage of total net revenues 
have gone down considerably (see table 3.2). The head of the Mexican anti- 
monopolies bureau, (Comisiön Federal de Competencia in Spanish) as well as the 
governor of the Central Bank of Mexico have recently raised their concerns in 
relation to the inefficiency of the credit markets and the monopolistic environment 
in which the banking system is currently operating (see e. g. Reuters 24 April 2007, El 
Universal 25 April, 2007, and Dow Jones, 15 March, 2007). 
6 Financial margin is defined here as operating revenues minus financial expenditure, i. e. the 
difference between interest rates on active and passive transactions 
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1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 
Fees revenue as % of 3,4 6,1 19 
interest revenue 
Fees revenue as % of 14,6 43,6 48,8 financial margin 
Fees revenue as % of 9,7 20,7 29,6 
operating revenue 
Interest revenue as % of 414,2 340 174 
net revenue 
Source: Condusef (2004) 
For example, the two largest banks operating in the country, Banamex (owned by 
the American Citicorp) and Bancomer (owned buy the Spanish BBVA), which 
received 50% of total deposits; 59% of fixed-time deposits, and had about 40% of the 
branches of the banking system, reported that 48% of their operating revenues in 
2004 came from fees and other commissions, twice as much as the share reported in 
1999 (Condusef 2004). Other medium-size banks (e. g. HSBC, Santander-Serfin, 
Banorte and ScotiaBank-Inverlat) have reported an average ratio of 35.3% whereas 
24 small-size banks reported a smaller figure, in the order of 21% (see figure 3.2). 
Fees and other costs related to the use of financial products from banking 
institutions have been considerably high, but they have been proportionally higher 
for micro and small enterprises related to the tradeable-goods sectors and low- 
income households engaged in income-generating activities. These costs could 
actually be a factor that has constrained the demand for savings and credit products 
in the banking sector, particularly from the population subgroup at the bottom-end 
of the income distribution. 
We discuss this issue below in chapter 7. In that context, the role of non-banking 
institutions in financing the tradeable-goods sectors and micro and small enterprises 
was fundamental in understanding the levels of manufacturing production during 
the period of financial market liberalisation. In section 3.2 we analyse the non- 
banking system in the context of its reorganization into a new framework of 
financial intermediation. 
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3.2 The non-banking system in Mexico 
We refer to the non-banking system as the group of institutions that include a range 
of regulated and unregulated organisations that mobilise deposits and lend capital 
primarily to micro and small enterprises. Credit unions and saving and credit 
associations or SAI's, are amongst those organisations regulated by the National 
Banking and Securities Commission (CN13V), whereas savings and credit co- 
operatives, solidarity associations and popular associations are unregulated by the 
Mexican regulatory authorities. 
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3.2.1 Credit Unions 
Credit unions have formally operated in Mexico since the creation of the National 
Banking Commission in 1924 (CNBV 2006). The original objective of those 
organisations was to form syndicates of producers and small firms in order to 
distribute direct credits, technical assistance and other benefits from development 
banks and other governmental agencies. During the financial liberalisation, credit 
unions received substantial support from the government to scale up their 
operations. Nacional Financiera, for example, increased its second-tier banking 
operations through credit unions by more than 60 times in only 6 years (see 
Villalpando-Benitez and Gonzalez-Vega 1998). 
In principle, the government decided to support the sector of credit unions in order 
to counterbalance the fall in loanable funds from the banking system in the early 
1990s. However, weak regulatory and supervisory standards were not exclusive of 
the banking system, and when the peso crisis began in December 1994, the sector of 
credit unions collapsed. By the end of 1995, several credit unions were intervened 
by the National Banking and Securities Commission for white-collar frauds. For 
example, the Credit Union of the Mexican Valley or Uniion de Cr6dito Valle de Mexico 
in Spanish (UNICREVA) alone was demand by Nacional Development Bank for a 
fraud of more than US$ 240 million (see Nafin 1996; 1997). The overall cost of the 
bankruptcy of the sector was estimated in the order of US $4.4 billion by the end of 
2000 (La Jornada, July 29,2001). 
After a restructuring process, only 32 credit unions were authorised to operate in 
the country, with a market share of less than 1%, and a loan portfolio of 95 million 
dollars distributed between 19 thousand members (see table 3.3). Despite the 
evidence that some credit unions (e. g. Fincomun7) began to use microfinance 
technology, the sector largely employs traditional methods of financial 
intermediation. 
FINCOMUN is a credit union that operates, employing individual lending, in poor 
neighbourhoods of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City. For further details see Chapter 6. 
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3.2.2 Savings and credit associations and savings and credit co-operatives 
Other types of non-banking institutions that operate in the country are savings and 
credit associations (SAPs), and savings and credit co-operatives (CAPs). On the one 
hand, the SAPs are defined as non-profit organisations with open membership. As 
in the case of credit unions, financial operations within SAPs are constrained to 
receive deposits and give credits to their members. One of the first authorised SAPs 
was the Caja Mexican de Fomento (CANAFO). This organisation achieved a rapid 
expansion and scale of its operations. During the first two years the organisation 
received deposits from more than 70,000 members with only 98 branches (Boutielle, 
1993). 
On the other hand, the CAPs are organisations that work under a set of simple 
principles: 1) one person, one vote; 2) no returns on capital, and 3) the use of profit 
for social purposes. CAPs usually operate in rural and semi-urban areas, and often 
unregulated by the CNBV. In fact, Villalpando-Benitez and Gonzalez-Vega (1998) 
have reported more than 300 CAPs that were unregulated by the time the Peso crisis 
began. One of the largest CAPs in the country, the Caja Popular Mexicana, reported 
333 branches with more than 970,000 members by the end of 2006 (Caja Popular 
Mexicana 2006). CAPs concentrate their operations in the central and southern 
regions of Mexico (see e. g. SHCP 1993; Chaves 1994). 
In a recent survey, reported in Gavito (2002), it was estimated that the non-banking 
sector was integrated by 630 institutions that provided saving and credit services to 
2.3 million clients (see table 3.3) that represented 6 percent of the working 
population in the country. Those organisations reported assets with a value in the 
order of US $1.6 billion that corresponded to approximately one percent of the 
overall assets of the banking sector (see Skertchly 2001 and Gavito 2002). 
The average loan size varied according to type of institution. For example, credit 
unions reported an average outstanding loan balance in the order of US $5,000, 
whereas SAPs and CAPs reported an average value of 540 dollars. Solidarity 
Associations and Popular Associations appeared to target low-income households, 
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with an average outstanding loan balance of approximately 120 dollars (CNBV 
2006). 
Despite the negative effect of the crisis of 1994, the Central Bank of Mexico (quoted 
in IMF 2001) reported that the amount of credit from non-banking institutions 
represented 53% of the total credit given to the private sector in 2000. This amount 
represented an increase of 27% relative to the amount reported in 1994. 
Table 3.3 Structure of traditional non-banking institutions 
Non-banking 
institutions 1 Institutions 
Members 
(Thousands) 
Market 
share (%) 
Total Assets 
(US$ million) 
Loan 
portfolio 
(US$ million) 
Credit Unions 2/ 32 19 0,82 148,0 94,6 
Savings and Credit 11 675 29,23 647,7 362,7 Associations (SAPs) 
Savings and Credit 157 1081 46,82 692,8 457,2 Co-operatives (CAPs) 
Solidarity 210 190 8,23 69,9 Unknown 
Associations 
Popular Associations 220 344 14,90 Unknown Unknown 
Total 630 2309 100,00 1558,4 914,5 
1/ Data on SAPs are to June 2000, and on Credit Unions and CAPs, to December 1999 
2/ It is estimated that only 32 of 266 credit unions in Mexico mobilise deposits 
Sources: Gavito (2002) and CNBV (2006) 
The experience of non-banking organisations in other Latin American countries 
reflects the potential development of this sector relative to the microfinance 
industry. In Bolivia, for example, saving and credit co-operatives tripled the number 
of microfinance organisations, and absorb more than 50% of the total assets, 
including loan portfolio of the overall microfinance sector, whereas in Peru, SAPs 
alone represent about 81 percent of the microfinance sector (see Skertchly 2001). 
In Mexico, many non-banking organisations, in particular SAPs and CAPs are fully 
dependent on deposits to support the loan operations, and it is actually due to this 
characteristic that these organisations were not severely affected by the Peso crisis, 
as they had virtually no liabilities in foreign currency. In fact, savings requirements 
from those non-banking institutions acted as an advantage vis-ä-vis the banking 
system, as the former were able to continue lending in a period of a drastic 
reduction in loanable funds from banks. To some extent, as pointed out by Skertchly 
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(2001), this deposit-based lending technology enabled some SAPs and CAPs to scale 
up in size when most of the banking institutions were shrinking. 
Although some of these non-banking organisations showed an ability to cope with 
the effects of the crisis, the absence of an effective regulatory and supervisory 
framework exposed the public, as discussed earlier in relation to the sector of credit 
unions, to significant risks (see table 3.4). In order to modernise the non-banking 
sector, the government through the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, the 
CNBV and the Central Bank of Mexico, decided to develop a new regulatory and 
supervisory framework for the non-banking system as a whole, including, although 
not explicitly, the microfinance sector. The Popular Savings and Credit Law (see 
CNBV 2001) that was passed by the Mexican Congress on April 30 2001, and 
became effective on June 4, is discussed in the following section. 
Table 3.4 Non-banking institutions by their leeal status 
Authorised to 
Under 
Type of institution receive 
regulation and 
deposits? supervision of 
the CNBV? 
Saving and Credit Associations Yes Yes 
Credit Unions Yes Yes 
Savings and Credit Co-operatives Yes No 
Solidarity Associations No No 
Non-Profit Organisations No No 
Source: Gavito (2002) 
3.2.3 The Popular Savings and Credit Law 
The Popular Savings and Credit Law (or Ley de Ahorro y Credito Popular, in Spanish) 
was part of a wider reform of the financial system in Mexico that took place in 2001, 
after the Mexican Congress amended several laws including the Credit Institutions 
Law; the Financial Groups Law; the National Savings and Public Bank Services 
Law; the Securities Market Law; the National Banking and Securities Commission 
Law, the Mutual Funds Law, and the General Law on Ancillary Activities and 
Organisations of Credit. Most of the amendments focused on eliminated legal 
hurdles for monitoring and supervising financial intermediaries (see table 3.5 for a 
summary). 
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The new Popular Savings and Credit Law identified two types of institutions legally 
authorised to receive deposits: 1) Savings and Credit Co-operatives (Cooperativas de 
Ahorro y Prestamo), and 2) Popular Financial Associations (Sociedades Financieras 
Populares). After a transition period of two years, beginning from June 2001, only 
those organisations that managed to transform into one of the two types of 
institutions were subjected to supervision and regulation, and thus authorised to 
operate as a formal financial intermediary. 
Tnh1ý 15 Main nhiarfivoc of the reform of the financial cvctem in Mexico 
1. Enhancing supervisory practices by the CNBV, particularly lifting bank secrecy 
provisions to allow financial supervisory from external auditors, and enable the 
CNBV to establish regulations for financial conglomerates. The reform also 
introduced a system of corrective actions to deal with troubled organisations in a 
more transparent and efficient manner. 
2. Increasing the catalogue of banking operations. The reform also included lifting 
the ban on back-to-back operations, and eased direct bill payments to expand 
banking services. 
3. The National Savings Trust Fund (PAHNAL) was transformed into a 
development bank, the National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) 
in order to develop the sector of savings and credit amongst low-income 
households. 
4. Covering gaps on corporate governance, in order to develop equity markets. The 
reform created auditing committees, introducing provisions to avoid conflict of 
interests amongst board members and senior managers, and to prevent abusive 
practices from shareholders. 
5. Providing an appropriate structure to develop the sector of mutual funds. The 
reform permitted a wide variety of investment instruments, with different risk 
profiles. 
Source: IMF (2001) 
Regulatory and supervisory activities were put into practice at four different levels, 
depending on the following indicators: 1) liabilities and assets; 2) number of 
shareholders and clients; 3) number of branches; 4) geographic coverage; and 5) 
operational and technical capacity. Although more developed institutions were 
authorised to operate a greater range of services, they were also subjected to tighter 
regulations (CNBV 2001). In this process, the CNBV was the only regulatory and 
supervisory authority responsible for, inter alia, liquidity, accountability, reserves 
requirements and risk management of the non-banking sector. 
The new law also required non-banking institutions to affiliate in federations, which 
were responsible for external monitoring and supervision of the affiliated 
57 
organisations. Similarly, federations were grouped in confederations, upper-level 
bodies that control a protection fund, created with compulsory contributions from 
individual organisations, to protect savings and other deposits from the public. 
Individual contributions to the fund are made on annual basis, based on the volume 
of deposits. Since capital loses in the fund are covered collectively, the fund acts as 
an incentive device that enhances peer monitoring, and reduces the moral hazard 
problem. 
One of these confederations, the Consejo Mexicano de Ahorro y Credito Popular 
(COMACREP), has grouped all major second-level organisations such as the 
Asociaci6n Mexicana de Sociedades de Ahorro y Prtstamo that integrate savings and 
credit associations; the Asociaci6n Mexicana de Llniones de Credito that integrates 
credit unions; and Prodesarrollo that group non-traditional microfinance 
organisations. 
3.2.3.1 The role of BANSEFI 
Whilst the CNBV is responsible for monitoring and supervisory activities, the 
recently created National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI) is in 
charged of developing and integrating the non-banking sector. BANSEFI, which 
was transformed into a bank from the former National Savings Trust Fund 
(PANHAL), also assisted in the formation and supervision of federations, and 
continued offering savings products to low-income households through 950 
branches, 50% of which are located in rural areas (see figure 3.3). By the end of 2005, 
BANSEFI reported 3.2 million savings accounts, with an average deposit of 1,700 
pesos (around 150 dollars) (Bansefi 2004). 
Recently, Gavito (2002) estimated that about 365 non-banking organisations, with 
more than 1.7 million members, participated in the process of incorporation to the 
new legal framework. This estimate excluded solidarity associations, which were 
expected to have difficulties to meet the minimum capital requirements to be 
incorporated into the system. In fact, around 56 percent of non-banking 
organisations (mostly solidarity associations) reported assets of less than 500 
thousand dollars, whereas 32 percent, had assets of less than 5 million dollars. Only 
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one large institution, the Caja Popular Mi'xicaiia, reported assets of more than 4(R) 
million dollars. 
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lt is important to point out that under the new legal framework, microfinance 
programmes were not explicitly defined. In fact, only those organisations that 
decided to transform into a fully regulated institution, were authorised to receive 
deposits and offer a wider range of financial products. Experiences in other 
countries (see e. g. the Bolivian Ley de Propiedad y CrMto Popular of 199811) have 
shown that microfinance operations can he incorporated into the banking regulatory 
framework. In the following section, and given the scope of our research, we 
analyse the microfinance sector in more detail, looking in particular at the system 
that operates in urban areas in Mexico. 
8 Details regarding this Law are available at: www. spvs. gov. bo 
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3.3 The microfinance sector in urban Mexico 
A small group of credit programmes that today operate savings and credit services 
in Mexico were non-governmental organisations (NGOs) originally established to 
support vulnerable groups that suffered from the devastating effects of an 
earthquake that hit Mexico City in October 1985. Some years later, those NGOs 
began piloting development projects to provide savings and credit products to poor 
enterprising households that were engaged in income-generating activities. 
Amongst those organisations were the Centro de Apoyo al Microempresario 
(CAME) and COMPARTAMOS (see Villalpando-Benitez and Gonzalez-Vega 1998). 
The initial funds to back such pilot projects came from a small group of private 
corporations and religious groups linked to the Catholic Church9, although other 
donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Ford Foundation, 
also contributed with funding with the purpose of increasing their scope and 
outreach. In the context of financial market liberalisation, and unlike many other 
developing countries, international donors played a minor role in supporting the 
expansion of the microfinance sector in Mexico. In fact, the federal government has 
been hitherto the main contributor to the sector (CGAP 2002). This became dear 
when the recently elected President Fox launched in February 2001 the National 
Programme for Financing the Microentrepreneur (PRONAFIM), a public revolving 
fund established with US$ 100 million to support, with seed capital, and subsidised 
credits, the foundation of new credit programmes, as well as the expansion of 
already existing organisations (Diaz 2001). 
3.3.1 The National Programme for Financing the Microentrepreneur 
The role of PRONAFIM in developing an infant microfinance industry was seen as 
complementary of a wider reform of the financial system that was implemented, as 
discussed earlier, in 2001 under a market-oriented policy approach. It is important 
to mention the fact that Mohammed Yunus was a central figure that encouraged the 
9 It is important to point out the influence of religious groups in the expansion of the microfinance 
sector in Mexico. Religious groups such as the Archdiocese of Mexico and Secours Catholique were 
supporters of the Centro de Apoyo al Microempresario (CAME), whereas the Juan Diego Foundation 
was a founder member of Fincomun. For further details, see Chapter 6. 
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Fox administration to support a small microfinance industry, through the 
subsidisation of capital and technical assistance (Presidency of the Republic 2003). 
Table 3.6 The largest microfinance organisations in Mexico by the end of 2000 
Active loan Average 
Outstanding 
Members portfolio outstanding 
loan balance 
as % of GDP (US$) loan 
per capita 
Santa Fe Guanajuato 1544 120 432 78,0 2,0 
Los Emprendedores 2185 289 913 133,0 4,0 
ADMIC Nancional 2 870 545 000 190,0 6,0 
Finca Mexico 3 650 351807 96,0 3,0 
CAME 7000 500000 71,0 2,0 
Fincomun 10 000 1100 000 110,0 3,0 
Compartamos 40 000 4400000 110,0 3,0 
Total Mexico 67 249 7307152 109,0 3,3 
Source: Peck (2000) 
In an early survey (see Peck 2000) the microfinance sector was integrated by a small 
group of organisations that operated in monopolistic markets, markedly 
differentiated in terms of number of clients and loan portfolio (see table 3.6). 
After five years of operation, in the period 2001-06, PRONAPIM reported a growing 
number of microfinance organisations currently receiving subsidised credits from 
the federal government (see table 3.7). 
Table 3.7 Microfinance organisations that have received 
financial suvvort from PRONAFIM 
Number of Subsidised Growth rate 
Year recipient credits 1/ of recipient 
organisations organisations 
2001 11 7,91 
2002 39 11,75 254,55 
2003 58 15,38 48,72 
2004 71 27,75 22,41 
2005 80 26,38 12,68 
Source: Arellano et at (2006) and Mexican Congress (2005) 
1/ Figures in millions of US dollars 
Many of the recipient organisations are clustered in a confederation integrated by 52 
credit programmes (see Prodesarrollo 2006) that recently reported to have allocated 
more than 1.2 million microcredits to low-income households. The average loan size 
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was in the order of 4,831 pesos (about US $440), in the case of female borrowers, 
compared to 6,227 (about US $566), in the case of male borrowers. Amongst those 
organisations supported by PRONAFIM were Fincomun, CAME and Promujer, the 
credit programmes that participated in our study (see chapter 6 for more details 
about these organisations). In fact, these organisations have received financial 
support to expand the scope of their operations. 
For example, in 2005 alone, CAME received subsidised credits for almost 4.8 million 
pesos (about 436,000 dollars) to open 20 new branches; whereas Fincomun received 
2.9 million pesos, and Promujer 240,000 pesos to open 12 and 1 branches, 
respectively. Amongst the 12 organisations that received subsidised credits from 
PRONAFIM, CAME absorbed almost 50% of the 12.4 million pesos (about US $1.12 
million) that were distributed in 2005 (see table 3.8). 
Table 3.8 Subsidised credits to open new branches in 2005 
Piovras in thrnmandc of nesns 
New branches Subsidise d Credits Percentage 
Projected Opened Approved Spent share 
CAME 20 20 4798 4564,6 48,81 
FINCOMUN 12 7 2878,8 1557,8 16,66 
PROMUJER-Mexico 1 0 239,9 0 0,00 
Finca Mexico 5 4 1199,5 795,1 8,50 
Grupo Crediexpress 5 4 1199,5 461,5 4,93 
Capacitacion y Desarrollo 1 1 239,9 130,4 1,39 Microempresarial 
Grameen Trust Chiapas 3 3 719,7 847,1 9,06 
Consultoria de Servicios Rurales 1 1 239,9 145,6 1,56 
Desarrollo Empresarial la Victoria 1 1 239,9 130,7 1,40 
FINAPRO 1 1 239,9 239,9 2,57 
Fondo 5 de mayo 2 2 479,8 479,8 5,13 
Total 52 44 12474,8 9352,5 100,00 
Source: Mexican Congress (2005) 
The provision of subsidies that materialise in the form of capital can be an important 
factor to help the microfinance industry to internalise, particularly in the short-term, 
negative externalities that are implicitly related to the process of lending to the poor. 
These subsidies could also facilitate the conduction of research aimed at, for 
instance, improving lending technologies that reduce the informational costs for 
both, the lender and borrower, thus having important effects on the efficiency of the 
credit markets (see e. g. Hulme and Mosley 1996, and Morduch 1999). PRONAFIM, 
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however, has mainly concentrated on expanding the industry's outreach, assuming 
that access to credit, per se, leads to poverty reduction. We investigate this 
assumption later in Chapter 7. 
It is important to point out, however, that equality in the distribution of such 
subsidies is a necessary condition to develop competitive markets. Some concerns 
have recently emerged regarding the highly concentrated portfolio of subsidised 
credits that are allocated amongst credit programmes operating in Mexico. In a 
recent document, the division of the Mexican Congress responsible for auditing 
government expenditure, reported that in 2005 the government distributed amongst 
69 organisations subsidised credits for 290.1 million pesos, about US $26.38 millions 
(see table 3.7); however, only two microfinance organisations (Fincomun and 
Desarrolladora de Emprendedores) received almost one third (32.5%) of the 
subsidised credits. 
The concentration of the loan portfolio was also high in 2004 (34%); 2003 (18% only 
with Fincomun as borrower); 2002 (39.8%), and 2001 (33.8% only with Fincomun as 
borrower) (Mexican Congress 2005). This situation could actually deteriorate the 
monopolistic environment in which credit programmes operate, and increase the 
loan portfolio at risk of the public fund that PRONAFIM administrate. In the 
following section, we briefly analyse other direct credit schemes that have recently 
emerged in the country. 
3.3.2 Other credit schemes 
The microcredit programme operated through the Fund for Social Development 
(FONDESO), which is administered by the local government of Mexico City, is an 
example of some direct credit schemes operating in the country. The programme 
works under the principles of joint liability, using group-lending methodologies for 
disbursement and loan repayment. Repayment schedules are on weekly basis, over 
a period of 16 weeks, and at a fixed monthly interest rate of 3 percent. By the end of 
2002, the local government had given 12,500 loans that represented more than US$5 
million, with an average loan size of 400 dollars per borrower (SEDECO 2002). 
However, the programme reported a 10% of arrears in the loan portfolio, which is 
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considerably high, relative to the average of 2.7% reported in the sector as a whole 
(see e. g. MicroBanking Bulletin 2006). 
Another credit programme that has been operating in poor areas across the country 
is the Solidarity Enterprises National Fund (FONAES). This programme allocates 
subsidised credits and monitor and supervises about 210 solidarity associations 
with more than 200 thousand members (Gavito 2002). Solidarity associations are 
governed by a general assembly, and usually employ a co-operative-based lending 
methodology. Despite the fact that during the reform of 2001 these organisations 
received technical assistance from the Canadian Developpement International 
Desjardins to strengthen their institutional capacity, it was estimated that only a 
small group of these associations were eligible to become fully regulated. 
Villalpando-Benitez and Gonzalez-Vega (1998) have also pointed out the potential 
problems that could emerge from rent-seeking behaviour amongst government 
officials that control such direct credit schemes. Furthermore, political intervention 
through subsidisation has also caused concerns regarding good governance and 
self-sufficiency. There are two important factors that could determine the future 
expansion of the microfinance system in Mexico, independently of the restrictions 
that the Popular Savings and Credit Law has imposed to receive deposits: 1) the 
potential market for the sector, and 2) the level of transaction costs involved in the 
process of lending to the poor. 
3.3.3 The potential market for the microfinance sector 
The banking system has historically reported a low penetration in the country. In 
the early 2000s, it was estimated (Labarthe 2001) that about 80% of the population 
had no access to the banking system. In the particular case of the Metropolitan area 
of Mexico City, where our study took place, (Casley et al 2004) have reported that 
24% of the population had a savings account in a bank; but only a very small 
percentage, 1.8% actually borrowed from an institutional lender. The paper does not 
identify whether the credits were for production or consumption expenditure. In 
order to explore the potential market for the microfinance sector in urban Mexico, 
we examined the National Survey on Microbusiness (ENAMIN) (INEGI 1999), 
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where more 4.2 million microenterprisesl° were reported to be operating in urban 
areas with more than 100 thousand inhabitants. We find that about 83.66% of those 
microenterprises (3.52 million) were family businesses, 94.14% of which had no 
more than 2 employees. The survey also showed that 80.61% of the microenterprise 
sector reported to have been credit-constrained by the time they started their own 
business. 
Table 3.9 Sources of fundine for microenterurises in Mexico 
Sources for starting enterprises Microenterprises (%) 
Commercial Banks 26 894 0,79 
Non-banking organisations 41 786 1,23 
Friends and Relatives 532 350 15,70 
Moneylenders 88 636 2,61 
Own savings 2 313 845 68,26 
Severance payments 214 888 6,34 
Credits from suppliers 74349 2,19 
Other 97111 2,86 
Total 3 389 859 100,00 
Sources for established enterprises 
Commercial Banks 50123 15,50 
Development Banks 7 486 2,32 
Credit Unions 6 766 2,09 
Financial Associations 5 364 1,66 
Savings and credit co-operatives 50 091 15,49 
Moneylenders 48 538 15,01 
Friends and relatives 125 319 38,77 
Others 28 904 8,94 
No specified 686 0,21 
Total 323 277 100,00 
Source: INEGI (1999) 
In fact, 74.6% of those microentrepreneurs that recently started an income- 
generating activity financed their ventures with their own assets, mainly with 
savings and severance payments from previous jobs, whereas 18.31 percent used 
credits from informal financial agents such as moneylenders, and relatives and 
friends. In relation to those businesses that were already established by the time the 
survey was conducted, 39% reported to have received credits from relatives and 
friends; 15.5% from savings and credit co-operatives and in a similar level (15%) 
10 Microenterprises are identified, according to the classification in the INEGI's National 
Survey of Microenterprises (INEGI 1999), as those businesses with no more than six 
employees, including the owner, in the building, commerce, services and transport 
industries. In the manufacturing sector, they may have 15 employees. 
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from moneylenders (see table 3.9). Martinez and Espinosa (2001) have estimated 
that the microfinance industry in Mexico could scale up in between 832 thousands 
and 2 million transactions in 4 years. The loan portfolio could reach one billion 
dollars, with an average loan size between 500 and 1,200 dollars, representing one 
percent of the overall assets of the banking sector". 
Commercial banks have recently explored the credit market at the bottom-end of 
the income distribution. For example, the Elektra Group, a retail company that 
offered in-store credits and money transfer services from the US, established in 
October 2002 the Aztec Bank, the first intermediary in the country that targets 
middle and low-income households, by offering savings products from a minimum 
of 50 pesos (about 4.5 dollars), and individual loans from 10 thousand pesos (about 
910 dollars). After 18 months of operation, by the end of 2003, the organisation had 
received US $747 million in savings from more than 3 million depositors, and had 
reported a loan portfolio of US 450 millions that had grown at an impressive 
percentage rate of 382% relative to 2002 (Banco Azteca 2003). 
Other banks have introduced different financial services that target at low-income 
households. HSBC, for example, has adapted the methodology used by rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAS) in order to offer savings products with a 
minimum deposit of US $25 that can be accumulated over a period of six months 
(see table 3.10). The BANAMEX and BBVA-Bancomer, the two largest banks in the 
country, have begun targeting low-income households by offering, in partnership 
with US telegraph companies such as Western Union and the Money Gram 
Payment Systems, electronic money transfers from the US (Villalpando-Benitez and 
Gonzalez-Vega 1998). 
11 This is according to data from the CNBV available at. www. cnbv. org. mx 
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In fact, the significant amount of remittances sent by Mexican labourers working in 
the US has been an important factor that has contributed to the increasing interest of 
commercial banks to enter the financial markets for low-income households. The 
amount of remittances in 2006 was in the order of US $23,054 millions, 15% more 
than in 2005, and they accumulated about US $98,380 millions in the period 2000- 
2006, with an average of 340 dollars per transfer. By the end of 2006, these flows 
were larger than the Foreign Direct Investment, and represented 71% of the country 
total oil-exports, and 2.6% of the GDP. The growing levels of remittances, which are 
comparable to the levels in countries such as India and China (see World Bank 
2006), are highly concentrated across the country. Only 5 federal states (Michoacan, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, State of Mexico, and the Federal District or Mexico City) 
received 46% of the overall transfers in 2005 (Bank of Mexico 2005). 
There are two important factors that explain these money transfers: the first is 
related to the increasing levels of migration to the US. It is estimated that around 11 
million Mexicans of working age are currently living in the US. This number 
represents about 24% of the working population in the country (INEGI 2005). The 
second factor is related to the reduction in the average cost of remittances, as a 
result of increasing competition in the market, and a growing use of electronic 
transfers. In fact, a large percentage of these remittances (88%) were sent by 
electronic means, whereas 10% used money orders and only 2% cash and in kind 
transfers (Banco de Mexico 2005). It is important to mention here that the market for 
remittances is restricted to organisations that are authorised to receive deposits. This 
restriction reduces the number of microfinance organisations that are able to offer 
money transfers to a small group of intermediaries. 
The structure of the credit markets in Mexico can be graphically represented by a 
pyramid segmented in three sub-groups of households: high and high-medium- 
income households, which are at the top of the income distribution, are targeted by 
commercial and development banks; low-medium and low-income households, 
which are in the middle of the income pyramid, are targeted by non-banking 
organisations such as savings and credit co-operatives and popular financial 
associations, whereas low-income households, usually engaged in income- 
generating activities, are targeted by microfinance organisations and informal credit 
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agents such as moneylenders and ROSCAS (see figure 3.4). An important factor that 
determines the segmentation of the credit markets is the transaction costs involved 
in the process of lending to the poor. 
Figure 3.4 Segmentation of the credit market in Mexico 
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3.3.4 Transaction costs 
Martinez and Espinosa (2001) have reported that microfinance organisations, 
through the implementation of group-lending methodologies, were able to reduce 
the level of transaction costs, particularly in activities related to the monitoring, 
evaluation and contracting processes, relative to organisations that employed 
traditional lending technologies (see table 3.11). In this sense, group-lending was 
seen as a mechanism that could encourage traditional lenders to adopt microcredit 
methodologies. Even though group lending could reduce transaction costs for the 
lender, these costs, particularly related to monitoring and enforcement devices are 
transferred to the borrower (see e. g. Besley and Coate 1995 and Stiglitz 1990). To our 
knowledge, there is no empirical examination of the effects of transactions costs 
(and opportunity costs) coming from screening, monitoring and enforcement 
devices on households' well-being in the context of Mexico. For that reason, we 
examine this particular issue later in chapter 7 and 8. 
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Table 3.11 Transaction costs of microcredit operations (figures in % 
Activity Microcredit 
Traditional 
lending 
As part of the monthly interest rate 
Microcredit Traditional lending 
Promotion 38,4 15,8 1,516 1,516 
Application 9,4 3,9 0,372 0,372 
Evaluation 11,6 25,5 0,457 2,44 
Operation 35,1 14,5 1,388 1,388 
Contracting 0,9 38,4 0,037 3,679 
Collection 2,2 0,9 0,088 0,088 
Recovery 2,3 1,0 0,092 0,092 
Total 100,0 100,0 3,95 9,58 
Source: Martinez and Espinosa (2001) 
3.3.5 Why high interest rates? 
As shown in table 3.10, interest rates charged by microfinance organisations 
operating in Mexico are above the threshold of 70 percent on annum basis, a rate 
substantially higher than the median value (about 31%) for MFIs worldwide (see 
MicroBanking Bulletin 2007). High interest rates in Mexico can be linked to three 
different but interrelated factors: 
1) A process of financial markets liberalisation that began in the 1980s with several 
structural reforms, including the removal of interest ceilings. After the oil price 
crisis of 1982, and in order to reduce the hyperinflation, the government followed a 
crawling-peg regime that was backed by high interest rates to attract foreign 
capitals and offset the deficit in the Current Account of the Balance of Payments. 
However, the high interest rates policy led later on to volatility in the exchange rate 
and in the end, to the peso crisis of 1994 (see section 3.1.4 for more details)12. In the 
aftermath of the Peso crisis of 1994, and with a heavy devaluation and a booming 
inflation, Fincomun, CAME and a small number of microfinance organisations that 
operated at that time, were forced to increase the interest rates in order to cover 
operational expenses adjusted to the inflation rate. 
2) However, when the inflation and interbank interest rate began to fall, the 
managers of these organisations decided to leave their interest rates unchanged, 
12 The connection between high interest rates and exchange rate volatility has been examined by Chen 
(2006). 
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taking advantage of their monopoly power. In fact, the lack of competition in credit 
markets in Mexico has allowed microfinance organisations to keep interest rate at 
very high levels with the apparent objective of generating enough operating 
revenues to finance a rapid scaling up process and achieve a greater outreach. This 
strategy has actually helped organisations such as Fincomun and CAME to finance 
a rapid institutional growth in a period of scarce sources of funding (see figures 6.2 
and 6.3 in Chapter 6)13. 
Donors such as CGAP and commercial-led organisations such as ACCION 
International have also backed this strategy on the grounds of achieving the goal of 
financial self-sufficiency and greater outreach 14. In addition, the Mexican 
government has been supporting with capital subsidisation, through PRONAFIM, 
the expansion of the microfinance industry'5. However, given the monopolistic 
characteristics of the credit market, and the small number of suitable recipients for 
such funds, we fear that the PRONAFIM as well as other donors supporting 
outreach expansion may be actually enhancing the monopoly power of a small 
number of microfinance organisations operating in the country, which could 
consequently diminish market competition and the prospects of lower interest 
rates's. In this sense, more research will be needed to investigate this issue in more 
detail. 
3) High transactions costs are the third factor driving up interest rates. Capital, and 
in particular labour, are expensive in Mexico, and operational and risk-associated 
costs, linked to a small average loan size, and monitoring, and enforcement 
activities, affect the interest rate. For example, it has been recently estimated (see 
13 For instance, Rosenberg (2007) has estimated that Compartamos financed 41 % of the expanding 
outreach through retained profits. 
14 A recent Initial Public Offering (IPO) of 30% ownership of the largest microfinance organisation 
operating in Mexico (Compartamos) was able to generate a huge interest amongst mainstream private 
investors. Those investors knew that high interest rates were generating supernormal profits. 
Eventually, those IPO shareholders received in a second offering US $450 million, which represented 
more than 12 times the book value of the IPO. There is an ongoing debate about the consistency of 
high-interests-for-outreach policies with the social mission of microfinance. For more details about 
this discussion, see Microcredit Summit (2007). 
15 See section 3.3.1 for more details about PRONAFIM 
16 A recent IMF country report (IMF 2007) as well as the governor of the Central Bank of Mexico 
have recently raised their concerns regarding the monopolistic environment in which 
lending organisations currently operate in the country. For more details see section 3.1.6 in 
Chapter 3. 
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Rosenberg 2007) that microfinance organisations such as Compartamos spend more 
than 35% of its revenues to cover operational costs vis-a-vis a mean value of 15% for 
microfinance organisations worldwide; however, one-fourth of the rate of interest 
represented the profit margin. This profit margin actually reflects the monopolistic 
environment in which microfinance organisations operate. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
Although credit markets, and in general the system of financial intermediation in 
Mexico, have moved from a direct-credit paradigm to market-based model, the 
system as a whole remains highly inefficient, with low levels of penetration, and 
operating in monopolistic markets. The dependency of banks on collateral and other 
traditional screening and enforcement devices, as well as the costs involved in the 
process of lending, can explain the low banking penetration at the bottom-end of the 
income distribution. 
The emergence of the microfinance industry in Mexico, and the strong support 
received from the government, through PRONAFIM and other public funds, to 
expand the industry's coverage and outreach, should be seen in that context, where 
a new legal framework has defined regulatory and supervisory measures to reduce 
potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Hitherto, it is not clear how 
many microfinance organisations will manage to transform themselves into fully 
regulated organisations; but just a few (e. g. Fincomun and COMPARTAMOS), have 
successfully completed the process. 
Although the microfinance sector has received substantial support, recent evidence 
suggests that the allocation of subsidised capital, in particular from the PRONAFIM, 
has been highly concentrated in a small group of intermediaries. This could 
deteriorate the functioning of the market, which is already highly inefficiency. 
Although subsidised capital, materialised in the form of new branches, can be an 
important factor to improve the access of poor people to credit, this action does not 
convert into poverty impacts per se. Other subsidised components could also have 
important effects on poor people's well-being. For example, subsidies aimed to 
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develop financial technology could reduce the costs of peer monitoring in group- 
lending contracts. These costs could be high enough to diminish the potentially 
impacts of microfinance on poverty reduction and households' well-being. To our 
knowledge there is no empirical evidence of the link between these costs and 
poverty impacts in the context of urban Mexico. We discuss this issue in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
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Chapter 4 
Poverty in Mexico 
Introduction 
Failures in credit markets, which originate from the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection, are widely regarded as one the critical factors that exacerbate 
poverty in developing countries'. It is apparent that expanding access to credit 
could help the poor to get out of poverty by e. g. engaging in income generating 
activities that yield higher returns. However, to what extent credit programmes 
have an impact on poverty reduction is a question that we investigate in Chapter 7. 
Since we are particularly interested in examining the effects of credit on poverty 
reduction, we need to answer a major question: who is poor in the context of urban 
Mexico? In order to answer this question, we devote this chapter to the analysis and 
identification of poverty estimates as well as well-established poverty 
measurements for the impact analysis. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 
4.1, briefly discusses the main theoretical conceptualisations of poverty, paying 
particular attention to the relativist versus absolutist controversy, before dividing the 
analysis of poverty measures into two sections: multidimensional (4.2) and monetary 
(4.3). Section 4.4 reviews the main poverty studies that have been recently 
conducted in Mexico, before examining, in section 4.5, the selected poverty lines that 
we use in the impact analysis. 
4.1 The notion of poverty 
Poverty, evident in various forms of human deprivation, is a problem that has 
caught the interest of scholars and philosophers since the time of ancient societies. 
In his famous dialogue with Adeimantus, and reproduced in Plato (1901: 422), 
Socrates was already aware of the pervasive effects of indiscriminate wealth and 
poverty in deteriorating peace and order in a state society. In his view, wealth was 
"the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other (poverty) of meanness and viciousness, 
and both of discontent". Similarly, and under the influence of Plato, Aristotle 
(1954: 1379a) saw in poverty a source of conflict and anger: "People who are afflicted by 
sickness or poverty 1... 1 or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused, 
75 
especially against those who slight their present distress. Thus a sick man is angered by 
disregard of his illness, a poor man by disregard of his poverty... " 
In that context, state governments were seen as fundamental instruments for justice 
and social equality that facilitated peace and prosperity. This is particularly 
illustrated in the Plato's Republic. The importance of state governments in reducing 
human deprivation and suffering was not exclusive of Western societies. In a 
conversation with Hsien, one of his disciples, Confucius (1979: XIV, verse 1) gives us 
an idea about the views of Ancient Asian civilisations: "When a country is well 
governed, poverty and mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is poorly 
governed, riches and honour are things to be ashamed of. " 
It is apparent though that the notion of poverty was seen in relation to what the 
other, the better off, possessed. This relativist perception of poverty has been 
influential ever since. Adam Smith (1995), for example, paid a great deal of attention 
to the relative notion of deprivation, conditional upon local necessities and customs. 
Writing on consumable commodities, in "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations", chapter II, Book V, he stated: 
"By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably 
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it 
indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for 
example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessity of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I 
suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through 
the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in 
public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that 
disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without 
extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a 
necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed 
to appear in public without them. (... I Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend not 
only those things which nature, but those things, which the established rules of decency 
have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people". 
In that view, well-being was a condition not only dependent on goods (e. g. food) 
"necessary for the support of life", but also on to two important and dynamic factors: 
time and space that shaped the norms and traditions in a social context. In similar 
We discuss this particular issue in Chapter 5 
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fashion, Karl Marx (2004: 35) pointed to the relative characteristic of poverty in his 
Wage labour and capital: 
"A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it 
satisfies all social requirements for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a 
palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its 
inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one, and 
however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighbouring palace rises 
in equal of even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always 
find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four 
walls... " 
More recently, the relativist view of poverty has been led by sociologist Peter 
Townsend, and captured by his widely cited opus magnum Poverty in the United 
Kingdom, although in a much earlier paper (1962: 225) he already defined his position 
regarding the notion of poverty in this way: "poverty is not an absolute state. It is 
relative deprivation. Society itself is continuously changing and thrusting new obligations 
on its members. They in turn develop new needs. They are rich or poor according to their 
share of the resources that are available to all [... ] Our general theory, then should be that 
individuals and families whose resources, over time, fall seriously short of the resources 
commanded by the average individual or family in the community in which they live, 
whether that community is a local, national or international one, are in poverty. 
Fundamental concerns have emerged through regarding the distributional 
characteristics of the relativist conceptualisation of poverty, particularly in relation 
to the potential problems of underestimating the absolute degree of deprivation. Sen 
(1985) for example, has pointed out that: "poverty is not just a matter of being relatively 
poorer than others in the society, but of not having some basic opportunities of material 
wellbeing, the failure to have certain minimum "capabilities". The criteria of minimum 
capabilities are absolute, not in the sense that they must not vary from society to society, 
(... ] or over time (... 1, but people's deprivations are judge absolutely and not simply in 
comparison with the deprivations of others in that society". 
Although there is an ongoing discussion over the relativist notion of poverty versus 
its absolute dimension (see e. g. Sen 1985a; 1983, and also the debate on his paper in 
Townsend 1985 and Sen 1985b), there is an increasing consensus on its 
multidimensional nature. For example, the World Bank (2000: 15) has defined 
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poverty as "a pronounced deprivation in well-being", in terms of economic opportunity, 
education, health and nutrition, as well as lack of employment and security. 
Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (1990) introduced two 
relevant concepts under the influence of the work of Professor Sent: human 
development, defined as a process that enlarges people's choices including freedom, 
dignity, self-respect, and social status, and human poverty, meaning deprivation of 
essential capabilities, such as a long and healthy life, knowledge, economic 
resources and community participation. 
Despite these recent efforts of including multidimensional indicators of well-being 
in poverty estimates, data on income and expenditure continues to be widely used 
as welfare indicator (see e. g. World Bank 1990). This is in part due to the difficulty 
of capturing well-being by a set of indicators such as child mortality, illiteracy rate 
or malnutrition. However, given the variety of analytical approaches to measure 
poverty, we devote the following sections to analyse and select poverty estimates 
that will be used in the formulation and test of hypotheses regarding the impact of 
credit on poverty reduction in the context of urban Mexico. For analytical 
simplification, we divide poverty estimates into two general approaches that can be 
absolute or relative in nature: a) multidimensional, and b) monetary. Additionally, 
we divide the reviewed poverty studies by their objective or subjective source of 
measurement (see figure 4.1 below). 
4.2 Multidimensional approaches 
There are several possible approaches to aggregate multidimensional measures of 
poverty and well-being. For example, it is possible to use a welfare function that 
includes various dimensions of well-being and then defines poor as those below a 
minimum threshold, which is usually arbitrary (see e. g. Tsui and Weymark 1997; 
Tsui 2002, and Bourguignon and Chakravarty 1998). However, as pointed out by 
Atkinson (2003), a major problem that can emerge from multidimensional welfare 
2 The methodology and measurement of the Human Development Index is derived in 
Anand and Sen (1994) 
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functions is related to the interactions between the components that integrate such 
well-being indicators. 
4.2.1 Human Development Index 
Perhaps the work of Anand and Sen (1994), and which was first presented in the 
Human Development Report 1990, as the Human Development Index (HDI), is the 
most influential multidimensional, absolute and objective measurement of well-being in 
a global scale. This index is built in terms of attainments of three separate 
components3: 1) longevity, measured by life expectancy at birth, and defined here as 
Xi; 2) educational attainment, defined as X2, and measured by a combination of 
adult literacy Xz., (with a two-thirds weight), and combined primary, secondary and 
tertiary enrolment rations X2b, (with a one-third weight), and 3) standard of living, 
measured by real income per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP$), and defined 
as X3. The index Iy, is a deprivation indicator for country j, with respect to variable 
X;, and is derived in the Anand and Sen paper as follows: 
max{X; k 
}- XÜ 
ItJ _k max{X; k}-min{Xik } 
(4.1) 
where each deprivation indicator lies between 0 and 1, and the deprivation index II, 
with its three components i, is derived as an unweighted average of the I, 1 as 
follows: 
13 
1ý=3 
. _j 
(4.2) 
In this respect, a shortfall in the HDI for country j, represented here by Hi, can be 
derived as 1- Hj=I, where 
Hj =1-Ij (4.3) 
3 For a calculation of the percentage contribution of the individual components of such an index to the 
overall achievement, see the generalised index proposed by (Chakravarty 2003). 
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Note that the HDI can also be expressed in terms of attainments by following (4.2) 
33 
and (4.3) to get Hi =1-1 I; ý and Hi =1 
(1- IÜ) which follows: 3 j=, 3 , _, 
13 max{Xj }- X Hj =-I 1- k (4.4) 3 i=l max{X; k 
}- min{X;, } 
-13 
Xy -min{X; k} (4.5) 
3 , =1 max{X, 1 
}- min{X; k 
} 
13 
= -E Hij (4.6) 3 , _, 
where 
X, ý -min{Xik} Hk (4.7) 
'' __ max{X; k}-min{Xik 
} 
is the ith variable's contribution to the HDI for country j. For the construction of the 
index, fixed minimum and maximum values were given to each welfare indicator. 
For example, the minimum level for life expectancy at birth was set at 25 years 
whilst its maximum value was projected at 85 years in the year 2050. In this sense, 
the lower and upper limits of Xi were fixed at those endpoints. 
The second variable, the educational attainment index, was calculated by combining 
two indicators: 1) the adult literacy index, derived from a 0-100 min-max interval 
(with a two-thirds weight), and 2) the combined primary, secondary and tertiary 
enrolment ratio index with a 0-100 min-max interval, with a one-third weight. The 
final component of the HDI is the logarithm of real GDP per capita in US dollars for 
2000 at purchasing power parity (PPP$). The logarithmic transformation of income 
reflects the diminishing returns to transforming income into human capabilities 
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(UNDP 2002). The upper limit of the min-max interval of the income variable has 
been set at the log value of US $40,000, whilst the lower limit has been set at the log 
value of US $100, both at (PPP$). 
Following the attainment approach from equation (4.7), it is possible to compute 
population subgroups for each of the components of the HDI at country or local 
level. In 1993 the UNDP began to calculate the HDI for Mexico and a few states 
across the country, but it was not until 2002 when the HDI was finally computed for 
the 32 states that constitute the country (UNDP 2002). In this respect, the HDI for 
Mexico (Mex) was derived by computing the life expectancy index as 
=IlMa = 
75.3-25 
= 0.838, where the actual XlM, value, i. e. life expectancy at birth 85 - 25 
in Mexico was estimated at 75.3 years. 
The first indicator of the educational attainment index, i. e. the adult literacy index, 
was computed as = 12a 
90.100 45 
--00=0.905 
where the actual X , ex value, 
i. e. adult 
literacy in Mexico was estimated at 90.45 percent. The second component of the 
educational attainment index, i. e. the combined enrolment ratio index was computed as 
6454-0 
.0_0.645, where the actual XýMes value, i. e. the combined 12bMex 100-0 
enrolment ratio was estimated at 64.54 percent. The sum of the adult literacy index 
and the combined enrolment ratio index, with their respective weights (two-thirds and 
one-third, respectively), resulted in the educational attainment index: 
12Mu 
3 
(0.905) + 
1(0.645) 
= 0.818. 
Finally, the standard of living in Mexico was estimated by computing the adjusted 
real GDP per capital index as: 13M,. = 
log1og((883140000))--loglog((100100) 
)=0.748, where the 
actual X3M, value, i. e. the real income GDP per capita for Mexico (in PPP$) was 
estimated at 8831 US dollars. As derived in (4.7), the HDI for Mexico was computed 
as the arithmetic sum of its equally weighted components as follows: 
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HDIM,,, =3 (0.838) +3 (0.818) +3 (0.748) = 0.801. The HDI was also estimated by 
the UNDP (2002) for individual states in Mexico. The resulting indexes showed 
important regional inequalities across the country. For example, whilst the life 
expectancy index for Mexico City was 10 percent above the index reported for the 
Southern state of Chiapas, the gap between the two states increases up to 23.5% and 
52% when educational attainment and GDP per capita were measured, respectively. 
Table 4.1 Components of the Human Develovment Index by selected areas 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth (years) 11 
Adult 
literacy rate 
(0/%) 
Combined 
enrolment 
ratio (%) 
Real income 
per capita 
(PPP$) 2/ 
Chalco Valley 76.3 93.48 59.06 1,841.7 
State of Mexico 76.3 93.54 61.53 6,724.0 
San Miguel Teotongo 77.2 89.09 53.48 2,171.5 
Mexico City 77.2 96.97 75.30 22,816.0 
Tula City 74.2 93.62 64.54 1,667.5 
State of Hidalgo 74.2 85.20 67.38 5,050.0 
Mexico 75.3 90.45 64.54 8,831.0 
1/ Values for life expectancy at birth were given to the subjects in the experimental sample 
according to the average values computed at local level. In this sense, we assumed that 
individuals living in the Chalco Valley could have a life expectancy similar to those living 
in the State of Mexico given that the Chalco Valley is a municipality of the State of Mexico. 
2/ Given that income data was collected between January and May 2004, we used the 
Consumer Price Index to deflate income levels at prices of December 2000, and the FIX 
exchange rate peso-dollar for the same period. 
Source: Author's sample survey and UNDP (2002) for data on life expectancy at birth 
In a global perspective, the level of regional inequality across the country becomes 
clear when the GDP per capita is compared with other countries. For example, 
whilst Mexico City reported a GDP per capita in the order of US $22,815 at 2001 
purchasing power parity (PPP), similar to countries such as Spain, Greece and Honk 
Kong, the poorest state in the country, Chiapas, reported a GDP per capita in the 
order of US $3,549, similar to countries such as El Salvador or Guyana. As pointed 
out by the UNDP, the level of regional inequality appears to be related to regional 
concentration as well. Five states (Mexico City, Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco and 
Chihuahua) absorbed 51.09 percent of the national GDP. 
Despite the fact that the HDI is an important measure of well-being, it does not 
solve the problem of giving reliable values to each component of the welfare 
function (see Ravallion 1992 for a critique). However, although the index does not 
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provide criteria on identifying who is and who is not poor, it can be useful as a 
comparative tool to map the level of deprivation in the areas where our study was 
conducted. With that specific purpose, we used primary data collected from the 
quasi-experiment that was operationalised in the areas where the case-study 
microfinance organisations operate4: Fincomun in San Miguel Teotongo, in the 
Iztapalapa District in Mexico City; CAME in the Chalco Valley, in the state of 
Mexico, and Promujer in Tula City, in the State of Hidalgo. The results from the 
estimation of the HDI are presented in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 The Human Develovment Index by selected areas 
Life 
expectancy 
index 
Educational 
attainment 
index 
Adjusted 
income per 
capital (PPP$) 
index 
ýI 
Chalco Valley 0.855 0.820 0.486 0.7204 
State of Mexico 0.855 0.829 0.702 0.7954 
San Miguel Teotongo 0.870 0.772 0.514 0.7187 
Mexico City 0.870 0.897 0.906 0.8913 
Tula City 0.820 0.839 0.470 0.7096 
State of Hidalgo 0.820 0.791 0.655 0.7557 
Mexico 0.838 0.818 0.748 0.8014 
Source: Author's sample survey and UNDP (2002) for data on life expectancy at birth 
We computed the values of the adult literacy rate, the combined enrolment ratio 
and the real income per capita with primary data; however, for the computation of 
the life expectancy at birth, we assigned the sampled households, a mean value 
according to the place of residence, which was previously estimated by the UNDP 
(2002). In this sense, members of a household living in, say, San Miguel Teotongo, in 
the Iztapalapa District of Mexico City, were assumed to have a life expectancy in the 
same order to the average reported in Mexico City. Similarly, a household living in 
the Chalco Valley were assumed to have a similar life expectancy than households 
living in the state of Mexico (see table 4.1). We are aware of the potential problems 
of overestimating this factor; however by using data at local level, we narrowed the 
probable gaps between the estimated and actual value of this variable. Moreover, 
the computation of the HDI is with the explicit purpose of showing a preliminary 
picture of the level of human deprivation in the areas under study, rather than using 
the index as a poverty measure in the impact analysis. 
4 For a discussion on the characteristics of the sample survey, see chapter 6. 
83 
i aerie ý. oi ne Human veveu menc muex anu us nun-moneta components ercema es 
FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Sample Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated 
size 
Overall 148 34,5 65,5 39,1 60,9 44,7 55,3 
HDI 
(%) below the local level a/ 145 100 97,2 94,4 96,4 100 100 
(%) below the country level b/ 139 100 86,1 83,3 96,4 100 100 
Life expectancy index 148 0,870 0,870 0,855 0,855 0,820 0,820 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 148 77,2 77,2 76,3 76,3 74,2 74,2 
Educational attainment index 148 0,675 0,823 0,849 0,802 0,922 0,798 
Adult literacy index 148 0,789 0,944 0,944 0,929 1,0 0,923 
Combined enrolment index 148 0,447 0,581 0,657 0,548 0,766 0,548 
Educational attainment idex 
(%) below the local level d/ 51 73,7 55,6 22,2 21,4 4,8 23,1 
(%) below the country level e/ 33 31,6 27,8 22,2 21,4 4,8 23,1 
Adult literacy rate 
(%) below the local level a/ 11 21,1 5,6 5,6 7,1 0 7,7 
Combined enrolment rate 
(%) below the local level b/ 98 100 83,3 61,1 60,7 23,8 61.5** 
(%) below the country level c/ 81 68,4 52,8 61 60,7 23,8 61.5** 
the statistically signihcant association in the cross-tabulations are indicated by the Chi-square values for 
the cell as a whole at 0.001('); 0.01("); 0.05 (* ); and 0.1(') levels of significance. 
a/ The HDI was estimated at 0.891,0.795 and 0.755 points for Mexico City, the state of Mexico and the state 
of Hidalgo, respectivelly 
b/ The HDI was estimated at 0.801 points for the country as a whole 
c/ The combined enrolment rate was estimated at 64.54% for the country as a whole 
d/ The educational attainment index was estimated at 0.897,0.829 and 0.791 for Mexico City, the state of 
Mexico and the state of Hidalgo, respectivelly 
Sources: UNDP (2002) and the author's sample survey 
The computed HDI and its disaggregated components show interesting 
information. For example, whilst Tula City and the Chalco Valley reported an 
educational attainment index in the order of 0.839 and 0.820, respectively, 
households living in San Miguel Teotongo reported the lowest mean value: 0.772. 
However, when we examined the same index by dividing the sample in treated and 
control households, we found that in San Miguel Teotongo almost 74% of control 
groups, relative to 56% of treatment households, were below the educational 
attainment index reported at the local level. Similarly, we find a statistical 
significant association at the 0.01 levels between treated and control groups but 
from households living in Tula City, in relation to the first component of the 
educational attainment index, i. e. the combined enrolment rate (see table 4.3). 
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The apparent, although statistically insignificant, heterogeneity found in the 
educational attainment index between the three areas under examination 
disappeared when the adjusted income per capita index was analysed. We also 
found a degree of homogeneity in the level of income deprivation that was well 
below the mean values of the corresponding regions. For example, whilst the Chalco 
Valley, San Miguel Teotongo and Tula City reported an income per capital index in 
the order of 0.486,0.514 and 0.470, respectively, the corresponding municipalities 
reported considerably larger values: 0.702,0.906 and 0.655, for the State of Mexico, 
Mexico City and the State of Hidalgo, respectively (see table 4.2). In fact, all the 
sampled households, treatment as well as control, reported income levels below the 
regional average. The degree of income deprivation was actually below the average 
values computed for the poorest states in the country, e. g. Chiapas (0.596), Oaxaca 
(0.603) and Guerrero (0.646). In Chapter 7 we discuss in detail the use of income as 
the welfare indicator for the impact analysis. 
Although the Human Development Index computed for the Chalco Valley (0.7204), 
San Miguel Teotongo (0.7187), and Tula City (0.7096) showed, as expected, low 
attainments levels for both treatment and control households, relative to indexes 
reported at the local and country level (see table 4.3), it does not give us criteria to 
define a threshold to divide the poor from the non-poor. In order to identify a 
deprivation indicator we explored the Human Poverty Index. 
4.2.2 Human Poverty Index 
The Human Poverty Index (HPI), which was presented in the Human Development 
Report (UNDP 1997), is a composite index of three different factors that constitute a 
welfare function: a) longevity, b) knowledge and c) decent living standard. The first 
component relates to the probability of death at an early age, and is captured by the 
percentage of the population expected to die before the age of 40. The second 
component captures the exclusion from education and knowledge, and is measured 
by the percentage of illiterate adults. The third and final component of the HPI is 
related to what is referred in the Human Development Report as a decent standard 
of living, and which is measured by a vector of three separate variables: 1) the 
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percentage of the population with access to health care institutions, 2) the 
percentage of population with access to safe drinking water, and 3) the percentage 
of malnourished children under fives. 
Note that whilst the HPI focuses on the welfare status of the poor, the HDI focuses on 
the welfare attainments of the overall population. In this sense, the HPI can be useful 
in first evaluating the degree of deprivation of the poor, and then monitoring the 
progress in improving such conditions overtime. Although the HPI offers an 
interesting approach, it does not solve the problem of identifying a threshold for 
human poverty. This is particularly important given the apparent weak relationship 
between the incidence of income poverty and the HPI (World Bank 1997). 
Furthermore, from a practical perspective, the structural characteristics of the HPI 
impose a constraint to our study, mostly in relation to the nature of the required 
data. Although we collected information on some of the components that integrate 
the HPI (e. g. adult illiterate rate, access to health care institutions, and access to safe 
drinking water), we were unable to estimate the probability of death before age 40, 
and the percentage of malnourished children under five. For that reason, the HPI 
was dropped from the poverty measures to be used in the impact analysis. 
4.2.3 Other multidimensional studies 
Other multidimensional poverty measures have been proposed in ethnographic and 
sociological studies on the basis of subjective criteria. For example, Narajan et al 
(2000) used qualitative participatory techniques to collect information on people's 
perceptions about minimum standards of living, and based on that collective 
judgement, a relativist poverty measure was constructed. Self-reported measures of 
well-being have the quality of complementing econometric analysis on income 
poverty that improves the reliability of the results. In fact, we have collected in our 
sample survey subjective and qualitative information on household well-being to 
strengthen the internal validity of our study (see Chapter 6). However, the use of 
S Note that the unlike the HDI, the HPI excludes the income variable as one of its components. For a 
discussion on this issue, see the Human Development Report (1997). 
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participatory techniques alone contain important limitations: first, relativist 
subjective and self-reported measures of well-being can fail to capture social 
constraints and thus, reproduce existing discrimination and exclusion patterns in a 
particular social context; second, self-reported measures of well-being suffer from 
the same distributional problems that characterise relativist and objective poverty 
measures. This is simply because in a sample of poor households, a group can be 
relatively wealthier than the average; however they are still, in absolute terms, poor 
independently that they are perceived by the community as better off. We discuss 
this issue below in section 4.3.2. Another multidimensional and dynamic concept of 
deprivation, which has been increasingly explored in the literature of poverty 
analysis, is the one of vulnerability. 
4.2.3.1 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is related to the exposure of households to observe risks that can 
deepen the existing levels of poverty and deprivation (Dercon 2002). As pointed out 
by Coundouel et al (2000), vulnerability can emerge from various sources at the 
macro, and micro levels. Whilst examples of the former are financial crises, natural 
disasters such as flooding, earthquakes or droughts, and social phenomena such as 
crime, street violence and war, examples of the latter are idiosyncratic events such 
as ill-health, accidents and death. 
In earlier studies, income variability (or consumption expenditure variability) were 
used as a proxy of vulnerability. For example, Ravallion (1988) has derived an 
expected poverty function using data on household consumption to examine the 
dynamics of poverty, in terms of persistent and transient deprivation. Regarding the 
effects of aggregate shocks, Glewwe and Hall (1998) analyse how different socio- 
economic groups respond to macro shocks, looking in particular at welfare declines 
during macroeconomic crises, using panel data from Peru. Freeman et al (2003) have 
also explored the risks associated to natural disasters as important constraints of 
economic development and poverty reduction in developing countries. 
Kamanou and Morduch (2002) have estimated a vulnerability measure, which is 
derived as a function of the expected distribution of future expenditure, for 
87 
individual households using panel data from Cote d'Ivoire. Similarly, Amin et al 
(2003) have identified households, whose consumption levels vary with income, 
after controlling for aggregate variation in mean consumption and employing a 
fixed effects estimation, using panel data from Bangladesh. 
Although vulnerability has been associated with income variability, it may also be 
related to the inability of the poor to cope with external shocks. This inability may 
emerge, as pointed out by Moser (1997,1998), from low stocks of human capital, 
physical capital and social capital; from inefficiencies in both labour and credit 
markets, and from inequality in intra-household resource allocation. Regarding the 
inefficiencies in credit markets, Dercon (2002) has reported that although poor 
households use risk-coping mechanisms such as savings and informal insurance to 
deal with external shocks, their effectiveness is limited. This is because, he argues, 
lumpiness limits the use of assets as insurance, entry constraints limit the 
effectiveness of income diversification, and informal risk-sharing provides limited 
protection to the poor. 
In relation to inefficiencies in intra-household resource allocation, Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) analyse, using panel data from Ethiopia, the ability of household 
members to keep consumption smooth over time, relative to other members of the 
household. They find that households do not engage in complete risk sharing, being 
women the more vulnerable. 
More recently, Dutta et al (2007) use the von-Neumann-Morgenstern framework of 
decision making under uncertainty to derive a measure of vulnerability that takes 
into account the depth and the incidence of external shocks. Under a similar welfare 
theoretical approach Ligon and Schechter (2003) have derived a vulnerability 
measure that quantifies the welfare loss associated with poverty and the loss 
associated with uncertainty, using panel data from Bulgaria. Their findings point to 
larger effects of aggregate macro shocks than idiosyncratic events on welfare 
variability, with poverty and risk being equally important in the welfare loss. 
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Table 4.4 External shocks and coping strategies 
fFimirpa in nerrpntaoacl 
FINCOMUN CA ME PROMUJER Pooled sample 
Sample Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated 
size 
Overall 148 34,5 65,5 39,1 60,9 44,7 55,3 39,2 60,8 
External shocks 97 47,4 66,7 66,7 85,7 61,9 57,7 58,6 70 
Type of shock 
Death, illness or accident 65 66,7 41,7 66,7 83,3 84,6 66,7 73,5 63,5 
Robbery, burglary or assault 52 66,7 70,8 75' 45,8 23,1 40 52,9 54 
Natural disaster 3 0 0 0 4,2 0 13,3 0 4,8 
Destabilising factors 
Losing source of income 42 15,8 27,8 33,3 32,1 33,3 26,9 27,6 28,9 
III-health 114 84,2 69,4 72,2 75 81 84,6 79,3 75,6 
Crime and delinquency 40 26,3 36,1 61.11 28,6 0 11,5 27,6 26,7 
Coping strategies 
Borrowing from 10 5,3 8,3 0 10,7 9,5 3,8 5,2 7,8 
moneylender 
Borrowing from relatives 124 68,4 97,2 88,9 67,9 90,5 84,5 82,8 84,4 
and friends 
Use credit from MFI 22 0 11,1 0 57.1" 0 7,7 0 24.4" 
Use of informal savings 67 42,1 50 50 39,3 38,1 50 43,1 46,7 
Work more hours 4 5,3 2,8 0 3,6 4,8 0 3,4 2,2 
Sold physical assets 17 5,3 19,4 11,1 7,1 9,5 11,5 8,6 13,3 
i ne stansncauy sigruncant associanon in me cross-tavuianons are rnaucatea oy the i. nr-square values ror me ceu as a 
whole at 0.001("); 0.01("); 0.05 ('""); and 0.1(""') levels of significance. 
Sources: Authors sample survey 
Although vulnerability measures provide important information about the 
dynamics of human deprivation, their measurement is restricted to panel data. It is 
particularly due to this constraint that we were unable to examine the impacts of 
credit on household vulnerability. We managed however, to collect information 
from our quasi-experiment on the type of shocks that poor households are exposed 
to, and the kind of strategies that are followed to cope with such events (see table 
4.4). We find, for example, that about 65% of programme participants reported to 
have experienced an external shock by the time the quasi-experiment was 
operationalised. Two types of shocks where most commonly reported: the first were 
idiosyncratic events such as ill-health, accidents and death. The second were shocks 
related to crime and street violence. The second type of shock, in particular, was not 
surprising in the cases of households living in San Miguel Teotongo (and borrowing 
from Fincomun) and the Chalco Valley (borrowing from CAME), given the high 
levels of criminality that characterise the Eastern periphery of the Metropolitan area 
of Mexico City. 
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In relation to coping strategies, we find that borrowing from relatives and friends 
remains the immediate and most common coping mechanism used by poor 
households after experiencing an external shock. This mechanism, however, was not 
exclusive. We also find that households use savings, and credit lines from 
microfinance programmes to deal with such events. And when these options were 
not available, the poor even considered borrowing from the local moneylender. 
Although borrowing from moneylenders could be seen as a short run coping 
mechanism, this choice could actually reduce the probability of asset accumulation 
that exacerbate the vulnerability of the poor in the longer run, as we discuss later in 
chapter 8. In the following section we turn our attention to the second general 
approach for poverty estimates: monetary. 
4.3 Monetary approaches 
Conventionally, monetary poverty estimates are based on minimum levels of income 
(or expenditure), needed to satisfy nutritional, material and social requirements that 
enable individuals to be part of their community. This approach usually employs 
data from household surveys that allows statistical analysis on the characteristics 
and dynamics of human deprivation. 
There is an ongoing debate on the advantages and disadvantages of using data on 
household income or expenditure for poverty estimates. Household expenditure, on 
the one hand, is argued to be a better indicator when the household is exposed to 
high levels of income variability, either due to seasonality or external shocks such as 
droughts, floodings or financial crises (see e. g. Hentschel and Lanjouw 1996; 
Adelman 1993; Glewwe and van der Gaag 1988). The income variable, on the other 
hand, is a preferred indicator when a clear distinction of income sources such as 
waged labour and income-generating activities, is needed in the investigation (see 
e. g. Chaudhuri and Ravallion 1994; Anand and Harris 1989; Atkinson 1989). 
However, what it is relevant for us is that poverty estimates employing the income 
(or expenditure) variable allows the identification of poverty lines, in the form of 
thresholds that distinguish the poor from the non-poor, and which make possible 
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the measurement of incidence and depth of deprivation in, say, the Chalco Valley6. 
In this sense, the identification of poverty lines can be important instruments for 
statistical analysis of the impact of programme interventions such as microfinance. 
It is important to point out that poverty lines can be derived under absolutist or 
relativist approaches7: 
43.1 The absolutist monetary approach 
A poverty line z, under an absolutist monetary approach, is an aggregate cut-off for a 
population subgroup whose levels of e. g. consumption expenditure or income are 
insufficient to satisfy a minimum of basic needs (or utility), which is estimated 
based upon the cost of a set nutritional requirements or basic food basket, ZF, 
which usually contains the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)'s criteria of a 
daily intake of 2,100 calories per person for a healthy living (FAO 1957), and which 
varies from country to country depending on factors such as customs and 
seasonality. The basket may also include a non-food component zNF, that captures 
items such as housing, clothing and cooking (Ravallion 2002). In this sense, the 
poverty line can be derived as z= ZF +z "F . 
For poverty estimates across countries, organisations such as the Work Bank (1990) 
have derived a fixed absolute and objective threshold of human deprivation, using the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) of 1993, based on prices generated by the 
International Comparison Program (ICP), which covers 110 countries. As a result, a 
line was obtained at the median of the 10 lowest poverty lines. That line was equal 
to US $1.08 a day in 1993 PPP terms and is widely referred to as the World Bank's 
US $1 a day poverty line. An upper poverty line, commonly referred to as the World 
Bank's US $2 a day poverty line, was estimated by doubling the amount of the 
lower poverty line to reflect living standards in middle-income countries such as 
Mexico. 
6 For applications of monetary poverty lines see e. g. Ravallion (1994); Bidani and Ravallion (1994), 
and Atkinson (1993) 
7 For a comprehensive analysis on this issue, see Foster (1998). 
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These standardised absolutist poverty lines have been widely used in the context of 
global poverty analysis (see e. g. the World Development Reports 1990 and 2000); 
however, increasing concerns have emerged regarding the inappropriate 
methodology used to specify the deprivation thresholds that are likely to understate 
the extent of global income poverty (Reddy and Pogge 2005). This criterion of 
defining a minimum threshold for a standard of living is particularly inappropriate 
on a country basis. These lines are too low for the existing domestic prices in 
Mexico, which lead to underestimation of the magnitude and severity of poverty. 
This becomes evident below in section 4.4, where we discuss domestic poverty 
estimates in Mexico. 
4.3.1.1 Intra-household adjustments 
Households of different structure have different needs that reflect the age, gender 
and activities of each member. A household with 2 adults and 2 children for 
example, is expected to report smaller consumption expenditure on food than a 
household with 4 adults. Similarly, household size should be expected to reduce the 
cost, in per capita terms, of items such as gas, electricity and housing. Although 
there is a general consensus in relation to intra-household differences, there is still 
an ongoing debate about the weights that should be given to individual household 
members (World Bank 2005). 
The most common and extended approach for intra-household adjustments is the 
per capita method that consists in assigning equal weights to household members in 
the distribution of income. In this sense, in a household with two adults and two 
children, an equal weight is given to each member. The main constraint of the per 
capita approach is that it gives equal weights to adults and children, as well as 
young and elderly, independently of their needs. 
An alternative is the method of adult equivalence scales that consists in giving 
children a fraction of the adults' weight in the distribution of income. The use of 
equivalence factors is generally justified given the fact that children report lower 
consumption expenditure than adults (see e. g. Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995, and 
Deaton 1987). Other studies (e. g. Dreze and Srinivasan 1997) have suggested that 
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additional adults should be weighed less than the first adult after taking into 
account economies of scale. In his pioneering work, Rothbarth (1943) proposed an 
equivalence factor that assigned weights to household members as follows: 
eh =(Ah+4'K, )° (4.8) 
where eh is the equivalence factor for household h, Ah is the number of adults (from 
age 18 to 65) and 14, is the number of children in household h. The parameter 0 is 
equal to 1 and 1 has different values corresponding to the age and sex of every 
child. As a result, boys in the range 0-5 years have a value of 0.661 while girls 
have one of 0.609; boys in the range of 6 to 12 years have a parameter c1 of 0.750 
whereas girls, 0.664; young men in the range of 13 to 18 years have a parameter of 
0.633 whilst young women in the same range of age, 0.635. Finally elderly men and 
women (65 years of age and older) were assigned values of 0.553 and 0.570, 
respectively. We refer to the Rothbarth factor as the equivalence factor 1 or IAE1. 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998) have also proposed equivalence factors that give 
the parameters d1 and 0 in equation (4.8) a value equal to 0.75 where children are 
defined as those aged less than 14 years. We refer to this measurement as the 
equivalence factor 2 or IAE2. The OECD have also used a modified equivalence 
scale based on the work of Hagenarrs et al, (1998), which weights the first adult with 
1, additional adults with 0.5 and children aged 14 and less with 0.3. We refer to this 
equivalence factor as the equivalence factor 3 or IAE3. 
There have been recent attempts to incorporate intra-household adjustments to the 
distribution of income in developing countries. For example, May et al (1995) in the 
context of South Africa, and Hentschel and Lanjouw (1995) in the context of 
Ecuador. However, in the particular case of Mexico, there is no clear consensus on 
the most appropriate approach that should be followed (Sedesol 2002). For that 
reason, we have estimated income values for households participating in our quasi- 
experiment, employing the equivalence factors mentioned above, in addition to the 
per capita method (see table 4.5). After adjusting for intra-household distribution of 
welfare, we observed that the income variable considerably varied from one method 
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to another. For example, in the case of programme participants at Fincomun, the 
mean value of individual income computed for control households, as the 
percentage of the income of treatment groups, changed from 59% using income per 
capita, to 54% using income per adult equivalent 3. 
Table 4.5 Intra-household distribution of income by equivalent factors 
Mean values per month FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER (Figures in pesos of 2004) 
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control 
Household income 9,899 4,831 6,567 5,219 6,339 6,663 
As a% of treatment group 100 49 100 79 100 105 
Income per capita (IC) 2,338 1,372 1,707 1,473 1,711 1,503 
IC as a% of treatment group 100 59 100 86 100 88 
IAE1 a/ 2,684 1,533 1,963 1,699 2,010 1,766 
IAE1 as a% of treatment group 100 57 100 87 100 88 
IAE2 b/ 3,545 1,945 2,524 2,106 2,546 2,364 
IAE2 as a% of treatment group 100 55 100 83 100 93 
IAE3 c/ 4,208 2,271 2,982 2,474 3,040 2,836 
IAE3 as a% of treatment group 100 54 100 83 100 93 
a/ Income per adult equivalent 1 follows the approach developed by Rothbarth (1943), 
B/ Income per adult equivalent 2 follows Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998). 
c/ Income per adult equivalent 3 follows the OECD modified equivalence scale based on 
Hagenarrs et al, (1998). 
Source: Author's sample survey 
However, using the same equivalence factors for programme participants at 
Promujer, we find an opposite result in the distribution, which could be explained 
by differences in household composition in the two regions. Consequently, impact 
analysis, and in particular the conclusions on programme interventions, can be 
sensitive to the intra-household distribution of welfare. We discuss this particular 
issue in chapter 7, where we estimate the impact of credit, using those equivalence 
factors, including the per capita approach. 
4.3.1.2 Poverty measures 
Once an absolute poverty line has been defined, the aggregated estimation of the 
incidence of poverty is straightforward. This is simply the share of the sample 
population below the defined poverty line, expressed as the head-count ratio, 
HC = 
L, 
where no is the number of individuals below the poverty line, and n is 
n 
the total sampled population. The virtue of this poverty measure is that it allows us 
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to construct a poverty index in the form: HC = -> 1(y; <z), where I(. ) takes the 
n ; =1 
value 1 if household members report individual levels of income y, (either from the 
income per capita method or from equivalence factors) below the poverty line z, and 
zero, otherwise. This index, also known as the headcount index, facilitates the analysis 
of poverty and is easy to construct; however, fails to capture the depth and severity 
of deprivation. 
This constraint however can be addressed by deriving a poverty gap index. This 
measure captures the mean aggregate income shortfall relative to the poverty line 
across the population, and is expressed as the percentage of the poverty line, in the 
following form: PG where the poverty gap is G; = (z - y; ) 
[I (y; < z)]. In 
n "_º z 
this sense, the poverty gap index shows the amount of resources needed, in terms of 
e. g. income, to bring the poor to the poverty line and above (Coudouel et a! 2000). 
The squared poverty gap (PS) has been used elsewhere (e. g. World Bank 2000) to 
measure the severity of deprivation, taking into account the degree of inequality 
among poor. This measure is from the same family of the FGT index discussed in 
section 4.2.1.4. 
Depth and incidence are fundamental elements in the poverty impact analysis of 
programme interventions such as microfinance. For example, there could be the 
case of credit programmes reporting significant impacts on the incidence of poverty, 
i. e. being effective in reducing the number of poor borrowers, but just by lifting 
those who were closest to the poverty line, with insignificant impacts on the poverty 
gap. Alternatively, there could be the case of a credit programme being effective in 
targeting the very poor and thus reporting significant impacts on the poverty gap; 
however, by doing so, they may report insignificant impacts on the overall 
incidence. We investigate this particular issue later in chapter 7. 
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4.3.2 The relativist monetary approach 
A poverty line z= as(x), under a relativist monetary approach, is based upon the 
standard of living s(x), for the overall income distribution x, of a given society. 
The parameter a can arbitrarily set at different levels, e. g. 50% of the mean country 
income. As discussed above in section 4.1, the objective relativist notion of poverty 
was developed by Peter Townsend (1979), who defined an "orthodox poverty line" 
with the levels of sufficient real income needed to satisfy the consumption of goods 
and services, including the obligations that individuals have with their community. 
This relativist approach is commonly employed for the measurement of poverty in 
developed economies. For example, the European Commission derived for country 
members, a poverty line set at a=0.5 of the country's mean income, based on the 
work of O'Higgins and Jenkins (1990). 
Similarly, Atkinson (1998) has proposed a relative "intermediate poverty line" that is 
derived using relative weights on the European Union average income YEu, and the 
average income for country i, in the following form: 0.5(YEueY'-8), where 0 is a 
proxy of converge at regional and country level. Chen and Ravallion (2001) have 
also estimated an objective relativist poverty line, in comparison to the standard 
World Bank's US $1a day poverty line, using one third of a country's average 
consumption level at 1993 purchasing power parity (PPP). The use of relative 
poverty lines resulted in higher poverty estimates in countries with high average 
consumption but great inequality. The opposite effect, i. e. a reduction in relative 
poverty, was reported from countries with low inequality. 
However, an improved income distribution does not necessarily lead to 
improvements in well-being. In fact, such distribution-sensitive characteristic of the 
relativist approach have raised important questions about the consistency of relative 
poverty estimates (see e. g. Sen 1981; 1992, and Atkinson 1990). With the purpose of 
addressing the distributional issue, Sen (1976) proposed a poverty measure that 
incorporated the Gini coefficient, as a measure of income inequality, to the incidence 
and depth of poverty. 
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, where HC is the Thus, the Sen index S, was derived as S= HC L1- 
(1- G") 2 
headcount ratio derived above, G" is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution 
amongst the poor and 
yP is the poverty gap. One of the main constraints of the Sen 
z 
index, as pointed out by Foster et al (1984) and Deaton (1997), is that it cannot be 
used in the decomposition of poverty into distributions from different population 
subgroups. 
Foster et al (1984) address the structural constraints of the Sen index by deriving a 
poverty measure, FGT =1Iz- 
y) f (y) d(y), that is decomposable for a living 
n ; _l lz 
standard indicatory, say income, with weights for population subgroups that are 
distributed with a density f (y) d(y). The notion of the poverty line is captured by 
z. The distributional problem is reduced by the coefficient of variation aZ0. Once 
a increases, the FGT index becomes progressively more sensitive to the income 
levels of the population subgroups at the bottom end of the distribution. In this 
sense, for a=0, the FGT = HC, whereas for a =1 and a=2, the FGT = PG and 
FGT = PS, respectively. For that reason, the parameter a has been referred 
elsewhere (Giovanni and Liberati 2005) as a poverty aversion indicator. The problem 
with the FGT measure is that gives no answer to the question of what is the best 
value for a. 
Other generalised poverty measures have been proposed, following the work of Sen 
(1976), which take the distributional problem into account. For example Kakwani 
(1980) has derived an index that gives weights to the poor relative to the poverty 
gap. In this case, the larger the poverty gap, i. e. the poorer an individual is, the more 
weight is given to him. Similarly, Thon (1979) has proposed an index that, as in the 
case of the Kakwani index, is derived from the Sen Index. The main difference from 
the Kakwani index is that Thon assigns weights, relative to the poverty gap, 
conditional upon the distribution of the overall sample population and not just of 
the distribution of poor individuals. 
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In the particular context of impact analysis of microfinance, several poverty 
assessment tools have been proposed in an attempt to address the interest of donors 
and governments to document the poverty impacts of credit programmes that are 
often subsidised with public funds. Most of these tools, e. g. the Poverty Assessment 
Tool proposed by CGAP; the Client Impact Monitoring System proposed by 
Opportunity International; the Housing Index proposed by CASHPOR, ASA and 
AIM; the Food Security Scales proposed by Freedom from Hunger, and the 
Scorecard developed by PRIZMA are built based on a relativist poverty approach 
that employing income, expenditure or a set of well-being indicators that are 
derived from a sample of households that usually participate in a credit 
programmes. The problem with these tools is that they suffer from the same 
distributional constraints of the relativist poverty measures and thus, are likely to 
bias the estimations about incidence, depth and poverty impacts. 
4.3.3 Alternative poverty estimates 
Recent attempts have been made to combine absolute and relative poverty lines. 
Madden (2000), for example, employs a measure that takes into account inequality 
and the relative position of the household whilst recognising the absolute value of a 
set of items needed for a minimum living standard. Under this approach, qualitative 
information serves for the assignment of specific weights to such items. Pradhan 
and Ravallion (2000) have proposed the construction of subjective poverty lines from 
survey data for Jamaica and Nepal using qualitative questioning on whether 
households expenditure on food, housing and other items are adequate for their 
needs. Pradhan and Ravallion report robust results from subjective poverty lines 
close to the lines derived from objective measures. 
Similarly, Goedhart et al (1977) use subjective questioning about the minimal income 
level required to satisfy household needs. They find a log-linear relationship 
between the minimum amount required and the actual income and household size. 
Figure 4.1 provides a summary of selected poverty estimates and their 
measurement. 
8 For a comprehensive review of these poverty assessment tools, see Zeller (2004) 
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Figure 4.1. Tree of poverty estimates and their measures 
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4.4 Monetary poverty estimates in Mexico 
In Mexico, two major studies have given monetary values to basic food baskets, 
specifically constructed to define absolute and objective poverty lines. The seminal 
work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) in the early 1980s was the point of departure for the 
conceptualisation of a basic food basket that was used by the National Programme for 
Deprived Zones and Disadvantage Groups (or Coordinaci6n General del Plan 
Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados in Spanish), Coplamar (1982) 
as the methodological foundation for the construction of the first poverty line in 
Mexico. The second study was jointly carried out in 1993 by the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI) in collaboration with ECLAC9. In the 
following sections we briefly describe the two baskets. 
9 For a summary of the content and characteristics of such baskets, see table 4.6 
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4.4.1 The Coplamar study 
In the Coplamar study, an absolute dimension of human deprivation was the leading 
conceptualisation for the construction of a basic food basket that identified the 
minimum nutritional requirements needed to enjoy a healthy living in Mexico. That 
basket was based on criteria recommended by the United Nations Commission for 
Food and Agriculture; the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations 
University. 
In addition to the food items in the basket, Coplamar included other goods and 
services that were considered important in a social context. For example, 
expenditure on clothing, education, health care, housing and public transport as 
well as access to piped water, electricity and drainage. The resulting basket was 
defined as the Normative Basket of Basic Needs (NBBN), in which monetary values 
were assigned in per capita terms, based on an average household size of 4.9 
members at constant prices of 1981. This set of items served for the definition of a 
threshold of human deprivation that was referred to as the unsatisfied basic needs 
indicator (UBN). 
A major problem with the UBN indicator is that it fails to provide information on 
the quality of the items contained in the basket. For example, although a household 
living in the Chalco Valley, to the Eastern periphery of Mexico City, may have 
access to piped water and electricity, the quality of such services can be rather 
deficient. Contaminated water usually forces households living in that region to buy 
drinking water, whereas power cuts often damage refrigerators, TVs and other 
electrical appliances. Another problem emerging from the UBN indicator is related 
to its subjective criteria of defining a minimum requirement to satisfy human needs. 
This problem, however, can be addressed, as suggested by Desai and Shah (1998), 
by constructing aggregated measures, using mean values and giving equal weights 
to each input variable. However, perhaps the major constraint of the UBN indicator 
is related to the NBBN itself, which at the present time fails to reflect the existing 
patterns of consumption expenditure that have changed over the last decades. 
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4.4.2 The INEGI-ECLAC study 
In order to address the UBN constraints, the INEGI-ECLAC (1993) proposed in the 
early 1990s a basic food basket that was adjusted from the initial NBBN to reflect the 
new patterns of consumption expenditure in the country, in both the urban and 
rural context'°. The basket used annual data from the Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (ENIGH) of the years 1984,1989 and 1992. Monetary values 
were given to the items included in the basket at the prices of the corresponding 
years. There are two important advantages of the INEGI-ECLAC basket over the 
Coplamar basket: 1) it allows poverty analysis in both urban settlements and rural 
communities, and 2) it is decomposable for population subgroups. 
However, a major constraint of the INEGI-ECLAC basket emerges from the 
structural characteristics of the ENIGH survey, and which is based on sample data 
collected at the country level. In other words, poverty analysis is restricted to 
aggregate levels, excluding the possibility of conducting evaluations by state or 
municipality. Additionally, due to the fact that the ENIGH is a cross-sectional 
sample survey, it does not allow dynamic poverty analysis. 
Takla 4_ 6 Characteristics of the main basic food baskets in Mexico 
Basket Characteristics Parameters of reference cost 
Normative basket Integrated by 34 products It is unable to differentiate Monthly cost of 522.15 
of food (Coplamar considered essential to rural from urban areas. pesos per individual 
1982) satisfy a daily intake of It is based on a mean (approximately US $52) 
2,082 calories and 35.1 household size of 4.9 at constant prices of 
grams of protein per adult members, where 2.77 are 2001. 
for a healthy living adults, 1.66 children from 
the age of 3 to 14 years, 
and 0.47 babies. 
Basic food basket Constructed based upon It differentiates rural from Monthly cost of 485.71 
(INEGI-ECLAC international criteria of urban areas. pesos per individual 
1993) 2,220 calories and 40 grams It gives different weights (approximately US $48) 
of proteins a day per adult according to age, sex and for rural areas, and 
for urban areas and 2,180 occupation. 652.57 pesos (US $65) for 
calories and 37 grams of urban areas, at constant 
proteins for rural areas. prices of 2000. 
Source: Sedesol 2002 
10 The INEGI define urban areas as those municipalities with more than 15 thousand inhabitants, 
whereas rural areas as those municipalities with less than 14.9 thousand inhabitants. 
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4.4.3 Poverty studies in Mexico 
Over the last 20 years, an important number of poverty studies have derived 
poverty lines, using different methodologies (see table 4.8). Levy (1991) and 
Hernandez-Laos (1990), for example, derived a threshold for moderate poverty 
based on Coplamar's (1982) Normative Basket of Basic Needs that included, as 
mentioned earlier, food and non-food items. Levy, however, followed Lipton (1983) 
by assigning more weights to non-food items within household expenditure to 
define an ultra-poverty line, which reflected insufficient income levels to buy the 
Coplamar's basic food basket. In that case, the cost of such basket was multiplied by a 
factor a= 1.25. 
In another study, ECLAC (1990) derived a moderate poverty line based on an 
adjusted basic food basket. The cost of the food component was estimated using a 
standard measure of nutritional requirements needed in both urban and rural areas. 
In order to include non-food items, the ECLAC study estimated that the total 
household consumption expenditure was twice the cost of the basic food basket in 
urban areas, and 75% of the same basket in rural areas. As a result, the ECLAC was 
able to derive an ultra-poverty line that only included the cost of the basic food basket. 
A few years later, the INEGI-ECLAC (1993) estimated, using the INEGI-ECLAC 
basic food basket, that in 1992,16.1% of households in Mexico, 9.6% living in urban 
areas, and 25.7%, in rural areas, were living in extreme poverty. The estimations also 
included moderate poverty, which was computed using non-food items. The results 
showed that 44% of the households in Mexico were moderately poor, with substantial 
differences between urban (36.7%) and rural (55%) areas. 
Table 4.7 Mixed poverty matrix 
Poverty line Poverty line 
Poor Non-poor UBN 
UBN Poor 55.1% 21.7% 76.8% 
UBN Non poor 3.8% 19.4% 23.2% 
E Poverty line 58.9 41.1% 100% 
Source: Boltvinik (1999) 
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Boltvinik (1999) has estimated the incidence of poverty by combining monetary and 
multidimensional measures of deprivation. This mixed approach used a poverty 
line and the UBN indicator to construct poverty matrices. As a result, Boltvinik 
reported that in 1989,55.1% of households in Mexico were living in extreme poverty, 
whereas almost 81% were in moderate poverty. This method has generated 
controversy, particularly over the results showed in the cells where households are 
classified as poor by the UBN but as non-poor by the poverty line (see table 4.7). 
Table 4 R. Selected nnverty shidiva in Mp, cirn 
Study Poverty measures T of basket End enous variable Methodological adjustments 
Raygoza (1999) Monetary Coplamar Consumption 
ECLAC (2001) Monetary INEGI-ECLAC Income Inputting missing prices 
crossing results with national 
account matrix 
INEGI-ECLAC Monetary Adjusted basket Income Rural and urban, 
(1993) based on the initial Crossing results with national 
NBBN with data from account matrix 
the ENIGH 
OECD (1995) Monetary Relative mean Disposable income Adult equivalent scales and 
(considered as poor scale economies 
those below 50% of 
median) 
Lustig and Szbkely Monetary INEGI-ECLAC Income and Crossing results with national 
(1999) consumption account matrix 
Lustig (19%) Mixed approach Current income 
(monetary and and consumption 
UBN) 
Levy (1994) Monetary Coplamar Consumption 
Hernandez Laos Monetary INEGI-ECLAC Income Crossing results with national 
(2000) account matrix 
Equivalent scales to adult 
Economies of scale 
Inputting missing prices 
Hemändez Laos Monetary INEGI-ECLAC Income Crossing results with national 
and Velazquez account matrix Inputting 
(2002) missing prices 
De la Torre (1997) Monetary Income 
Coplamar (1982) UBN NBBN based on a Income Weighted means to capture 
basic food basket sector variability 
Pänuco-Laguette Monetary Coplamar Income per capita 
and Sz6kely (1997) 
Boltvinik (1999) Mixed approach Coplamar Income Adult equivalent scales 
Per capita analysis 
Adjustment by age, sex and type 
of activity 
Szekel et al (2000 Monetary Coplamar Consumption Per capita analysis 
Sedesol (2002) Monetary INEGI-ECLAC Income Per capita analysis 
Rural and urban 
Crossing results with national 
account matrix 
z, ource: aeaesoi (ZW ) 
Other studies, based on the INEGI-ECLAC basic food basket, have reported different 
results. For example, Pänuco-Laguette and Szekely (1997) estimated that in 1994, 
27.8% of households in Mexico lived in extreme poverty, whereas Lustig and 
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Sz6kely (1999), using the same data, estimated that 15.5% were in that level of 
extreme deprivation. In the Raygoza (1999) study for 1996,38.4% of population was 
estimated to be in extreme poverty, whereas Sz6kely et al (2000) estimated that 
21.2% of the population was under the same threshold of human deprivation. More 
recently, Hernandez-Laos and Velazquez (2002) estimated that 30.1% and 50.1% of 
the population was in extreme and moderate poverty, respectively whereas the 
ECLAC (2001) estimated that 9.7% of the urban population in the country lived in 
extreme poverty compared to 58.5% in rural communities (see table 4.8). The World 
Bank (2000) has also reported poverty estimates for Mexico, employing standard 
absolute poverty lines. According to the bank, in 1995 approximately 17.9% of the 
population lived on less than US $1 a day, whereas 42.5% lived on less than US $2 a 
day. Similarly, the OECD (2006) has estimated the level of deprivation in the 
country by using a relativist income poverty approach based on 2002 data. The 
organisation reported that around 20% of the population had an equivalised 
disposable income of less than 50% of the median income, whereas one quarter of 
the population had less than 60% of such level. 
4.4.4 Official poverty lines in Mexico 
Despite the fact that there are an important number of studies that propose different 
poverty lines (see table 4.8), it was not until 2000 when the Mexican government 
called for the formation of a panel of experts, the Technical Committee for Poverty 
Measurement (TCPM), with the explicit purpose of deriving the first official poverty 
lines in the country. Academics and government officials, the latter with no voting 
rights on methodological issues, integrate the panel of experts. During the first year 
of the Fox administration, the panel worked in the methodological and analytical 
framework that served as the foundation for the estimation of poverty in the 
country. This section is based on a document circulated by Sedesol (2002). 
According to the TCPM, the main ingredients considered in the estimation of the 
poverty lines were: 1) data availability, 2) the selection of a basic food basket, and 3) 
theoretical and methodological consistency in deriving poverty measures. 
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In relation to the first aspect, the panel identified the Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey and the corresponding rounds for 1984,1989,1992,1994,1996, 
1998,2000 and 2002 as the source of data on current household income as the indicator 
of well-being, weighted in per capita terms for intra-household distribution of 
welfare. Household income was derived from the sum of monetary income (from 
e. g. wages, earnings from business activities, remittances, capital income, and so 
on), and non-monetary income (from e. g. payments in-kind, gifts, and estimates of 
self-consumption and housing rent, etc). The resulting dataset was normalised on 
monthly basis in prices of August of the corresponding year and deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index (Sedesol 2002). 
In relation to the last two aspects, the panel decided to use the INEGI-ECLAC (1993) 
basic food basket B, that measures, in monetary terms, the minimum nutritional 
requirements for a healthy living, and from which a line of extreme poverty was 
derived. This bottom-end and food-based threshold of human deprivation zl , 
(referred hereafter as poverty line 1 or PL1) was derived by the estimation of the 
income levels required, in per capita terms, to purchase such a basket in both the 
urban and rural context. This was possible by computing the share of food 
expenditure cp, relative to total household expenditure E,, using information from 
F 
the ENIGH surveys as follows: f'= , where 
EF is the food expenditure of 
r 
household i, and (p: 5 1. Note that when EF = E,, the share of food expenditure 
fp =1. Let us refer to this equality as e. 
Then all sampled households in the ENIGH were ranked by E, and matched with 
V. Once a group of households reported the equality 0p , it was possible to derive 
the poverty line 1 as follows: z, = B(fo) . In this sense, the incidence of extreme 
poverty could be computed by the estimation of the headcount index. In order to 
derive an upper-end poverty line that captures a moderate degree of human 
deprivation, z3, (referred hereafter as poverty line 3 or P13), a mean value of the 
non-food expenditure component of the poverty line was estimated as follows: 
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z"F = z3 [1-EC(z3)], where EC(z3) is the Engel coefficient for household i with 
income levels equal to the poverty line. Note that z3 = 
z' 
, where the Engel EC(z3) 
coefficient was computed with a mean value ECP for the group of households with 
income levels below p= 10, i. e. 10 percentiles. As a result, z3 was computed by 
multiplying the inverse of the Engel coefficient by the poverty line 1, as follows: 
This threshold was identified in the Sedesol study as an asset-based z3 = zl EC 
P P 
poverty line. 
Taking into consideration that the Engel method may include non-food items that 
are not strictly necessary in a social context, the TCPM added to the basic food 
basket B, a non-food expenditure component EZ F, that only included expenditure 
on clothing, housing, health care, formal instruction and public transport, 
E2, =B+ E2NF . The ratio of the two components relative to the total 
household 
expenditure E, , is fp2 = 
EZ' 
, where (p2 <_ 
1. Note that when E21= E, , q'2 =1. We E; 
refer to this equality as ßpp . 
Once a group of households reported a V2, it was possible to derive the adjusted 
poverty line z2, (refer hereafter as poverty line 2 or PL2) as follows: z2 = E2; (SpZ) . 
This threshold is defined in the Sedesol study as a capability-based poverty line, where 
z3 > zZ > z,. As a result, the Technical Committee for Poverty Measurement was 
able to set the poverty line 1, which measures extreme poverty, at 626 pesos per capita 
per month in prices of August 2000 for urban areas, and at 462.9 pesos per capita 
per month for rural areas. 
In relation to poverty line 2, it was set at 767.7 pesos per capita per month for urban 
areas, and at 548.4 pesos for rural areas. Finally, the poverty line 3, which measures 
moderate poverty, was set at 1,225.3 pesos per capita per month for urban areas and 
"For a discussion of the Engel coefficient, see Fisher (1992) and I louthakker (1957). 
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at 842.6 pesos for rural areas. The resulting estimations of the headcount index 
showed that about 24% of the population (18.6% of households) were below the 
food-based poverty line 1 in 2000. Similarly, and using the capabilities-based poverty 
line 2, the incidence of poverty showed that 31.9% of the population (25.3% of 
households) were below that threshold of deprivation, whereas 54.7% of the 
population (45.9% of households) were below the asset-based poverty line 3 that 
measures moderate poverty (see table 4.9). 
Table 4.9. Poverty estimates for 2000 
Urban areas Rural areas Individuals Households 
(in pesos per capita (in pesos per capita below z (%) below z (%) 
per month) per month) 
Food-based 626 426.9 24.2 18.6 
poverty line 1 
Capabilities-based 767.7 548.4 31.9 253 
poverty line 2 
Assets-based 1,225.3 842.6 53.7 45.9 
vovertv line 3 
Source: Sedesol (2002) 
A debate emerged in the academic community in Mexico, particularly in relation to 
the potential bias from the use of the Engel coefficient in the estimation of the non- 
food component of the poverty line (see also Ravallion and Bidani 1994). 
Additionally, there have been some concerns about, e. g. the choice of using 
household income rather than household expenditure; the selection of income per 
capita rather than using adult equivalence scales and economies scales for intra- 
household distribution of welfare; the exclusion of multidimensional variables of 
human deprivation, and controls for price variations across the country (World 
Bank 2005). 
Despite constraints, these poverty lines offer the possibility of separating urban 
areas from rural communities (see figure 42), which is crucial for our study, and 
including other equivalence factors for intra-household distribution of welfare. 
Furthermore, it allows us to conduct well-established poverty measures such as the 
headcount index and the poverty gap in the poverty analysis, (which are presented 
later in chapter 7), and make our results comparable with the standard criteria of 
poverty measurement in the country. 
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Figure 4.2 Poverty trends in Mexico 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
By using the Consumer Price Index to deflate the levels of prices in 2004, we were 
able to estimate the food-based poverty line I for the period January-May 2004, 
when our quasi-experiment was conducted. The I'LI was set at 26.15 pesos per 
capita per day for urban areas, and at 19.44 pesos per capita per capita for rural 
areas. In other words, a person living in the Metropolitan area of Mexico City with a 
monthly income of Y, S 794.5, was considered to he extremely poor. In relation to 
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poverty line 2, we estimated this threshold at 50.25 pesos per capita per day for 
urban areas, and at 33.78 pesos per capita per day for rural areas. In this respect, a 
person living in Mexico City, with income levels y,: 51507.5, was considered to be 
poor. Finally, the upper-end poverty line 3, which measures moderate poverty, was 
estimated at 62.70 pesos per capita per day for urban areas, and at 41.97 pesos per 
capita per day for rural areas. In consequence, an individual living in urban 
settlements with monthly income below 1881 pesos was regarded as a moderately 
poor. (See table 4.10) 
Table 4.10 Poverty lines for Mexico in prices of 2004 
Poverty line 1 Poverty line 2 Poverty line 3 
Food-based threshold Capability-based Asset-based threshold 
that measures extreme threshold that that measures 
poverty measures poverty moderate poverty 
Urban 784.5 1507.5 1881.0 
Rural 583.2 1013.4 1259.0 
Using these updated poverty lines, and employing data collected at the household 
level from our quasi-experiment, (see chapter 6 for further details), we were able to 
estimate the headcount index, as the share of the sampled households below the 
selected poverty lines, and the poverty gap, as the mean aggregate income per 
capita shortfall relative to the poverty line across the sample, for both treatment and 
control groups participating in our study. Note that we use the poverty estimates 
for urban areas, given the demographic characteristics of the settlements where our 
study took place. For comparative purposes, we also estimated the World Bank's 
poverty line of US$2 a day (see table 4.11). 
Taking for example, poverty line 3 as a point of reference, we observed a large 
incidence of poverty amongst treatment and control groups living in the 
neighbourhoods where the case-study organisations operate, relative to the mean 
value reported for urban areas in the country (about 40%). However, only In the 
case of Fincomun we find a statistically significant association, at the 0.05 levels, 
between treatment and control groups in relation to the incidence of poverty. 
Similar results were found when the poverty line 2 was used. More precisely, the 
empirical evidence suggests a significant relationship between programme 
participation and poverty reduction in the case of Fincomun. We discuss this 
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particular issue in more detail in chapter 7, where the impact of credit on income 
poverty is examined. In the following Chapter we present the analytical framework 
for the investigation of the impacts of credit on income poverty, labour and well- 
being. 
Table 4.11 Poverty and human deprivation amongst programme participants 
Figures in percentages 
FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Concept Sample Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated 
size 
Overall 148 34.5 65.5 39.1 60.9 44.7 55.3 
Incidence of extreme poverty 
(PL1) c/ 
5 784.5 pesos per month 10 15.8 11.1 11.2 0 0 3.9 
Poverty gap 43.4 28.2 13.5 0 0 5.1 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 341 221 106 0 0 43 
Incidence of poverty (PL2) 
51507.5 pesos per month 60 63.2""" 27.8 50.0 42.9 33.3 385 
Poverty gap 38.1 36.2 35.0 20.2 17.5 21.2 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 574 545 527 304 263 319 
Incidence of moderate 
poverty (P13) 
51881 pesos per month 87 73.7"" 36.1 77.8 67.9 61.9 53.9 
Poverty gap 44.8 39.3 34.1 25.4 23.3 30.6 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 842 738 642 477 439 576 
World Bank's poverty line 
SUS$2aday 7 15.8 8.3 5.6 0 0 0 
Poverty gap 33.6 23.7 1.1 0 0 0 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 225 159 7 0 0 0 
The statistically significant association in the cross-tabulations are indicated by the Chi-square values 
for the cell as a whole at 0.001("); 0.01('"); 0.05 ("'); and 0.1("'"') levels of significance. 
c/ Poverty lines are derived in prices of 2004, following Sedesol (2002) 
Source: Author's sample survey 
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Chapter ,5 
Analytical framework 
Introduction 
In this chapter we propose an analytical framework that seeks to set up the 
theoretical foundations for the investigation of the impacts of credit on various 
aspects of household well-being in the context of fragmented credit markets. We 
employ an approach that focuses on the connection between the direct and indirect 
mechanisms that microfinance organisations exploit to reduce the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, and enable low-income enterprising 
households to access institutional financing. And it is precisely through the decision 
of borrowing that we investigate its effects on various aspects of households' 
wellbeing. 
In the analytical framework we also introduce the notion of household capital 
endowments, which are integrated by a set of three separate but interrelated factors 
of production: physical capital, human capital, and social capital. These factors of 
production are central in our impact analysis. The analytical framework is devised 
from the relationship between capital endowments and the key markets: labour and 
credit. The chapter is organised as follows: in section 5.1 we briefly discuss the 
effects of informational asymmetries on credit markets, and the direct and indirect 
mechanisms that microfinance organisations exploit to reduce such constraints. 
Section 5.2 presents the analytical framework in which the notion of household 
capital endowments is introduced. In the same section we analyse the relationship 
between capital endowments and the access to the labour and credit markets, 
whereas in section 53 we briefly discuss the theoretical propositions to be tested in 
relation to the impacts of credit on household well-being. 
5.1 The problems of fragmented credit markets 
Over the last three decades, important theoretical contributions have improved our 
understanding of the principles under which fragmented credit markets operated. 
In particular, the pioneering work of Arrow (1963); Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) led to subsequent studies e. g. Besley and Coate (1995); Stiglitz (1990), 
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) amongst others, that examine the effects of moral hazard and 
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adverse selection on credit markets with asymmetric (or imperfect) information. The 
emergence of the information paradigm (Stiglitz 2001) has challenged the foundations 
of the competitive equilibrium analysis, in which financial market liberalisation has 
been the mainstream rationale'. In an effort of analytical simplification, we 
arbitrarily divide the analysis of the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection in 
two separate sections (5.1.1 and 5.1.2), although they simultaneously and 
dynamically interact with each other. 
5.1.1 The problem of moral hazard 
To begin with a comprehensive account of the effects of imperfect credit markets, 
let us assume that an enterprising household i has a business opportunity at the 
fixed cost Cf, which we normalise at Cf =1. The decision of investing in that 
business will yield a return R=0 if the venture fails, and R>1, otherwise. The 
predicted probability of business success, denoted here by the function ir(a), 
heavily depends on unobservable factors, contained in a vector a, that are 
endogenously related to the efforts and abilities that the enterprising household put 
into practice, and which affect the outcome R (see Varian 1984). We also assume 
that the expected utility function of the household's actions, EU(a), is affected by 
both the utility cost of working C"(a), and the opportunity cost of staying in 
business, which is represented by alternative employment opportunities, W. Note 
that W= w(L) - C" (L) , where w(L) and C(L), are the wage rate, and utility cost 
of waged labour, respectively. In this sense, the decision of staying in business is 
constrained by EU(a) = x(a)R - C" (a) z W. 
Suppose now that the enterprising household considers borrowing from a lender, 
say a microfinance organisation, at an interest rate (r) that together with the 
principal (P) constitutes the interest factor i=P(1+r). Under that condition, the 
expected return to the lender (i) is conditional upon the probability of business 
success, z(a), and the opportunity cost of investment funds in the capital market, 
p. Note that . 7r(a) is inversely related to the rate of loan default, d, i. e. 
I For advocates of the competitive equilibrium analysis, see Adams et al (1984); Vogel and 
Adams (1997) and Von Pischke et at (1983). 
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x(a)=1-d , whereas p is simply a function of the interest rate paid by the lender 
to external sources of funding, F, i. e. p= F(1 + r). Assuming zero subsidisation 
from external donors, the lender will need to derive the following rate of interest to 
breakeven: 
p+a(d)+s 
r= 1-d 
(5.1) 
where a(d) and S are the share of the principal conditional upon the expected rate 
of loan default, and the informational costs from screening, incentive and 
enforcement devices, respectively (Hulme and Mosley 1996). In a risk-neutral 
situation, the household will take the loan if the expected return to the investment 
satisfy the condition i: 5 R. If that was the case, then the returns to the lender and 
borrower yield the outcomes represented in the upper row of the following 
representation: 
Borrower Lender 
Sucess R-i- C" (a) i 
Failure C°(a) 0 
where both the borrower's and lender's utility functions find the optimal 
equilibrium at Max . c(a)(R-i)-C"(a) ZW in the case of the former, and 
r, a 
Max 'r(a)i >_ p in the case of the latter. However, due to imperfect information, the 
i, " 
actions contained in (a) are unknown and difficult to monitor from the lender's 
point of view. In order words, the lender finds it difficult to know whether the 
actions taken by the borrower are sufficient to achieve a successful (or failure) 
outcome, i. e. Va e {0,1} . This is a dilemma that Kenneth Arrow (1963) identifies as 
the moral hazard problem. In order to induce borrowers to take the morally correct 
actions to succeed in the business, the lender will require borrowers to offer 
collateral (c) in the form of household assets or guarantees with a value greater than 
R. In this sense, equilibrium will be set at the level where borrowers achieve 
2 We have borrowed this matrix representation from Bardhan and Udry (1999). 
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Max ; r(a)(R-i)-[1-, r(a)]c-C"(a)2tW (5.2) 
i, a, c 
and lenders, 
Max 't(a)i+[1-1t(a)]c Z p. (5.3) 
,. a, c 
A fundamental problem emerges when the actions a, taken by the borrower are 
driven by a risk-averse behaviour (Arrow 1971; Pratt 1964). In situations of 
uncertainty, risk aversion will affect borrowers' willingness to absorb the entire risk 
of taking a loan (through the use of collateral) and ultimately will aggravate the 
adverse selection problem. Additionally, the effect of risk aversion can exacerbate 
the problems of credit rationing in the market. 
5.1.2 The problem of adverse selection 
To illustrate this problem, let us assume that in a population (p) there are two types 
of enterprising households: type 1 households are risk-averse, so they are engaged 
in projects that are more likely to succeed but yielding low returns. Type 2 
households are risk-lovers, so they are usually engaged in riskier businesses that are 
more likely to fail, but they yield high returns when successful. In other words, the 
predicted probability of success is greater for risk-averters, i. e. n(1) > r(2), whereas 
the expected returns to borrowers investments are larger for risk-lovers, i. e. 
R(l) < R(2). 
At the interest rate i, the expected utility function for enterprising households, 
EU(i, t), is given by the restriction 2r(t)[R(t)-i]ZW where the two types of 
households are contained in a set te {1,21 . Due to differences in risk sensitivity, we 
assume that ; r(1)[R(1)-i] <; r(2)[R(2)-i], i. e. the expected utility functions for the 
two types of borrowers are EU (i, 1) < EU (i, 2). 
A major problem emerges from the lender's point of view, and which is related to 
the nature of credit markets with incomplete information that makes difficult to 
differentiate between the two types of borrowers. Since the returns to the lender are 
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restricted to 'r(t)i Z p, where p denotes the opportunity cost of funds, then the 
expected returns to the lender will be greater if loans are given to secure applicants, 
i. e. ß(1)t > >r(2)t. 
For a discussion of the problems that emerge from the difficulty of identifying the 
two type of borrowers, we follow the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and consider 
the case where type 1 borrowers will be willing to borrow up to the highest rate of 
interest i*(1), level at which 2r(l)[R(l)-i*]=W. At an interest rate higher than 
i. (1), type 1 borrowers will dropout or simply not borrow in the first place. Type 2 
borrowers are willing to take higher risks and borrow up to the rate of interest 
i*(2), level at which ; r(2)[R(2)-i*]=W. At a rate higher than i*(2) type 2 
borrowers will stop demanding loans. 
Since ie(1) <i*(2), at the interest rate below ie(1), i. e. 15 i*(1), the two types of 
applicants in the population will demand loans, and the lender will receive 
increasing returns conditional upon 2r(t)i=p(1). (1)i+[1-p(l)]; r(2)i. This is 
shown by the distance from p to b in the lower-right quadrant of figure 5.1. 
However, if the lender increases the interest rate beyond i*(1), i. e. i* (1) <i 5 i* (2), 
anticipating higher returns, he soon realises that only risky applicants take loans, 
i. e. 2r(t)i =; r(2)i . As a consequence, the expected probability of loan default 
(d ) 
increases, and the returns to the lender begin to fall. This is illustrated by the 
distance from b to c in the lower-right quadrant of figure 5.1, where the vertical axis 
represents the returns to the lender 'r(t)i conditional upon the borrower's risk- 
taking, whereas i shows the interest rate charged by the lender. If the lender 
continues increasing the rate of interest, he will continue losing money until the 
point iZ iß(2), where no household will apply for a loan and the lender will make 
zero profits. Note that zero profits denote the opportunity cost of funds, i. e. 
X(t)i =0=P. 
This is what Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have identified as the adverse selection problem 
in credit markets. A crucial condition pointed out in the Stiglitz and Weiss paper is 
that the equilibrium interest rate i will not be at the level where the supply of funds 
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cleans the demand for loans (point e in the upper-right quadrant of figure 5.1), but 
where the lender minimises losing money, i. e. point a in the upper-right quadrant 
where the vertical axis shows the demand for loans DL. The lower-left quadrant 
shows the supply of funds as a function of the cost of those funds, p. In this sense, 
the lender will set the interest rate at the level where profit maximisation is 
achieved, i. e. Max )r(t)i, subject to p< r(t)i* for a given number of ith type of i't 
borrowers, i. e. at the rate i =i*(1) . Clearly, the consequence of adverse selection 
leads to credit rationing with equilibrium. This is shown in figure 5.1 by the areas 
covered with the capital letter E, representing the excess demand for loanable 
funds. 
Figure 5.1. Market equilibrium with rationing (from Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) 
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As in the case of moral hazard, lenders usually deal with the adverse selection 
problem with the use of collateral. But because borrowers differ in the likelihood of 
loan default, the use of collateral can only mitigate but not eliminate the problems 
of moral hazard and adverse selection. This restriction causes the lender 
informational costs that Hoff and Stiglitz (1990: 237) have referred to as 1) the 
screening problem, because it is costly to determine the risk of loan default; 2) the 
incentive problem, because it is costly to ensure that borrowers take the correct 
actions to increase the likelihood of repayment, and 3) the enforcement problem, 
because it is costly to force borrowers to repay the loan. In developing countries, 
informational costs can vary considerably according to infrastructure and local 
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prices. However, the cost of screening applicants can be reduced by the use of 
information from residents of the same neighbourhood. This is actually the way 
indigenous agents such as moneylenders exploit their informational advantage 
relative to outside uninformed lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1998)3. 
An important number of devices have been exploited by microfinance 
organisations, and increasingly examined in the literature (see e. g. Stiglitz 1990; 
Besley and Coate 1995; Ghatak 1999; van Tassel 1999; Laffont 2003; Armendariz de 
Aghion and Collier 2000). These devices deal with the screening, incentive and 
enforcement problems; however, as pointed out by Stiglitz 1990, they can be costly 
substitutes for collateral, in particular to the borrower. We discuss this issue later in 
Chapter 7, when the costs of peer monitoring in group-lending contracts are 
analysed in more detail. Following the Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) categorisation of 
direct and indirect mechanisms, we briefly examine some of these devices. 
5.1.3 Direct mechanisms 
Direct mechanisms have been conceptualised in the Hoff and Stiglitz paper as those 
devices that directly deal with the costs of screening applications, and enforcing 
repayment. Generally used by banks and other traditional non-banking institutions, 
collateral in the form of land, assets or guarantees, remains the most common direct 
screening device in traditional lending. However, in deprived social environments, 
where microfinance organisations usually operate, potential borrowers (often in 
poverty) do not have enough assets to back a loan application, and for that reason 
they are also likely to be risk averse (Ravallion 1988; Sinha and Lipton 1999). These 
attitudes towards risk considerably restrict, as discussed above, the effectiveness of 
collateral as screening device. 
Lenders in fragmented markets have explored other direct mechanisms. For 
example, Bell and Srinivasan (1989) showed that trade-credit linkages between 
suppliers (or dealers) and lenders can considerably reduce the informational 
3 In chapter 6 we discuss the strategy of data collection in which we surveyed households 
living in the same neighbourhood and borrowing from microfinance organisations operating 
in the area. This helped us to keep constant informational costs and other factors such as 
input costs, local prices and infrastructure characteristics that could affect the estimation of 
credit impacts. 
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asymmetry and reduce the enforcement problem that affect the expected default 
rate (d), and the informational costs (q) in equation 5.1. But Bell (1990) have also 
reported in the context of India that trade-credit linkages can exacerbate 
informational asymmetries between lenders, since those with linkages with suppliers 
exploit their informational advantage over those with no connections, leading to 
monopolistic practices. 
The screening process between lenders and borrowers may also create trust, a 
process that can be linked to the concept of social capital (Putnam et al 1993; Becker 
1996). Aleem (1990), for instance, found in the context of Pakistan that the screening 
process from moneylenders creates "relationship-specific" that are likely to reduce 
the screening and enforcement costs overtime. In this sense, once borrowers shift 
from one lender to another, they would need to build up creditworthiness with the 
new lender. Dowla (2005) in a recent paper reported the creation of social capital 
from the lending process between Grameen Bank and programme participants. In 
this sense, collective action through horizontal and vertical networks allow poor 
households to access credit markets. Similarly, Van Bastelaer (1999) has examined 
the role of social capital in reducing the screening and enforcement problems and its 
effects on market efficiency. We discuss the importance of social capital in the 
process of accessing credit in section 5.2.2 
Compulsory savings, playing the role of loan insurance, is another direct mechanism 
exploited by lenders to reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
that emerge from the process of lending with no collateral. The device consists in 
periodic deposits usually set as a percentage of loan instalments, and which take 
place on a regular basis often simultaneously to loan repayments. Compulsory 
savings help lenders to reduce the expected default rate (d), the informational costs 
(s) and the components in p related to interest rate paid by the lender to external 
sources of funding, i= F(1 + r). Savings and credit co-operatives, and credit unions 
have largely used the device since the 19th Century, in countries such as Germany, 
England, Italy and Canada4. Nonetheless, the role of compulsory savings in group- 
lending contracts has been at the centre of recent discussions that advocates for the 
4 For comprehensive historical reviews of loan funds and credit co-operatives in Europe, see 
Hollis and Sweetman (1998), and in the case of credit unions, see MacPherson (1999). 
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introduction of more flexible mechanisms of deposits in microfinance (see e. g. 
Robinson 1997). However, international experiences5 have shown the importance of 
preventive and protective regulatory systems to safeguard small depositors against 
the implicit risks associated with financial instability (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega 
1994). 
Compulsory savings as well as loan repayments are arranged in periodical repayment 
schedules. In traditional group-lending models, periodical repayment schedules act 
as direct screening and enforcement devices to reduce the expected default rate and 
informational costs. This is through the obligation of group members to attend 
compulsory meetings that take place on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis, where 
peer monitoring (as indirect device) take place, and loan repayments are made. Group 
lending contracts, based on either solidarity groups (e. g. Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh and BancoSol in Bolivia) or village banking (e. g. FINCA and its country 
partners), take advantage of the informational flows that emerge from peer 
monitoring during group meetings in order to screen out irregular borrowers and 
prevent future defaults. 
Although periodical repayment schedules are important for the lender, given the 
nature of joint liability that characterise group-lending models, the rigidity of these 
devices can cause distortions in credit markets with adverse effects to the borrower. 
For example, in communities with seasonal income, the probability of observing a 
mismatch between inflows of household income and the scheduled loan 
repayments increases. This can force households to borrow below the optimum 
level. 
5.1.4 Indirect mechanisms 
The use of joint liability in group lending contracts, in what Besley and Coate (1995) 
have referred to as social collateral, acts as an indirect6 mechanism that substitutes 
5 For example, in Chapter 2 the catastrophic effects of the Mexican financial crisis of 
December 1994 on small depositors were discussed. McDonald and Ledgerwood (1999) have 
also discussed the effects of financial crises in the context of Eastern Europe in the 1990s 
when many small depositors lost their savings. 
66 Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) refer to indirect mechanisms as those devices that the lender use to 
ensure that the borrower takes appropriate actions to reduce the likelihood of loan default. 
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physical collateral. In this sense, group lending contracts help lenders to reduce the 
components d and S of equation 5.1. Ghatak (1999) has shown that the 
effectiveness of group lending is in part due to self-selection, which leads to a 
homogenous matching within group formation, resulting in an improvement in the 
pool of applicants with an increasing probability of loan repayment. But because 
self-selection is exploited as a screening device, those risk-averse members of the 
community (usually the poorest) are often excluded from institutional lending. This 
is precisely one of the reasons why lenders using group lending contracts may still 
encounter problems of adverse selection (Morduch 1999). 
Group lending contracts treat group members as defaulting borrowers if a single 
member fails to repay the loan. This is one of the reasons why Besley and Coate 
(1995) have suggested that social collateral is more likely to work in communities 
with high degree of social cohesion, where social sanctions are hard enough to 
persuade borrowers to repay the loan. Good informational flows in small 
communities can also improve the functioning of credit contracts by reducing peer- 
monitoring costs where the use of collateral has been reported as absent (Udry 1990). 
Clearly, peer monitoring play a central role for the success of these contracts; 
however, Stiglitz (1990) has pointed out the fact that the cost associated to these 
transactions are actually passed onto the borrower. The transfer of these costs can 
also affect the way in which defaulting borrowers, particularly women, are 
subjected to social sanctions. 
Some scholars (e. g. Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996; Osmani 1998, and Rahman 1999) 
have suggested that institutional lenders targeting women are actually exploiting 
rigid socio-cultural norms that govern women's behaviour in traditional socio- 
cultural environments. Hashemi, Schuler et al (1996) for example, have reported 
increasing intra-household violence that emerges from the struggle of power 
relations originated from credit contracts. Contrary to this view is the Amin, Becker 
et al (1998) argument supporting the view of credit transactions as instruments of 
women's empowerment that reduce gender inequality. 
Another important indirect mechanism acting as an incentive device is what Hulme 
and Mosley (1996) have referred to as progressive lending. Progressive lending 
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consists of lenders giving borrowers small loans in the beginning of the loan 
relationship, accompanied by a promise of progressively larger loans if and only if 
repayment is satisfactory; however, if defaults persist, credit lines may be cancelled. 
Progressive lending is an effective device not only in testing borrower's 
creditworthiness and helping lenders to screen out defaulters before loan size has 
increased (i. e. reduces the component d in equation 5.1), but when loan size 
expands, the informational costs S, are also reduced. 
Progressive lending may also facilitate the formation of long-term relationships 
between lenders and borrowers based on trust with potentially positive effects on 
market efficiency? (Stiglitz and Weiss 1983) and social capital. As pointed out by 
Morduch (1999), the success of progressive lending as an incentive device largely 
depends on the interest rate charged by the microfinance organisation relative to 
other local lenders. To some extent, this explains why credit programmes, although 
charging higher interest rates than banks, keep the rate well below the levels of 
moneylenders. Narrative evidence from rural credit markets in Bangladesh also 
suggests that the power of progressive lending may be diminished in competitive 
markets where the price-elasticity of demand for loans becomes more elastic (Nino- 
Zarazüa 2002). In that context, the interest rate becomes an important screening 
device (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). Morduch (1999) also suggests that progressive 
lending is likely to work effectively in rural communities with low mobility. But, 
targeting rural areas does not ensure the effectiveness of progressive lending. High 
levels of migration in poor communities can diminish its power as incentive device. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of progressive lending can be reduced by the 
imposition of upper limits of credit. The problem is that these upper limits cause 
micro-rationing8, which mostly affects experienced (and generally excellent) 
borrowers. Once these borrowers reach the maximum, they are forced to search for 
other sources of funding often from the local moneylender or continue borrowing at 
a suboptimal level that will cause under-investment and under-allocation of effort 
7 We refer to the concept of market efficiency in the context of constrained Pareto efficiency, 
after taking into account informational constraints. Therefore, under inefficiency, we allow 
for constrained Pareto improvements in allocation of credit. For a discussion see Dixit (1987) 
and Besley (1994). 
8 Micro-rationing reflects a situation in which even those with access to credit are still credit 
constrained. 
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(see Ghosh et al (2000). Although group-lending contracts in microfinance have 
received much of the attention in the literature of credit impacts (e. g. Pitt and 
Khandker 1998a, 1998b; Coleman 1999; Hulme and Mosley 1996), there are an 
increasing number of programmes combining group lending with individual 
contracts. 
For example, Huppi and Feder (1990) have reported a type of contract in which 
individuals are responsible for loan repayment. Group formation in that context 
plays the role of providing information about the applicants as well as supporting 
other groups. Bhatt and Tang (1998) have described a similar schedule implemented 
by the Economic and Employment Development Centre (EEDC) in Los Angeles, 
California where the Asian minority was targeted as beneficiaries. This 
methodology is likely to succeed in communities where groups share social 
characteristics or backgrounds and where there is an increasing benefit from the 
creation of social networks. Individual lending contracts have also been adapted to 
the characteristics of social settings in which credit programmes operate. For 
example, Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) have reported comparative 
advantages of individual lending contracts in the context of Russia and Eastern 
Europe, where the use of collateral, progressive lending and other mechanisms 
serve as screening, incentive and enforcement devices against the expected rate of 
default. 
Direct and indirect mechanisms are likely to reduce the problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection in different magnitudes (see table 5.1); however, they also 
generate different transaction costs, which as mentioned by Stiglitz (1990) are 
transferred totally or partially to the borrower through the mechanisms that 
characterise group-lending contracts. Transaction costs to the borrower can emerge 
from time-intensive activities, relative to e. g. peer monitoring and enforcement 
activities that usually take place in compulsory group meetings. Other costs can 
also emerge from the time spent travelling to the branch as well as from the 
opportunity cost of attending such meetings. All these factors contribute to 
increasing the utility cost of borrowing. 
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Table 5.1 Screening, incentive and enforcement devices that reduce the moral hazard and adverse 
sPletinn nrnhlama in mirrnfinanro 
Direct mechanisms Indirect mechanisms 
Periodical Through peer monitoring, they deal Group- Based on joint liability, they 
repayment with the screening and lending substitute collateral and deal with 
schedules enforcement problems by reducing contracts the screening and enforcement 
the components d and g in problems by reducing the 
equation 5.1, but increasing the components d and S in equation 
transaction and opportunity costs 5.1 but increasing the transaction 
to the borrower. They can also and opportunity costs to the 
cause distortions in the credit borrower 
market 
Compulsory Reduces the problem of moral Progressive Based on trust, it works as an 
savings hazard by reducing d, S and the lending incentive device that reduces d in 
components in p related to the equation 5.1, and when loan size 
interest rate paid by the lender to expands, the informational costs s. 
external sources of funding It can also facilitate the formation of 
i= F(1 + r) social capital through long-term 
relationships between lenders and 
borrowers 
Trade-credit Deal with the screening problem by Targeting at It woks as screening and incentive 
linkages reducing components d and S in women that reduces the components d and 
equation 5.1. However, this device s in equation 5.1. This device can 
can also create local monopolistic be effective in specific socio-cultural 
practices. environments; however, adverse 
effects can also emerge from intra- 
household violence and social 
sanctions to defaulters. 
It is important to point out here to the fact that the utility cost of borrowing will 
gradually increase once the expected returns to the borrower increase. This is 
simply because the borrower will need to forgo increasing revenues for attending 
compulsory group meetings. To our knowledge there are very few attempts to 
examine the impacts of the utility costs of borrowing on household welfare, 
especially when group lending and individual lending models are compared, and 
other factors such as prices, infrastructure and selection problems are appropriately 
controlled for in the impact estimation. 
5.2 The interaction of the household with the key markets 
In order to examine the interaction of enterprising households with the key 
markets, i. e. labour and credit, we follow a modified model based on the work of 
McElroy and Homey (1981) where the utility function for each member of the 
household is achieved as the consequence of a bargaining process of resource 
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allocation that leads to a Nash cooperative equilibrium9. Resource allocation within 
the household is assumed to be, as suggested by Chiappori (1988) and Browning et 
al (1994) Pareto-efficient. Therefore, utility maximisation of the efficient household 
is achieved by 
MaxZIU, [g,, l, ] (5.4) 
where individual members i of the household cooperate and bargain for the 
consumption of goods g, and leisure 1, weighted by an equivalence factor A>0, 
and subjected to budget constraints. Let us now assume that the household decides 
to engaged in an income generating activity to produce a market good y, base upon 
a Cobb-Douglas-type production function y=f (L, K)°, where L and K are the 
quantity of labour and capital, respectively, and a is a parameter of technology in 
the production of y. As pointed out by Pitt and Khandker (1998a), it is very unlikely 
that at the bottom end of the income distribution a will change, at least in the 
short-term. For that reason, we assume that technology remains constant, i. e. a =1. 
5.2.1 Labour as factor of production 
In the production of y, the enterprising household will supply the amount of labour 
L", restricted to a maximum of hours-work, h, conditional upon the number N of 
household members of working age i, in the form of LH Z Max N [i(h)]. In this 
,, ti 
sense, under self-employment, L= LH . Since we assume that a remains constant, 
an overall increase in the level of output, after an injection of capital from a 
microcredit, will lead to an increase in labour intensity. However, if in the 
production of y the enterprising household reaches its maximum capacity of labour 
supply, then they will need to hire workers, e. In that context, the quantity of 
labour involved in the production of y will be given by L= L" +LH, where labour 
hiring is the result of increasing levels of production. 
9 Manser and Brown (1980), and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) have pointed out that in 
exceptional circumstances such as imminent 
divorce and intra-household conflicts, the 
cooperative equilibrium can be threatened. 
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Note that the demand for labour outside the household is not only a function of 
household income but also of the cost of labour. As pointed out by Leibenstein 
(1957); Mazumdar (1959) and Dasgupta (1993), labour efficiency is conditional upon 
factors such nutrition, abilities and efforts that determine labour productivity. 
Informational asymmetries can also play an important role in the demand for hired 
labour (see e. g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1996, and Bardhan and Rudra 1986). 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) have pointed out that at low levels of household income, 
even if enterprising households want to hire labour, they soon realise that they can 
only afford to hire unskilled and malnourished labourers with very low 
productivity. They may also perceive it to be very risky to employ workers for not 
having enough information about their skills, behaviour or moral integrity. In the 
end, the enterprising household may simply decide to self-employ. 
Households will only consider hiring labour when they have reached a certain level 
of income, F, where the cost of an efficiency unit of labour, , l[ is at its maximum'0, 
i. e. )7 = max[w/ 2(w)] . The cost of buying an efficiency unit of labour is measured 
by w/ 2(w) , where w is the wage rate, and 
2(w) captures labour efficiency. Note 
that lim f (A) = 0. The quantity of labour hired is measured by the expenditure 
wi2(w)-º.. 
on efficiency labour, L'2(w), where Lh is the number of units of labour hired in 
hours. 
At very low levels of household earnings, from 0 to Y in the upper quadrant of 
Figure 5.2, no household hires workers given the high cost of buying an efficiency 
unit of labour (the area above )! ) and they will remain self-employed, (from 0 to 
LN in the lower quadrant). However, once the household reaches the level of 
earnings F, as a result of higher production, they can consider hiring labourers 
with a minimum level of skills, abilities, and so on, that represent a maximum cost 
of efficiency labour, i7, that the household is willing to absorb. Thus, if is 
affordable, L'1 >0 and then L= L" + e. Note that the further the distance from Y 
to Y, i. e. the higher the income levels of household i, the higher the probability of 
hiring productive labourers, and thus, the lower the cost of buying additional 
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efficiency units of labour It. As a result, enterprising households begin to increase 
labour expenditure, L''2(w) . 
(Expenditure on 
efficiency labour) 
n`A(w1 
gure 5.2 The relationship between 
)usehold income and expenditure 
i efficiency labour 
/i 
/i 
Y 
Cost of efficiency labour 
, Nj =max[w/A(w)] 
y (Household income) 
0 LH n (Quantity of labour) 
Self-employment Labour-hiring 
Source: Adapted from Dasgupta and Ray (1986) 
If for example, the choice of borrowing from a microfinance organisation increases 
the probability of an income rise, then we may observe an indirect effect of credit on 
the quantity of labour hiring. The impacts of credit could be observed on poor 
labourers whose skills and nutrition levels are improved by the fact of being 
employed by the enterprising household. This could potentially lead to 
improvements in labour efficiency. 
lo This maximum is the upper limit of the cost of buying an efficiency unit of labour that an 
enterprising household is willing to pay. 
1 Nlý 
1 
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5.2.2 The notion of household capital endowments as factors of production 
Note that the production of y can be operated at low levels of capital intensity 
relative to labour. However, although these products are said to be labour intensive, 
a minimum level of capital endowments Kn; nr, 
is needed. In this sense, if 
y=f (L, K)' was to be positive, then KzK,,,, y. 
We introduce the notion of 
household capital endowments K into the model, which is integrated by a set of 
three separate but interrelated factors: physical capital (pK ), human capital (H K) 
and social capital (SK ). 
The concept of physical capital goes beyond the traditional conceptualisation of 
physical infrastructure that the classic growth theory developed during the 1940s 
(e. g. Rosenstein-Rodan 1943). The physical capital concept not only includes the 
availability of piped water, electricity, telephone lines, paved roads or railways that 
improve household well-being, but also incorporates other factors such as housing 
conditions and household assets that are important in the production process as 
well as coping mechanisms against external shocks (Deaton 1989; Moser 1997; 1998; 
Chen and Dunn 1996). The functioning of asset markets and their value are 
important considerations that need to be addressed in the impact analysis. 
The importance of including the concept of human capital comes from the general 
consensus about the strong relationship between education and health, as 
components of human capital, and people's well-being (Becker 1993). Human 
capital poses special properties since it correlates to both physical capital and social 
capital as well as to the key markets: labour and credit. For example, educated and 
healthy individuals can adapt more easily as economic circumstances change, using 
physical capital more effectively, accessing more easily the credit markets and 
exploiting social arrangements and income opportunities more quickly (Schultz 
1975). The incorporation of human capital becomes even more important in the 
context of fragmented credit markets, where education and health are important 
determinants of increasing future levels of labour productivity and income (see 
Schultz 1988 and Spence 1973 for the effects of education, and Strauss and Thomas 
1995, for the effects of health). 
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The concept of social capital has been increasingly recognised as a crucial factor in 
the development process (see e. g. Coleman 1988,1990 and Portes 1998 in the 
sociology discipline; Putnam et al 1993; Putnam 2000 in politics, and Becker 1996 in 
economics). As pointed out by Putnam (2000), social capital can emerge in the form 
of informal and organised reciprocal networks of trust and norms embedded in 
vertical and horizontal social organisations. For example, social capital can 
materialise in occupation-based groups of mutual help such as rotating saving and 
credit associations (Cox 1987) or in group-based lending programmes such as 
Grameen Bank (Dowla 2005). Since the household uses social capital as part of their 
portfolio of possibilities, it is important to consider it in our analysis. 
52.3 The household utility function 
The utility maximisation of the efficient enterprising household in equation (5.4) 
can expressed as a reduced unitary model (Gorman 1953) by equalising 
Max>AUi[gi, 1, ]=MaxU(g, 1) (5.5) 
where the household utility function U (g, 1) is restricted to: 
p(g)+w(LhI)+v(Kh) <_ F(L, K)+w(L'")+v(K'") (5.6) 
where p, w and v are the price of goods g, the wage rate of labour L, and the 
value of units of capital endowments K, respectively, whereas the superscripts h 
and m denote hired and market, respectively. Accordingly, w(Lm) represents 
household income from waged labour, whilst v(Km), represents rents from 
household capital endowments. It is pertinent to note here that v is determined in 
terms of prices and endowments. For example, v(K'') could emerge in terms of 
prices from the rent of a premise, machinery or equipment for the production of y. In 
this particular case, v(K") = v(PK) . Alternatively, v(K'') could emerge in terms of 
endowments after joining a group-lending programme. In this case, v(Kh) =v(SK), 
i. e. social capital endowments are used to access the credit market and produce y, 
which, as a result, will correspond to a social obligation to their peers in the form of 
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joint liability. Equation (5.6) can be seen as the conventional budget constraint where 
expenditures on consumption, hired labour and capital endowments cannot exceed 
revenues from production, waged labour and capital. By weighting leisure time 1, 
with the wage rate w, and assuming that w(Lh) = w(Lm) = w(L) and 
v(Kh) = v(Km) = v(K), we can rewrite equation (5.6) as follows: 
p(g) + w(l) <- F(L, K) - w(L) -v(K) (5.7) 
where the utility maximisation of the efficient enterprising household is given by 
the product 
fl(w, v) =Max F(L, K) - w(L) -v(K) L, K (5.8) 
In this sense, household decisions regarding production will be motivated by the 
utility maximisation conditional upon labour, capital and the corresponding prices 
and endowments for each factor of production. This can be represented by 
equalising equation (5.8) to the returns to household R, as follows: 
11 (w, v)=MaxR (5.9) 
A fundamental problem emerges here, which is related to the increasing evidence 
pointing to the fact that households' decisions under uncertainty are driven by risk- 
averse behaviour, particularly at low levels of income (Ravallion 1988; Sinha and 
Lipton 1999). Some scholars have explained this phenomenon as the consequence of 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth (see e. g. Arrow 1971; Pratt and Zeckhauser 
1987; Segal and Spivak 1990). To briefly illustrate this problem, consider the case 
where the household has a pair of choices, ai and a2. Both {al, a2) ea; however, 
choice al corresponds to a set of actions for a business project with low returns but 
involving a certainty outcome R1, whereas choice a2 corresponds to a business 
project with high returns but involving a gamble between Rl and R., with the 
predicted probabilities p; and 1- pi, respectively. In other words, a1= R, and 
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a2 = [R1, p;; R,,, 1- p; ]. If p; - 0, then a, >- a2. On the other hand, if p; -1 then 
a, -< a2 . 
In the context of choices involving risky prospects, it is clear that the magnitude of 
utility reflects the household attitudes towards risk (Sandmo 1971; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991; Starmer 2000). However, since the household finds it hard to 
predict the probability of the final outcome R, then choice g will be selected. This 
assumption implies that, as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Grether 
and Plott (1979); Camerer (1989; 1995), and Machina (1987), when faced with two 
choices involving only the best and the worst possible outcome, the household will 
prefer the choice with the highest probability of success. This is particularly true at 
low levels of income, where the poor are highly sensitive to income falls. As Rabin 
(2000: 1281) has pointed out: "a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable that a 
dollar that helps us become very rich". 
In this case, R is not only conditional upon household decisions contained in a set of 
actions a, but also upon factors ; r, that are related to the prevailing state of the 
world that affect the probability of achieving the expected outcome R. These factors 
can be linked to events such as accidents, robberies, death, or seasonal weather. 
Note that the actions in a are finite, restricted to capital endowments (or stocks) 
hold by the household at the time the decision is made. In the following section, it is 
presented the analytical framework that we devised from the relationship between 
household capital endowments and the key markets. 
5.2.4 The relation between capital endowments and the key markets 
As an illustrative example, let us suppose that the enterprising household choose a 
set of actions a, to increase the probability of business success in order to remain 
self-employed in the labour market. The alternative combinations of actions a are 
represented by points A, B and C of the smallest triangle in figure 5.311. The three 
heights of triangle ABC meet at zero, representing the point at which the household 
holds zero capital endowments. Points {A, B, C} Ea where (A, B, C) > 0. Height is 
11 We have borrowed from Schrödinger (1958) the geometrical representation of figure 5.3 
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the perpendicular, dropped from a corner to the side opposite to it, represented by 
household capital endowments: physical (P"), human (H"), and social (SK). 
Consequently, the greater the height of triangle ABC, the larger the capital 
endowments held by the household, and the higher the probability for the 
household to have the minimum level of capital K., i. y, required to engage 
in 
income generating activities and produce y. 
Figure 5.3 The dynamics of household capital endowments 
within the key markets 
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At points A, B and C, there are different combinations of capital endowments that 
the enterprising household use to access the labour market, which is represented by 
the inner area of the bigger triangle DEF. Labour, L, is the key factor that enables the 
household to create value through the production function (5.8) and maximise 
returns. For simplicity, let us assume that the fraction of one capital is equal to the 
fraction of another one, both used in the production of y, that is 
A=IPK+I HK (5.10) 
2 
B=IPK+ISK (5.11) 
2 
C= 
2 
H" +I SK (5.12) 
2 
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where (A, B, C) > 0. By choosing point A, for example, the enterprising household 
will access the labour market, with the use of a fraction of physical capital 
endowments, which are materialised in the form of tools, machinery and other 
assets needed in the production of y, and another fraction of human capital 
endowments, which can be represented by the level of education, expertise or skills 
of the enterprising household. 
Similarly, by choosing point C, the household will use a fraction of human capital 
endowments, and another of social capital through, for example, a local trade 
cooperative or a network of mutual help that increases the probability of business 
success 2c(a). Note that households having very low levels of physical capital, 
human capital and social capital (the distance from zero to points A, B, C), will not 
have the minimum capital endowments required to produce y and will remain out 
of enterprising activities, employed perhaps as low-paid workers. 
Now, the larger triangle DEF is drawn through the corners of triangle ABC, by the 
corresponding lines running to the opposite sides that intersect with the interlined 
elliptical outer area, which represents the credit market. The three heights of ABC 
are the symmetry lines of triangle DEF, which are erected in the middle of its sides. 
In point D for example, there is a hypothetical equal distance (or combination of 
capital endowments) from point B as from point A, whereas in point E and F, there 
are equal amounts of capital endowments from points A and C, as well as from 
points B and C, respectively. Therefore: 
D=(A+B)=PK+! HK+I SK (5.13) 
2 
E=(A+C)=HK+IPK+ISK (5.14) 
2 
F=(B+C)=SK+ 
I HK+IPK (5.15) 
2 
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where {D, E, F) ea 12. In the interaction of capital endowments with the credit 
market, a fundamental element emerges from the household's point of view, and 
which is related to an action, contained in the set a, that the household can take to 
affect the expected utility function EU = 'c(a)R: borrowing. In traditional financial 
intermediation such as banking, the household's ability to enter the credit market is 
highly contingent on two key elements: 1) the predicted probability of achieving the 
expected outcome (e. g. business success), and 2) capital endowments, in particular 
physical, which works as collateral to back loan applications. This is shown in point 
D of figure 5.3. 
But even if an enterprising household has enough capital endowments to enter the 
labour market (either at points ABC) and produce y, the stock of physical capital will 
be insufficient, as collateral, to access the credit market. This is a problem that has 
traditionally confined the poor to stay out of institutional credit markets even if 
they manage to access the labour market and produce y (see e. g. Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). In this sense, joint liability in the form of social collateral helps enterprising 
households to enter the credit market through point F in figure 5.3, where social 
capital endowments work as a substitute for physical collateral, and play the role of 
linkage between labour and credit markets (see e. g. Cassar et al 2007, and Karlan 
2007). Thus, social capital in the form of social collateral helps to reduce credit 
rationing in the market with potential positive impacts on income and wellbeing. 
To illustrate this, consider the case of a group of homogenous enterprising 
households living in a perimeter x that represents the community market where a 
pioneering microfinance organisation operates. Let us assume that the organisation 
competes in a monopolistic competitive market (Chamberlin 1933; Robinson 1933) 
with n number of informal agents such as moneylenders and ROSCAS. 
The microfinance organisation will initially face high short-term average costs 
(SACO) related to the screening, incentive and enforcement problems discussed 
12 The conceptualisation of household capital endowments allows us to introduce an index 
that captures the level of such endowments. We present this index in the Appendix to 
Chapter 5, which served as an initial measurement of the degree of deprivation beyond the 
income variable. The index is built on primary data collected at the household level from 
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earlier in section 5.1.2. For those reasons, the organisation will need to charge the 
interest rate i to breakeven. Other competitors such as moneylenders charge the 
rate of interest i. 
Now assume that the enterprising household is willing to borrow capital I, at the 
maximum interest rate i*. If the enterprising household wants to get a loan from the 
organisation, they will need to travel a distance d, to the branch, at the cost c, that 
together represent the transaction cost to the borrower, c"d. If the transaction cost 
from borrowing from the microfinance organisation is equal to the transaction cost 
from borrowing from, say, a moneylender, then the decision of borrowing will be 
conditional upon the rate of interest and the terms of the loan contract. In 
consequence, the potential market for the microfinance organisation is restricted to 
the number of households H, within the distance d, willing to take the cost of 
borrowing, c"d+i: 5 i* relative to interest rate charged by moneylenders, i. 
Therefore, the demand curve for credit facing the microfinance organisation is 
given by DL(i)=min 
H 
(i +C-i)], where DL depends on the magnitude of 
Cn 
i and n, respectively. Note that if i>i or n is very small, then the microfinance 
organisation will operate as monopoly; however, once moneylenders reduce the 
rate of interest or modify the terms of conditions of loan contracts, the microfinance 
organisation will need to exploit different screening, incentive and enforcement 
devices, such as joint liability and progressive lending, to reduce the components 
d and g* in equation 5.1, and shift downwards the average cost curve. A reduction 
in the average cost of lending, as shown by the distance from SAC ° =A to 
SAC 1=B in the upper diagram of figure 5.4, will enable the organisation to 
reduce the interest rate from i° to i`. 
As mentioned by Hulme and Mosley (1996), at the new point B, there is a gain not 
only in the marginal efficiency of household capital endowments, but also in the 
number of new enterprising households entering the credit market (represented by 
three urban settlements in the surroundings of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City where 
the case-study microfinance organisations operate. 
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the distance from I0 to P). ). This could potentially have positive impacts on the 
poor. However, as pointed out by Stiglitz (1990) the use of screening, incentive and 
enforcements devices such as periodical repayment schedules and peer monitoring 
activities transfer the informational costs to the borrower that can potentially 
exacerbate the transaction and opportunity costs to the borrower, particularly when 
programme participants have to forgo income to attend periodical group meetings 
that often last for several hours. This situation can be particularly distressing for the 
urban poor who often travel long distances in search of sources of livelihood. In this 
sense, the utility cost of borrowing emerging from rigid and inefficient devices 
could undermine the potential positive impacts of credit on poverty reduction. 
Figure 5.4 The impact of credit on household's income and 
wellbeing 
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52.5 Time and space in the impact analysis 
The impacts of credit, however, should be also linked to the length of programme 
intervention. Length contains two important dimensions: time and space. Time can be 
associated to the notion of before and after, which resides on the cause and effect 
relationship, whereas space can be associated to the physical dimension of the 
relationship between the credit programme and the local market, i. e. the area of its 
influence. However, although the effects of the credit programme could be 
observed on different dimensions of well-being, there will always be an upper limit 
to its effects conditional upon a geographical setting. 
In this sense, the effects of credit on the outcomes of interest Y, e. g. income and 
household assets, will depend not only on a set (or vector) of household 
characteristics, but also on the interaction of the household with the credit 
programme in a given geographical area. This can be captured by information on 
the distance d, (and time t), from the place of residence of the enterprising 
household to the branch of the credit programme. Other factors such as local prices 
and infrastructure characteristics should be controlled for in the impact estimation 
procedure. 
Time can be measured in terms of months or years of programme participation in 
the microfinance organisation. In this sense, a household with 5 years of 
programme participation in a group-lending programme is on the average more 
likely to report greater impacts on e. g. income or housing improvements than a 
household with only one year of programme participation. It is simply due to 
factors such as cumulative wealth, experience and informational flows that can 
improve the predicted probability of business success and the returns to the 
borrower. We are particularly interested in examining the potential impacts of 
credit on poverty reduction, labour and wellbeing. In that context, we wish to 
consider several hypotheses that are stated as propositions, which in an effort of 
analytical simplification, are divided into several sections: 1) functioning of credit 
markets; 2) labour; 3) business performance; 4) income and poverty reduction; 4) 
physical capital, and 5) human capital (see table 5.2 for a summary of these 
hypotheses). 
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5.3 Hypotheses to be tested in relation to the impacts of credit 
In relation to the functioning of credit markets: 
1. The informational costs, which are reduced by the use of screening, 
incentive and enforcements devices (the shift in the average cost curve from 
SAC ° to SAC 1 in the upper diagram of figure 5.4) exacerbate the utility 
cost of borrowing, and this cost increases once household income raise. 
2. Utility cost of borrowing is a significant determinant of the demand for 
credit, and it varies from group lending to individual lending contracts. 
3. Screening, incentive and enforcement devices such as periodical repayment 
schedules and progressive lending create micro-rationing and market 
inefficiency. 
In relation to the impacts on labour: 
4. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the demand for labour (from 
LO and Ll in the diagram at the centre of figure 5.4) with effects on labour 
intensity and labour efficiency. 
5. Labour hiring, in the form of labour expenditure, is a function of household 
income, and it becomes positive after a minimum level beyond the poverty 
line. 
In relation to the impacts at the business level: 
6. Access to credit is a significant determinant of higher returns to the 
borrower, represented by the distance from R° to k' in the diagram at the 
centre of figure 5.4. 
7. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the accumulation of business 
assets. 
8. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the propensity towards 
financial stability. 
9. Access to credit is a significant determinant of business generation. 
In relation to the impacts on income and poverty reduction: 
10. Access to credit is a significant determinant of an income rise. 
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11. The gain in household income from the access to credit (the distance from YO 
to Y' in the lower diagram of figure 5.4) is a significant determinant of 
poverty reduction. 
12. The magnitude of the poverty impacts, in terms of incidence and depth, 
varies from group lending to individual lending contracts. 
In relation to the impacts on physical capital: 
13. Access to credit is a significant determinant of housing improvements. 
14. Access to credit is a significant determinant of vehicle purchases. 
15. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the accumulation of electrical 
appliances and other household assets. 
In relation to the impacts on human capital: 
16. Access to credit is a significant determinant of children's schooling. 
17. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the propensity of having a 
good health status. 
Given the potential problems in estimating the impacts of credit, we discuss in 
Chapter 6 the methodology and research strategy followed to control for selection 
bias and endogeneity problems. 
Table 5.2 Hypotheses to be tested during the investigation 
Sections where 
Propositions the propositions 
are analysed 
Regarding the functioning of credit markets 
1. Screening, incentive and enforcement devices such as periodical Chapter 7, 
repayment schedules exacerbate the utility cost of borrowers, and this cost section 7.2.1 
increases once the returns to the borrower have raised. 
2. Utility cost of borrowing is a significant determinant of the demand for Chapter 7, 
credit and it vary from group lending to individual lending contracts. section 7.2 
3. Screening and incentive devices such as progressive lending create micro- Chapter 7, 
rationing and market inefficiency. section 7.2.3 
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Regarding labour 
4. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the demand for labour, with Chapter 8, 
effects on labour intensity and labour efficiency section 8.4.2 
5. Labour expenditure is a function of household income, and it becomes Chapter 8, 
positive above the poverty line. section 8.4.1 
Regarding business performance 
6. Access to credit is a significant determinant of higher returns to the Chapter 8, 
borrower section 8.1.1 
7. Access to the credit is a significant determinant of the accumulation of Chapter 8, 
business assets section 8.1.2 
8. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the propensity towards Chapter 8, 
financial stability section 8.1.4 
9. Access to the credit is a significant determinant of business generation Chapter 8, 
section 8.1.4. 
Regarding household income and poverty reduction 
10. Access to credit is a significant determinant of a rise in household income. Chapter 7, 
section 73 
11. Access to credit is a significant determinant of poverty reduction Chapter 7, 
section 7.4 
12. The magnitude of poverty impacts vary from group lending to individual Chapter 7, 
lending contracts section 7.4 
Regarding physical capital 
13. Access to credit is a significant determinant of housing improvements Chapter 8, 
section 8.2.1 
14. Access to credit is a significant determinant of vehicle purchases Chapter 8, 
section 8.2.2 
15. Access to credit is a significant determinant of the accumulation of Chapter 8, 
electrical appliances section 8.2.2 
Regarding human capital 
16. Access to credit is a significant determinant of children's schooling Chapter 8, 
section 8.3.1 
17. Access to credit is a significant determinant of having a good health status Chapter 8, 
section 8.3.3 
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Chapter 6 
Methodology and research design 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, we discuss the quasi-experimental research design that was 
operationalised to investigate the impacts of credit on household income and 
wellbeing in the context of urban poverty in Mexico. An appropriate research 
strategy was required to control for several potential problems that are implicitly 
related to the choice of borrowing: 1) selection bias; 2) non-random programme 
placement; 3) attribution, and 4) fungibility. Section 6.1 introduces the reader to the 
methodological constraints in impact analysis; section 6.2 presents the quasi- 
experimental research design; section 6.3 discusses the strategy followed to control 
for selection bias; sections 6.4 present the selected case-study organisations; section 
6.5 discusses the strategy followed to control for non-random programme 
placement and describes the settlements where the protocol of data collection was 
conducted. Sections 6.6,6.7 and 6.8 discuss the instruments of data collection, the 
content areas of the interview, and the process of data entry and analysis, 
respectively. 
6.1 Methodological constraints in impact analysis 
One of the main constraints in impact analysis is the problem of selection bias. It 
usually emerges from unobservable factors related to individual efforts, abilities 
preferences and attitudes towards risks that affect the choice of borrowing (see 
Mosley 1997, and also Heckman 1974; Cogan 1980 and Lee 1978 in the context of 
fragmented labour markets). As a consequence, the predicted probability of an 
increase in, say, income could be higher amongst those who are risk-loving relative 
to those risk-averse. Similarly, those households with the ability to engage in income- 
generating activities are potentially more likely to improve their incomes than those 
households simply employed as unskilled labourers. Another potential bias can 
emerge from the structural characteristics of fragmented credit markets where the 
demand for credit is commonly rationed by the lender (see e. g. Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). For instance, lenders may screen out applicants who are not engaged in 
income-generating activities, or live faraway from the area where the credit 
programme operates, given the high screening and monitoring costs that such 
applicants cause to the lender. 
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A major problem in impact analysis, and which is linked to the cause-effect 
relationship, is the attribution of specific outcomes e. g. an income rise, or asset 
accumulation to programme intervention (Hulme 2000). Attribution can be 
potentially serious in markets with several credit programmes competing for poor 
borrowers, or where informal agents such as moneylenders and rotating savings 
and credit associations actively participate. If in the econometric estimation we do 
not control for the potential effects of competing credit agents, we could wrongly 
attribute positive effects to a microfinance organisation when in fact they come from 
e. g. the participation in rotating savings and credit associations. For that reason, we 
collected primary data about the access that both treatment and control groups had 
to other sources of funding such as institutional lenders, moneylenders and 
ROSCAS, and the use of such financial resources. This information allowed us to 
include in the econometric estimation equation (derived in Chapter 7, section 7.1) a 
vector of credit market characteristics that control for the potential effects of such 
agents in the impact analysis. 
In the past, a great deal of attention has been paid to the fungibility problem, which 
is related to the use of loans by someone other than the borrower, particularly in 
gender studies when the credit programme targets women (see e. g. Osmani 1998; 
Rahman 1999, Goetz and Gupta 1996), or when the loan is not used for the purpose 
for which it was given in first place. This may be in particular relevant in impact 
studies that focus on the enterprise level (see e. g. Copestake et a! 2001); however, it 
remains difficult even to detect fungibility. Malcolm Harper in a recent group 
discussion used the cow and the TV example to illustrate the problem: "A lady wants 
first a TV and then a cow. Both cost $50 and she has $50 in cash. A [microfinance 
organisation] comes along with 'loans for productive purposes' so she borrows $50 and 
buys the cow and the TV. What did she use the loan for? " 
Mosley (1998) has suggested that the use of qualitative research methods for 
crosschecking could be used to detect possible "leakages", although the fungibility 
problem may be irrelevant when the household is at the centre of the analysis. As 
pointed out by Hulme (2000: 85) "the best investment returns may be on 'consumption' 
(in terms of developing or maintaining human capital through school fees and doctors' bills, 
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or buying food at a time of crisis when the credit terms on 'in-kind' borrowing from traders 
may be exceptionally high) I... ] attempting to control for fungibility (to prove impact) has 
failed to recognise that fungibility is a process to be encouraged (to improve impact)! "1. 
Placement heterogeneity in terms of infrastructure, costs of inputs and local prices 
could also bias the results of impact analysis. If credit programmes are deliberately 
placed in poor areas, then the comparison between borrowers living in deprived 
areas and control groups living in richer locations could cause a downward bias 
result. Pitt and Khandker (1998a) have proposed the use of a village fixed effects 
estimation procedure that controls for the potential problems of programme 
placement in the rural context. However, this approach remains limited for studies 
that look at the impacts of credit in urban areas. In the following section, we present 
a quasi-experimental research methodology that was particularly designed to 
investigate the impacts of credit in densely populated areas. 
6.2 The quasi-experimental research design 
The implicit characteristics and requirements of our research project demanded the 
collection of information from two groups of households: 1) one with access to 
institutional lending and actively borrowing from the organisation; and 2) another 
with access to institutional lending but not borrowing from the organisation. 
Hereafter, the former is referred to as treatment group and the latter, as the control 
group. As mentioned in other studies e. g. Hulme and Mosley 1996; Pitt and 
Khandker 1998; Coleman 1999, the inclusion of a control group in the study is 
essential to evaluate the impacts of credit on the outcomes of interest, e. g. income. 
In this sense, and due to methodological requirements, we decided to design a type 
of quasi-experiment that is often referred to as a non-equivalent, post test-only quasi- 
experiment (Gribbons and Herman 1997; Trochim 2006; Cook and Campbell 1979), 
where a convenient sample (Creswell 1994), was collected, taking the following form: 
Although we followed a qualitative questioning strategy to crosscheck the answers 
regarding the use of credit and detect potential problems of fungibility, we acknowledge the 
possibility of still having some "leakages" in the data. However, since we focus the analysis 
on the household, we believe, as suggested by Hume (2000) to have reduced the magnitude 
of this problem. 
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Treatment group N --ý X -ý 0 
Control group N -ý --' 0 
where N refers to a non-random assignment; X represents the exposure of a group of 
households to a treatment, i. e. the use of credit, the effects of which we were 
interested to measure; and 0 represents the outcome of interest, i. e. income, 
household assets, children schooling and so on (Campbell and Stanley 1966). 
6.3 Controlling for selection bias 
A major problem that emerges with the non-equivalent, post test only quasi-experiment, 
referred hereafter as simply quasi-experiment, is that the two groups, treatment and 
control, may differ in important ways that influence the individual decision of 
borrowing and thus, the outcome of interest. In other words, there might be 
unobservable factors related to e. g. individual efforts, abilities, preferences and 
attitudes towards risk that could affect the internal validity of the study. For 
example, it could be expected that enterprising households are more likely to take 
higher risks, and therefore self-select to participate in a credit programme, than 
those households with no business activities. A fundamental assumption here is that 
participation in a credit programme is always voluntary. As a consequence, the 
probability of an income rise should be expected to be higher for the former group. 
We refer to this potential problem as a demand-related bias. 
Another potential selection problem could emerge from structural characteristics of 
underdeveloped financial markets, where the demand for credit is traditionally 
rationed by the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Even if we had a control group of 
enterprising households willing to take risks and borrow from, say, a microfinance 
organisation, we may still face selectivity discrimination made by the lender, which 
could screen out applicants who, for example, are not residents of the 
neighbourhood where the branch is located, or who are not considered to be poor, a 
practice commonly found amongst credit programmes that target low-income 
households. We refer to this potential problem as a supply-related bias. In this sense, 
the selection process, I,, is defined by two components: 1) the decision of a 
household of whether or not to participate in a credit programme, 1; and 2) the 
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decision of the lender (or group members) of whether or not to accept the applicant, 
1 (see figure 6.1). 
Population 
Households self-selecting Households self-excluding to 
to participate in a credit participate in a credit 
programme (I, =1) programme (1, = 0) 
Households accepted Households rejected by 
by the lender to the lender to 
participate (12 =1) participate (I2 = 0) 
/ý 
Household participants that Household participants that 
have received a credit have not received a credit 
(TREATMENT GROUP) (CONTROL GROUP) 
Figure 6.1 The selection process for programme participation. Adapted from Maddala (1999) 
Although we cannot observe households that choose either to participate or not, and 
households that are either accepted or rejected by the lender, i. e. I= Il +12, we can 
specify the distribution of households that have self-selected to participate in the 
credit programme, and have been accepted by the lender, i. e. 1= Il " 12, with a time- 
variance difference that accounts for the length of membership. Consequently, those 
households who had self-selected to participate in a credit programme and had 
been accepted by the lender, and therefore were actively participating in the credit 
programme were eligible to be sampled as members of the treatment group. 
Similarly, those households who had self-selected to participate in a credit 
programme and had been accepted by the lender, but had not received a loan by the 
time the quasi-experiment was conducted, were eligible to be sampled as the 
members of the control group. In this sense, selection bias and potential Hawthorne 
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effects2 were assumed to be substantially reduced through the process of data 
collection itself. We test for the underlying assumption of no self-selection in the 
econometric procedure presented in section 7.1.1. 
6.4 Selecting the case-study organisations 
After identifying the appropriate design for the quasi-experiment, we began to 
identify microfinance organisations that were operating in the metropolitan area of 
Mexico City. Mexico City was selected as the geographical point of departure for the 
investigation for two reasons: 1) the largest microfinance organisations in the 
country operate in the region, and 2) since I was living at the time in a suburb of 
Mexico City, it was convenient for me to conduct the quasi-experiment in the 
region, taking into consideration transaction costs and mobility constraints to 
conduct the study. Once an initial contact was made with organisations that 
operated in the region, we selected three institutions willing to participate in the 
study, and which employed different lending technologies. The selected case-study 
organisations are the following: 1) Community Financial Services or Servicios 
Financieros Comunitarios in Spanish (Fincomun); 2) Centre for the Assistance of the 
Microenterpreneur, or Centro de Apoyo al Microempresario in Spanish (CAME), 
and 3) Programs for Women, or Programas para la Mujer Mexico in Spanish 
(Promujer). 
6.4.1 Community Financial Services (Fincomun) 
Community Financial Services (Fincomun) is a credit union founded as an initiative 
of the Juan Diego Foundation just a few months before the financial crisis of 
December 1994 started. Shortly, the institution faced the challenge of increasing the 
scope of its operations with a devaluation of the peso-dollar parity of 40.25 percent 
just in one month, and which mounted up to 94.86 percent by the end of 1995. The 
devaluation of the Mexican currency had an immediate impact on the Consumer 
Price Index that pushed inflation up from 7 percent in December of 1994 to 52 
2 The Hawthorne effect refers to the phenomenon of people changing temporarily behaviour 
as a result of being under observation. The term gets its name from a factory called the 
Hawthorne Works, where Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) conducted a series of 
experiments between 1924 and 1932. 
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percent in the end of 1995 (Banco de Mexico 1996). Fincomun, as a credit union, was 
authorised by the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) to offer 
three financial products: savings, certificates of deposit (CDs) and microcredits3. 
The institution decided to begin operations in modest-looking branches with the 
idea of encouraging potential low-income borrowers and savers to join the 
institution. Branches are coordinated by a manager who deals with loan 
applications and deposits with a team of two financial advisors and a cashier. Four 
or five credit officers are responsible for searching new clients, screening up loan 
applications and monitoring the loan portfolio. Fincomun put in place an aggressive 
policy of expansion in the metropolitan area of Mexico City that helped the 
institution to increase substantially the deposits and loan portfolio. In 1995, the 
organisation operated in San Miguel Teotongo with 3 staff members and 237 clients. 
By 2000, the organisation had increased the number of branches to 11, with 84 
employees and 12,830 clients, and by the end of 2005, it had 34 branches in Mexico 
City, with more than 450 staff members and more than 80,000 clients (see table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Institutional erowth 
Number of 
personnel 
A 
(%) 
Branches 
(accumulated) 
A (%) Clients A (%) 
1994 2 1 12 
1995 3 50 2 100 237 1875 
1996 10 233 4 100 2470 942 
1997 17 70 5 25 3644 48 
1998 34 100 10 100 3575 -2 
1999 73 115 11 10 8120 127 
2000 84 15 11 0 12830 58 
2001 130 55 12 9 11557 -10 
2002 178 37 14 17 24900 115 
2003 227 28 18 29 38368 54 
2004 337 48 27 50 61385 60 
2005 450 34 34 26 80000 30 
Source: Fincomun 
3 As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, on April 30 2001, the Mexican Congress passed a new 
law "Ley de Ahorro y Credito Popular" that recognises two types of intermediaries: 1) Savings 
and Credit Co-operatives; and 2) Popular Savings Associations. As a response, Fincomun 
began a long process of institutional transformation that ended in October 2005, when the 
National Banking and Securities Commission authorised it to operate as a Popular Savings 
Association. Under this new institutional framework, Fincomun will not only be subjected to 
strong regulation and supervision, but will also be entitled to offer other financial products 
such as debit and credit cards, housing credits, remittances and insurance. 
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6.4.1.1. Savings products 
Small-scale savings and certificates of deposit are important products offered by the 
institution. Small-scale savings accounts, known as ltbreta de ahorros, can be opened 
with 10 pesos (around US $1) with no minimum amounts required to keep the 
account. Clients can withdraw their savings at any time; there is no cost of 
membership and the interest rate paid on deposits is above the market rate (paid by 
banks). These conditions are particularly competitive in a market with monopolistic 
characteristics. For example, Banco Azteca, an institution of recent creation that 
targets low and low-middle income households, requires a minimum of 50 pesos 
(US $5) to open a savings account, and charges an annual fee of 10 pesos to cover 
administrative costs. Nevertheless, commercial banks normally require an average 
of 500 pesos to open a savings account and to keep minimum balance to avoid extra 
fees and administrative costs (see table 6.2). The comparative advantage of 
Fincomun has helped the institution to increase the number of small-scale savers 
from 3,200 in 1998 to 33,477 in 2004, with an annual growth rate of 56.9% and 
average deposits of US $98. 
Table 6.2 Fees and other costs to open savings accounts in Mexico. Selected financial institutions 
Figures in vesos of 2004 
Initial amount Minimum Administrative fees 
Fees to 
Bank 
required balance (annual) replace 
debit 
card 
Fincomun 10 Not required No fees 
No card 
offered 
10 + another fee when 
Banamex 500 Not required savings balance is below 100 
500 
Banca Afirme 500 500 50 50 
Banco Azteca 50 50 10 25 
1200 required to 
Banorte 1000 received 80 75 
interests 
BBVA-Bancomer 750 750 182 75 
HSBC 250 250 50 No card 
offered 
HSBC 500 1800 44 75 
Scotiabank Inverlat 500 Not reouired Not available 75 
Source: Condusef (2005) and Fincomun 
Certificates of Deposits (CDs), known as Invemwx, is another important product 
offered to middle and high-income households. Clients can invest in this instrument 
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with a minimum of 1000 pesos (US $100) for periods of 28,60 and 90 days. The 
portfolio of investments in CDs as well as the number of investors has significantly 
increased during the last years. In 1995, in the beginning of its operations, the 
organisation received investment funds for 17.5 million pesos, and by the end of 
2004, the deposits from trust funds and private companies represented almost 84 
million pesos (See figure 6.2). Furthermore, by issuing CDs the organisation was 
able to strengthen the financial operation without depending heavily on donor 
funding and governmental subsidies. In fact, the institution became self-sufficient in 
part due to the rapid growth of investment in CDs. For further details see the 
Appendix to Chapter 6. 
Figure 6.2 Savings and Investment products 
* Figures in thousands of pesos 
90000 
80000 
70000 
50000 
40000 
90000 
10000 
o 1994 1995 - 1996 1997 1999 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Savers' 7 197 1820 2444 3200 6786 9500 6974 15336 24187 33477 
-'41 -Smaf-scale savor 3386 5075 8050 9772 15132 20254 
-9l-Investors 30 70 120 175 292 420 425 585 743 884 934 
-Inveshnentin CW 0,36 17500 35700 44000 56000 78000 72900 76030 60200 78600 83800 
Source: Fincomun 
6.4.1.2. The credit product 
Despite the fact that Fincomun has been operating with two credit methodologies 
(individual lending and solidarity groups), the institution heavily relies upon 
individual lending. The organisation charges a 6% interest rate on monthly basis (72% 
per annum), upon outstanding loan balances4. Loan repayments are paid on fixed 
* Fincomun calculates the rate of interest taking into account several variables: financial, 
operational and administrative costs; the portfolio at risk; the level of arrears; the expected 
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weekly or fortnightly instalments that can be made at any of the branches that the 
institution has in Mexico City or alternatively, by a direct deposit in an account that 
the institution has in the HSBC Bank. The institution has adopted various screening, 
incentives and enforcement devices to deal with the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard (see table 6.3). 
6.4.2 Centre for the Assistance of the Microenterpreneur (CAME) 
In 1985, Mexico City was severely hit by an earthquake that badly damaged many 
residential buildings, particularly at the heart of the old city where many poor 
families were irregularly living. In that context, the Archdiocese of Mexico 
established Foundation for Community Assistance or FundaciOn de Apoyo a la 
Comunidad (FAC) with the aim of receiving donations from the public to support a 
large population that suddenly found themselves homeless. In 1990, FAC 
established Emprendedores Foundation that was originally visualized to facilitate job- 
formation on the basis of income-generation activities amongst those poor 
households that lost their home and job. Months later, in 1991, Centre for the 
Assistance of the Microenterpreneur (CAME) was born with the task of 
complementing, with training and technical assistance, the activities that 
Emprendedores Foundation was carried out. 
In 1992 the Managing directors of CAME and Emprendedores came into contact with 
Maria O'Keefe from FINCA to receive technical assistance and supervision to 
transform CAME into a village-banking operator. As a result, and with financial 
donations and subsidised credits from Ford Foundation, Secours Catholique, Inter- 
American Foundation, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Mexican 
Government, CAME began operations in August 1993, constituted as a Trust Fund, 
in one the poorest settlements of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City: the Chalco 
Valley. 
During the beginning of its operation, and in particular after the financial crisis of 
December of 1994, CAME put into practice some strategies to reduce the effects of 
level of capitalisation; the legal reserve fund; the rate of interest charged by the competition, 
and the period and loan size. 
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the crisis and to ensure the survival of the organisation. Amongst those strategies, it 
is worth to mentioning the following: 1) keeping the interest rate as high as 
necessary to cover operational costs; 2) basing most of the lending operation on 
compulsory savings and revolving funds resulting from the lending process itself in 
order to avoid borrowing from commercial sources of funding; and 3) maintaining a 
constant number of personnel and branches without embarking in any attempt or 
ambition to grow rapidly to other areas. 
Consequently, during the crisis period, CAME experienced a modest growth in terms 
of the number of active members that reached its lowest point (2.8%) in 1996. 
Despite this poor performance, the loan portfolio and savings continued growing at 
an average rate of 49.7% and 80.9%, respectively in the period 1995-96. Incentive 
and enforcement devices such as progressive lending and compulsory savings 
helped the institution to achieve these figures despite the low rate of membership. 
Furthermore, by being particularly careful in operating under consistent and 
transparent rules, CAME was able to build trust amongst its members at the time 
where financial institutions had a terrible reputation and were blamed to be largely 
responsible for deepening the crisis. All these elements were fundamental for 
CAME to build the foundations for future expansions in the coming years. 
By the end of 1996, CAME began to increase the number of personnel, in particular 
the number of credit officers to back the expansion of its operations. This expansion 
took place not only in the Chalco Valley but also in other municipalities of the 
surrounding areas such as Ixtapaluca, Los Reyes, La Paz and Tlahuac. The rapid 
growth however, required more funds to fulfil the increasing demand for credits 
that the institution was facing at the time; but commercial sources of funding were 
expensive; local and external donors, including the government, were irregular and 
given the particular context of financial volatility in the country, the organisation 
decided to modify its lending methodology. 
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A fundamental change was made in 1998 to reduce potential problems of liquidity 
that could affect the expected rate of institutional growth: the periodical repayment 
schedules, originally designed for eight fortnightly instalments were modified to a 
16-weeks schedule. This strategic change together with a reduction in operational 
costs, allowed CAME to increase the cash flow and improve its position towards 
achieving operational self-sufficiency (Zapata et al 2002). In fact, the loans-to- 
savings ratio was substantially reduced from high levels just before the reform 
(103% in 1997) to a 65% a year after. This ratio continued falling to 42%, in the end of 
20035. After this institutional reform, the organisation enjoyed a sustained and high 
rate of growth not only in the number of active members, that averaged 65.2%ß in the 
period 1998-2002 but also in the loan portfolio and savings, that averaged 75.7% and 
117.8%, respectively, in the same period (see figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3 CAME: Institutional growth 
Figures in thousands of pesos (excluding active members) 
160 000 
140 000 
120 000 
100000 
80000 
60000 
40 000 
20 (Xx) 
Source: CAME 
This institutional expansion however, remained highly concentrated in the Chalco 
Valley, which absorbed in 2002 almost 50%, of the number of active IGCs (see figure 
6.4). By the end of 2003, CAME had more than 40 thousand active members, 
5 For further details see the Appendix to Chapter 6 
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2(HX) 2001 2002 2(X)3 
grouped in 1600 Income-Generation Groups 't'hese groups were normally 
integrated by 25 members who were predominantly women (80%). 
Credit officers play a fundamental role in the operation of CAME, since they are 
responsible of promotion, group-formation, and supervision of (IGGs). Promotion 
takes place in public places such as outdoor markets (known in Mexico as tian, lIlis), 
schools, and hospitals, or by door-to-door tactics in the neighbourhood. Once an 
IGG is formed, the corresponding credit officer is responsible for monitoring the 
good functioning of the IGG. He or she will attend weekly meetings where deposits 
from members and loan repayments to CAME and the Revolving Fund (known 
amongst members asfondo interno) are collectedh. 
An essential task for the credit officer is to disseminate amongst group members 
basic principles of financial accounting that are needed to calculate inter alia, 
minimum deposits, loan repayments, interest rates on arrears, revenue sharing from 
the revolving fund, and so on, which are fundamental for the operation of the 
group. IGG is governed by collective rules that are voted democratically, signed 
individually, and explicitly captured in a document known as Reglameººto tntertto. 
Figure 6.4 Distribution of IGGs by local branch 
Ixtapalu 
27% 
I hr Chako 
va Ilcv 
4"" 
Cha lco-T&"j une, 
25% Source: CAME. 
The Reglamento specifies, for example, the name of the IGG; the day, hour and 
place where group meetings take place; penalties for absence or delays; interest 
' The general characteristics of the Revolving Fund, as an incentive device, are discussed in 
the Appendix to Chapter 6. 
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IVevahualcovotl 
rates on loans from the revolving fund; interests in arrears and minimum 
compulsory deposits. Although the Reglamento's rules can be modified in the end 
of each credit cycle, the core principles for group operation e. g. periodical 
repayment schedules, compulsory attendance to periodical meetings, and 
compulsory savings, are unalterable. 
6.4.2.1. The savings component 
Income-Generation Groups began with individual deposits that can be as small as 
five pesos, i. e. around US $0.5. During four weeks, group members will attend 
weekly meetings where savings are deposited and training is given on principles of 
financial accounting and the model developed by CAME. When the IGG has finally 
grouped 25 members and completed the training, the group is formally opened. 
Savings is a key component in the methodology developed by CAME. Without 
minimum savings, group members cannot receive loans either from CAME or from 
the revolving fund. During the first credit cycle, group members are required to 
deposit savings on weekly basis, relative to the credit borrowed that range from 
10% to 12% depending on the loan size. A member that borrows, for example 5000 
pesos, will be required to deposit at least 38 pesos every week in order to be eligible 
to larger loans in the consecutive credit cyde7. By requiring increasing amounts of 
savings, the organisation has reduced potential problems of moral hazard, the 
expected rate of default, and the loans-to-savings ratio that helps diminishing the 
share of the principal paid to external sources of funding. Compulsory savings also 
help group members to reduce the risk that is collectively and equally absorbed 
when borrowers fail to repay the credit. 
6.4.2.2. Credit products 
The IGG receives a single loan from CAME every 16 weeks, where loan repayment 
is guaranteed by a promissory note backed by the group as a whole. Social collateral 
in the form of joint liability acts as the main enforcement device to secure that 
credits are fully repaid in time. As soon as group members fail to pay back their 
instalments, the justice committee uses several mechanisms such as penalties, 
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collection of physical collateral and even legal actions to persuade defaulters to pay 
back the loans. When the IGG receives a credit from CAME, it is distributed 
according to the amount requested by individual group members. Credit officers 
calculate loan instalments for each member as well as minimum deposits to be 
made during group meetings. IGGs are responsible for loan collection and 
repayment to CAME. These payments are made in an account that the organisation 
has in the National Savings and Financial Services Bank (BANSEFI), one of the few 
institutions operating in the Chalco Valley. The organisation employs several 
screening, incentive and enforcement devices to deal with problems of moral 
hazard and transaction costs (see table 6.4). 
6.4.3 Programs for Women (Promujer) 
Programs for women Mexico (Promujer) is a non-governmental organisation that 
began operations in Bolivia targeting poor women. Since its foundation in 1990, it 
has expanded to other countries in Latin America, including Peru, Nicaragua and 
recently Argentina. In November 2001, the organisation started operations in Tula 
City and the surrounding areas in the state of Hidalgo, one of the poorest in Mexico, 
with financial support from the Mexican federal and state governments as well as 
from private donors such as Citibank, JP Morgan Chase and Unitus. In fact, it was 
due to the initial support from the governor of Hidalgo that Promujer was able to 
initiate operations in the locality. 
Promujer employs the methodology of village banks, which embraces a holistic 
approach that combines group lending, and training as the main services provided. 
By the end of 2004, Promujer had managed to open 21 branches in Tula City and the 
surrounding areas that covered 489 village banks, with almost 12,000 active 
borrowers. Between 2003 and 2004, the gross loan portfolio grew at a rate of 118%, 
reaching over 1,2 million dollars, with a portfolio at risk for more than 30 days in 
the order of only 0.6%. Despite the institutional growth, the loans to savings ratio 
still remained considerably high (222%) (See table 6.5). 
7 Compulsory savings are calculated as: s=L"0.12 where L is the amount borrowed. 
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As a consequence, the organisation reported only 45% of financial self-sufficiency by 
the end of 2003, with a high financial dependency on state subsidies and private 
donors8. Village banks, referred hereafter as VBs, are integrated by 25 women 
organised in 5 solidarity groups. VBs are independently governed and 
democratically voted in issues of collective interest. The VB has a credit committee, 
formed by the heads of solidarity groups, which are in charge of the screening, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Credit officers play an important role in 
the operation of Promujer. They are responsible for promotion, group formation 
and supervision of the VBs. 
Table 6.5 Promujer. Institutional growth 
' Figures in thousands of US dollars 
2002 2003 2004 
Number of active members 
A% 
Number of Village Banks 
Credit officers 
2567 6596 11872 
- 156,95 79,99 
93 252 489 
- 170,97 94,05 
15 28 45 
A%) - Sb, br ou, zI 
Gross Loan Portfolio 231 574 1249 
A% - 148,34 117,59 
Client Savings * 231 574 1249 
A% - 334,61 172,95 
Loans to savings ratio 487,89 278,78 222,24 
Source: Promujer 
6.4.3.1. The savings component 
Compulsory savings are an essential component in the methodology employed by 
Promujer, which require a minimum deposit of 10 to 15% depending on the loan 
size. Savings are deposited in a collective account with the signatures of the VB's 
treasurer and the credit officer in order to avoid delinquency. Borrowers can only 
withdraw their savings when they dropout the programme at the end of the credit 
cycle. 
Recently, the organisation extended its model to a voluntary savings component 
that enables borrowers to deposit additional amounts of savings that can be 
8 By the end of 2004, Promujer had received subsidised credits from PRONAFIM for more 
than 5 million pesos. 
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withdrawn every week during the periodical group meetings. By the end of 2003, 
Promujer has received more than 275 thousand pesos in voluntary savings that 
represented 12% of the portfolio of total deposits. 
6.4.3.2. Credit products 
Like any other group lending model, Promujer exploits social collateral in the form 
of joint liability, as the main enforcement device to secure repayment. Each VB 
receives a single loan from Promujer in the beginning of the credit cycle to be repaid 
within 3,4 or 6 months, depending on the loan size. Loans are distributed according 
to the amount requested by individual members clustered in solidarity groups. 
Credit officers calculate loan instalments as well as minimum deposits for each 
member according to the periodical repayment schedule. Loan repayment is 
guaranteed by a promissory note backed by the VB. As soon as group members fail 
to pay back their instalments, the credit committee employs several mechanisms 
such as penalties, collection of physical collateral and even legal actions to persuade 
defaulters to payback the loans (see table 6.6). 
Selecting distinctive microfinance organisations was important in order to capture 
possible impact differences according to lending technology. These organisations 
operate in the urban context, in densely populated deprived communities, where 
the market for credit has been traditionally rationalised by the banking sector. We 
present in table 6.7 a summary of the nature and main characteristics of the three 
organisations whose clients participated in our study. The areas where the quasi- 
experiment was operationalised are described below in section 6.5. 
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Table 6.7. Summary of the nature and main characteristics of the case-study organisations 
Information corresponding to 2004 
Institutional FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Type of Credit Union Non-Governmental Non-Governmental 
organisation Organisation Organisation 
Year of 
establishment 
1994 1991 2001 
Juan Diego Foundation 
for 
Founders Foundation a catholic 
Community Assistance, Pro-Mujer 
, belonging to the International 
group Archdiocese of Mexico 
Ford Foundation, 
USAID; JP Morgan 
Private investors; 
Secours Catholique, 
Chase, Unitus, 
Main donors PRONAFIM 
Inter-American government of 
Foundation, and IADB 
ý and dalgo alga an an 
PR . 
Iztapalapa and other The Chalco Valley and a Tula City and the 
Area of influence municipalities of 
the few other municipalities surrounding areas in 
metropolitan area of of the metropolitan area the state of Hidalgo Mexico City of Mexico City 
No of branches 27 5 21 
Personnel 339 580 45 
Lending Individual lending Credit-only village- Credit-plus village- 
methodology banking banking 
16 to 24 weekly 16 weekly instalments in 
12 to 24 weekly or 
Repayment instalments at 
compulsory group 
fortnightly instalments 
schedules Fincomun officers or meetings. 
or compulsory group 
HSBC branches meetings 
Interest rate (per 72% 72% 60% 
annum) 
Savings as % of 10 10-12 10-12 loan 
Physical collateral Yes No No 
Guarantees Yes, two guarantees 
Yes, through joint Yes, through joint 
liability liability 
Voluntary savings 
Life Insurance to cover Training in financial 
Other services products and 
loan balance. Extra-loans literacy, business 
certificates of deposits 
from the internal development and 
revolving fund health care 
Borrowers (000) 25.8 40 11.8 
Women 
60 80 100 borrowers (%) 
Gross loan 
portfolio 169,725 58,000 13,739 
(000 MEX$) 
Average 
outstanding loan 6.6 1.5 2.1 
(000 MEX$) 
Loan loss reserve 2.7 1.8 2.9 
ratio (%) 
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6.5 Controlling for non-random programme placement 
In order to strengthen the internal validity of the study, it was important to follow a 
geographical criterion, i. e. to operationalise the quasi-experiment amongst households 
living in the same district, in areas with a minimum level of socio-economic and 
cultural homogeneity, where a comparison between treatment and control groups 
could be reasonable9. In this sense, by following a geographical criterion, it was 
possible to hold constant factors such as infrastructure, costs of inputs, and local 
prices that could otherwise cause a bias from a non-random programme placement. If 
credit programmes are deliberately placed in e. g. deprived areas with poor 
infrastructure, then the comparison of borrowers living in those poor areas with 
control groups living in "better off" neighbourhoods could cause a downward bias 
result in the impact estimation. 
The densely populated areas under investigation made possible to follow this 
approach.. Additionally, it was also important to follow a temporal criterion, i. e. to 
select an area where the case-study organisations had achieved a certain level of 
market penetration, where the effects of credit on the outcomes of interest could be 
more likely to be observed. In this sense, to have access to institutional information 
on market and households characteristics was crucial to identify the areas where the 
study could be conductedlo. 
In order to capture the physical and socio-economic characteristics of potential areas 
where the study could be conducted, we analysed secondary sources of information 
(Creswell 1994) such as public documents, (e. g. reports from local governments and 
statistics on demographic characteristics) as well as private documents provided by 
the case-study organisations (e. g. financial statements, balance sheets and internal 
reports). See table 6.8 for further details. 
9 Bawden and Sonenstein (1992) have suggested that the use of eligible control groups from 
the same community is possible when selection bias has been controlled and adequately 
tested for. In chapter 7, we discussed in more detail the econometric procedures to test for 
potential problems of selectivity. 
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Table 6.8 Type and source of secondary data 
Organisation and area 
of interest 
public Private 
1. Local statistics Notebook from 
2. 
INEGI (2000) 
Socio Economic information 7. Annual Reports; Financial 
from IDFM (2003) Statements and Balance Sheets, 
a. Fincomun in San 3. Institutional website various years 
Miguel Teotongo 4. Reports at the MixMarket 
8. Report from Kellee (2005) 
website 
9. Project proposal from Union de 
5. Leaflets Colonos (2005) 
6. Journalistic articles 
10. Credit Officers' Handbook 
1. Information on local 
infrastructure from National 
Commission on Water Resources 
2. Socio Economic information 
from IDFM (2003) 
3. Governmental reports and urban 
b. CAME in the development plans 
Chalco Valley 4. Local statistics Notebook from 
the INEGI (2000) 
5. Monographs and photos from 
the local library and museum 
6. Leaflets 
7. Journalistic articles 
8. Financial Statements and Balance 
Sheets, various years 
9. Internal Rules for IGGs 
(Reglamento Intern) 
10. Credit Officers' Handbook 
11. Report on Impact Evaluation 
from CAME-CP (2002) 
12. Institutional monograph, various 
authors 
6. Annual Reports; Financial 
1. Local statistics Notebook from Statements and Balance Sheets, 
the INEGI (2000) various years 
2. Socio Economic information 7. Credit and Training Officers' 
c. Promujer in Tula from INDFM (2003) Handbook 
City 3. Institutional website 8. Internal Rules for Village banks 
4. Reports at the MixMarket 9. Report on Impact Evaluation 
website from Reddy (2003) 
5. Leaflets 10. Market research project from de 
Sousa and Hall (2001) 
Note: For further details, see the Bibliography 
I also travel several times to those neighbourhoods following an observational 
protocol (Bogdan and Bilden 1992) that helped me to have a firsthand experience 
about the level of households' deprivation in the areas, and ensure that any possible 
difference was not significant. During these journeys, we were able to confirm the 
homogeneity of deprivation of these communities. In the end, three geographical 
settings were chosen, one for each case-study organisation: 1) San Miguel Teotongo 
for the case of Fincomun; 2) The Chalco Valley for the case of CAME, and 3) Tula 
City, for the case of Promujer". 
10 My gratitude to Vicente Fenoll, Alfredo Ubard, and Armando Laborde, Managing 
directors of Fincomun, CAME and Promujer, respectively, for providing me with the 
information that I needed to select the areas under examination. 
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6.5.1 San Miguel Teotongo 
The settlement of San Miguel Teotongo, located in the Iztapalapa District to the 
Eastern periphery of Mexico City, is one of poorest of the metropolitan area (see 
figure 6.5). Poor families that migrated from Central and Southern Mexico settled 
San Miguel Teotongo in 1972. It started growing rapidly up to a population that has 
been estimated at 80,000 inhabitants (Heredia and Purcell 1995). Despite the fact that 
San Miguel Teotongo has not experienced a substantial growth since the late 1980s, 
the surrounding areas have grown substantially in recent years to a level of 300,000 
inhabitants. 
Figure 6.5 The Iztapalapa District and its territories 
guei 
igo 
San Miguel Teotongo is densely populated, with two or more families living in the 
same house. On average, between six and eight members integrate a household. 
Single mothers in the range of 15 to 22 years of age constitute 15 percent of the 
population. The adult illiteracy rate is 11.7 percent, significantly higher than the 
regional rate (3%) for Mexico City. Given the deprived labour markets in the region, 
San Miguel Teotongo has become a dormitory town, where some 85 percent of the 
working population take on average a two-hours journey every day to reach their 
'' For a statistical overview of the selected areas, see the Appendix to Chapter 6. 
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workplace, and around 52 percent is employed in the industry, and 40 percent in the 
commerce sector (Union de Colonos 2005). 
6.5.2 The Chalco Valley 
The Chalco Valley is a municipality of the State of Mexico located in the Eastern 
periphery of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City (see figure 6.6). It started in 1978 
as an irregular settlement in communal land (known in Mexico as Ejidos) on what 
once upon a time some 120 years ago was the Chalco Lake12. 
The municipality was established by poor immigrants from Central and South East 
Mexico who in the search for better job opportunities migrated to the capital. 
However, it was not until 1985 when it started to grow rapidly due to high 
immigration from other deprived districts in the surrounding areas of Mexico City 
such as Nezahualcoyotl City and Iztapalapa. Most of those immigrants were poor 
families who were attracted by cheap land and who could not afford to buy land or 
rent in Mexico City. 
The Chalco Valley remained as one of the largest irregular settlements in the 
country until November 1994, when the Mexican Congress approved its 
constitution as an independent municipality of the State of Mexico. In the year 2000, 
it was documented a population of 323.5 thousand people (69.6 thousand 
households) that had grown at a rate of 5.3 percent in the period 1995-2000 (INEGI 
2000). In 2003, the local government (Gobierno Municipal del Valle de Chalco 2005) 
estimated a population of 406.5 thousands inhabitants that given its territory, 
situated the Chalco Valley as the seventh most densely populated municipality in 
the country. As many other deprived localities in the region, the Chalco Valley 
suffers from deficient public services such as water piped, electric power and 
12 The Chalco Lake was located in what is known as the Mexican basin. The lake was a fresh 
water hydrologic structure. Together with other Mexican great lakes such as Texcoco, 
Zumpango, Xaltocan and Xochimilco formed the ancient Mexico Lake Basin, which was the 
home of many ancient civilisations such as the Aztecs. In the late years of the Nineteenth 
Century, the dictator Porfirio Diaz authorised Inigo Noriega, a Spanish cacique (landlord) to 
drain the lake for agricultural purposes (Tortolero 1993). Understandingly, nowadays the 
region suffers from problems of flooding. 
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drainage. Only 88.84% of households enjoy these public services together and 
almost 25% is still with no water piped inside the residence13. 
Figure 6.6 The Chalco Valley and its surroundings 
HGO. 
Mat 
Di. 
GRO. 
DF 
C iko 
The Chalco Valley 
Residences are gradually built. One fourth of the properties are constituted by only 
two rooms and kitchen (excluding bathroom) and on average five members 
integrate each household. Most of the properties are constructed with rough blocks 
and roofed with cement (59%), cardboard sheets (19%) and asbestos sheets (17%) 
that give the landscape a peculiar grey colour. The municipality is located next to a 
canal (La Companfa) that carries sewage water from other municipalities of Mexico 
City. Frequently during the rain season, this canal overflows its banks, causing soil 
and water pollution, and during the dry season, given the flat geographical 
characteristic of the Valley, clouds of dust often cover the area, causing significant 
health problems for the population. 
13 Despite the fact that the Chalco Valley suffers from deficient public services, there have 
been substantial improvements in recent years as a consequence of governmental support. It 
was in this municipality where the National Programme, Solidaridad, a safety net known 
today as Oportunidades, began in 1985 with a public investment of 700 million pesos (almost 
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6.5.3 Tula City 
Tula City is a medium-size town with 90,000 inhabitants located at the centre of Ihr, 
country, an hour from Mexico City (see figure (1.7). In in earlier study, it was 
estimated a potential number of borrowers in the order of I0,000 Iow-income 
women14. In 2000 the locality reported a ratio of 93 men per 100 women, which is 
explained by the large emigration, particularly amongst men, registered in recent 
years. Migration has actually grown at a rate of 15%ß per year, despite the fact that 
two large companies, Mexican Cements (CEMEX) and Mexican Petroleum (I'I; MIA) 
operate in the region. The main destinations are Mexico City and the US. In fact, 
about 4% of the working population is currently living abroad, and t; 0"4 of 
households in the municipality have relatives living in the US. Amongst those who 
stay in the region, 42% are self-employed. 
Figure 6.7 Tula City and the surrounding areas 
State of Hidalgo 
I, iJ 
r Tula City 
US$ 2 billion). After this intervention, the percentage of households with drainage pipe 
increased from 58%% in 1995 to 91%, in 2000. 
11 This figure was obtained from a market research project reported by dc Sousa and Hall 
(2001). 
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Household income in Hidalgo is particularly low. A recent survey reported that 
75% of households earned no more than 2 minimum wages, which weighted by the 
average household size (4 members per household) gives an income per capita of 
about 2.5 dollars per day (INEGI 2001). Women play a fundamental role in 
generating income. About 50% of households had a female member employed or 
engaged in income-generating activities, and amongst those women, 60% were 
employed in the commerce sector, and 22% in the manufacturing sector. The 
distribution of financial institutions in Tula City is highly dispersed. On average, 
there is a branch per 11,000 inhabitants, where a few banks and non-banking 
financial institutions operate (INEGI 2001). As a consequence, indigenous savings 
and credit agents in the region are the natural competitors of Promujer. 
6.6 Instruments of data collection 
In order to collect primary data, a cross-sectional sample survey was conducted 
amongst treatment and control households participating in the case-study 
organisations and living in the selected communities. Given the homogeneity of 
households' characteristics in those communities, a sample survey was the 
preferred type of data collection. As suggested by Babbie 1990; Sudman and 
Bradman 1986; Fowler 1988; Keppel 1991, and many others, this strategy has 
important advantages in terms of identifying important attributes of the target 
population from the groups that we were planning to interview, and due to time 
constraints of the study. 
The sampling strategy was implemented using a multistage procedure in the form of 
clusters (Fink and Kosecoff 1985; Creswell 1994): first, we had access to a list of 
programme participants (both treatment and control) from the case-study 
organisations (the dusters), and who lived in the selected areas. Participants with 
loan in arrears were also included in the list in order to avoid bias results and 
strengthen the internal validity. In the second stage, both treatment and control 
groups were selected at random. In the end, we managed to survey 148 households, 
55 of which were participating at Fincomun and living in San Miguel Teotongo; 46 
who were members of CAME and lived in the Chalco Valley, and 47 participants at 
Promujer and living in Tula City and the surroundings (see table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9. Sources of nrimarv data 
Institution Supply side Demand side 
FINCOMUN Individual interviews with the 55 semi-structured interviews (36 
Managing Director; and directors with treatment households and 19 
of Finance and Product with control groups) 
Management 
CAME Individual interviews with 46 semi-structured interviews (28 
directors of Finance; Operations; with treatment households and 18 
Research and Evaluations, and with control groups) 
with the branch manager in the 
Chalco Valley 
PROMUJER Individual interviews with the 47 semi-structured interviews (26 
Managing Director; and directors with treatment households and 21 
of Finance and Product with control groups) 
Management 
Total 10 interviews to key decision- 148 semi-structured interviews (90 
makers with treatment households and 58 
with control groups) 
The survey was administrated face-to-face to programme participants employing, as 
instrument of data collection, a semi-structured-interview format. We selected a 
semi-structured interviewing technique due to its implicit properties: it enabled me 
to administrate a quantitative component to capture, just like structured 
questionnaires do, information on variables such as income, assets, education and so 
on, in combination of a qualitative component to capture with open-ended questions, 
just like in-depth interviews do, opinions, experiences and relevant information for 
the research (Arksey and Knight 1999; Berg 2003). 
Semi-structured interviews, referred hereafter as simply interviews, were also 
useful in developing a positive connection with the interviewees and gaining 
insights in relevant issues that clearly improved the quality and reliability of the 
information. In this sense, the instrument embodied a combination of methods in a 
dominant-less dominant design form (Creswell 1994) aimed to answer the research 
questions based on the analytical framework presented in chapter 5, and where a 
simultaneous triangulation's was adequately and straightforwardly implemented. 
is The concept of simultaneous triangulation refers to the procedure where the researcher is 
able to answer quantitative and qualitative research questions at the same time in the study. 
For further details see Morse 1991. 
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In this sense, it was possible to record answers and when needed, the reasons for 
such answers (Davis 1990). The interview was constructed as a modified instrument 
from a questionnaire that BANSEFI developed for a panel survey, and which we 
adapted for the objectives of the study. Permission from officials at BANSEFI was 
granted to obtain and modify the instrument into an interview format. A copy of the 
content sections of the interview is presented in the Appendix to Chapter 616. 
6.6.1 The administration of the instruments 
In the beginning of the fieldwork, a pilot testing was conducted with the purpose of 
improving language, format and order of the questions in the interview as 
recommended by Goode and Hatt (1952); Silverman (1999); Yin (2003), and Padua et 
al (1979). I asked permission to record the interviews using a digital recorder 
whereas I was taking brief notes on key elements. Several issues were tested, for 
example, is the interview too long? Is the idiomatic language correct? Are important 
questions omitted? Is the order of the questions appropriate? Are the questions 
answering the research questions? Pilot testing was important to improve the 
validity of the instrument and reliability of the information. For example, when I 
asked participants if they had borrowed from moneylenders, (known in Mexico as 
usureros), I often had to use other adjectives such as agiotistas, prestamistas or quien 
presta a reditos, to ensure a full understanding of the question. In the end, piloted 
interviews were excluded from the final sample. 
Prior the interviews, I visited group meetings or the branch of the organisations 
where I introduced myself as a PhD student and I explained the scope and 
objectives of the study. Since many participants were busy, I arranged appointments 
to conduct the interview, usually for the day after, in their place of residence or 
where they had their business. Interviews were also conducted during group 
meetings, particularly with participants at CAME and Promujer, where long-period 
16 By the time I operationalised the quasi-experiment in Mexico City, the National Savings 
and Financial Services Bank was piloting a panel survey that was expected to collect data 
from households borrowing from non-banking institutions, which traditionally offer 
financial services to middle and low income households across the country, over a period of 
5 years. I arranged a meeting with the officials in charge of the project, and asked permission 
to access the first rounds of to the panel survey. Although I had several meetings with the 
officials I was never given an answer on whether or not I could access the database. I was 
allowed, however, to get a copy of the content of the questionnaire. 
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sessions allowed me to do so. Group meetings regularly took place at the branch of 
the organisation or at the residence of one of the group members. The interview was 
administrated, when possible, to both the interviewee and partner. Obtaining 
information about the household from more than one household member was 
important to triangulate and directly crosscheck the answers to increase the 
reliability of the evidence. Since our analysis is at the household level, the 
fungibility problem is considerable reduced. In order to evade contamination, control 
groups were immediately interviewed after data collection from treatment 
households had been finished. This strategy helped to avoid what Mosley (1998) has 
referred to as downstream evaluations. 
Table 6.10 Measures to strenethen internal validi 
Potential threats Corrective actions during instrument design and data collection 
a. Selection bias 1. Households participants in a credit programme (including those with loans in 
arrears) were eligible to be sampled as members of the treatment group. 
b. Hawthorne effects Households who had self-selected to participate and had been accepted by the 
lender, but had not received a loan, were eligible to be sampled as members of 
the control group 
c. Non-random 2. A geographical criterion was followed in order to hold constant external factors 
programme such as infrastructure, costs of inputs, and prices. An observational protocol helped 
placement to ensure the homogeneity of the selected areas. 
3. A Temporal criterion was followed in order to record the effects of "treatment" 
after a certain level of market penetration from the case-study organisations. 
d. Attribution 4. Data was collected in relation to access to credit from institutional lenders, 
moneylenders, and ROSCAS. 
e. Fungibility S. Data collection and econometric analysis were conducted at the household level. 
6. A component was designed in the interview to investigate the use of credit. 
f. Causation 7. Simultaneous triangulation was employed to record the answer, and when 
appropriate, the mason of such an answer. 
g. Motivation 8. Drinks and costs of transportation (when applicable) were offered to 
participants. 
9. Crosschecking with interviewees and other household members was used to 
ensure the reliability of the answers. 
IL Downstream 10. Control groups were interviewed immediately after treatment groups. 
evaluations 
i. Testing 11. A Piloting process was carried out to correct language, format and order of 
questions. 
Note: Some ideas have been borrowed from Mosley (1998) 
The length of each interview varied from household to household, from a minimum 
of 50 minutes to a maximum of 2 hours. During that period, I offered interviewees 
soft drinks and to cover transportation costs for participants that used public 
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transport. See table 6.10 for a synopsis of the corrective actions undertaken to 
strengthen the internal validity of the study. Interviews were also conducted with 
the Managing directors of the case-study organisations as well as with other key 
decision-makers, in order to get first-hand information on institutional issues that 
were relevant for the research, e. g. legal constitution; operational and financial 
structure; products and services; efficiency, productivity and outreach; risk and 
liquidity, etc. Documents and statistical information were requested during the 
interview in order to support the information provided. 
I regularly spent 3 hours in daily return journeys from my place of residence (in the 
South of Mexico City) to San Miguel Teotongo and the Chalco Valley (in the Eastern 
periphery). In the case of Tula City, the Managing Director of Promujer offered me a 
temporal accommodation in the locality. On average, I interviewed 3 households 
per day, although in many occasions I was able to complete only one. To a great 
extent, the social characteristics of the selected neighbourhoods played an important 
role in slowing down the originally fieldwork plan. The Chalco Valley, and in 
particular San Miguel Teotongo, have been recently listed amongst the most 
dangerous areas of the metropolitan area of Mexico City (see the report on 
criminality from ICESI 2005). 
Since dangerous gangs control the areas, I was advised, for security reasons, to leave 
before sunset. Despite of my precautions, I was robbed by some of these bands. I 
also faced other unexpected events. When I was conducted some interviews in a 
block next to the canal "La Compania", in the Chalco Valley, I was infected with a 
bacteria known as Klebsiella pneumoniae that sent me into hospital. I was ill for more 
than 3 weeks. This canal, that carries sewage water and produces a terrible odour, is 
the cause of significant health problems in the region. In the end, the fieldwork was 
completed in a period of 9 months, from September 2003 to May 2004. 
6.7 The content areas of the interview 
The interview began with general questions in order to build a rapport with the 
participant. When more private issues were discussed, open-ended questions often 
helped to encourage interviewees to provide information in grater detail. Interviews 
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were structured in seven components of interest: 1) general characteristics of the 
household; 2) physical capital, including both household and business assets; 3) 
human capital, including education and health; 4) social capital; 5) access to 
financial institutions and informal financial agents, including the use of products 
such as credit, savings, remittances and insurance. In this component, a special 
section was devised in order to capture information on the microfinance 
organisation; 6) labour activities and income sources, including waged employment 
and income-generating activities; and 7) external shocks and copying strategies. The 
first section was designed to investigate households' characteristics, for example: 
household size, age, gender and activity of each household member, marital status 
of the participant, and so on. An overview of this section is presented in table A6.9 
in the Appendix to Chapter 6. 
In section 2, information was collected on the stock of physical capital both at the 
household and business levels, e. g. data on asset-holdings such as vehicles, electrical 
appliances and real estate and the means by which these assets were acquired. 
Section 3 was designed to investigate the characteristics of human capital. This 
section was divided in two different areas: education and health. The former looked 
at the level of formal instruction of each family member whereas the latter focused 
on the health status and the means by which the household cope with illness and 
diseases. Section 4 was designed to investigate the stock of social capital in the form 
of formal and informal organised reciprocal networks of trust and mutual help. An 
overview of these sections is presented in table A6.10 in the Appendix. 
Section 5 was devised to collect information on the access to and use of financial 
products. Questions were divided into several segments aimed to examine the 
following issues: 1) access to formal institutions and informal savings mechanisms 
such as ROSCAS. In this section, information was collected on the use and amount 
of savings, periodicity of deposits and conditions of such instruments. A special 
subsection was designed to investigate the use of savings instruments offered by the 
case-study microfinance organisation. See table A6.11 in the Appendix. A second 
segment was designed to investigate the access to institutional lending and informal 
credit agents such as moneylenders. In this section, information was recorded on 
loans requirements such as repayment periods, interest rates, collateral and so on, 
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and the use of such credits. A special subsection was also designed to record data on 
the use of credits from the case-study organisations, and qualitative questioning 
was employed to capture information on issues such as fungibility and causationl7 
that could be relevant to the study (see table A6.12 in the Appendix). Information 
was also captured on the subjects of remittances and other forms of money 
transferring (see table A6.13 in the Appendix). 
Section 6 was designed to capture information on labour and income sources, 
including waged labour and income-generating activities. In relation to income- 
generating activities, information was collected on the type, location and age of the 
business; reasons to start the business and sources of seed capital; number of people 
involved in the business, including household members and employees; wages paid 
to employees; days and hours worked per week; and revenues, costs and profits per 
week. Regarding waged labour, information was collected on number of household 
members with waged jobs, wage-rate and job characteristics. Information was also 
collected on other income sources such as governmental safety nets, remittances and 
other transfers. Qualitative questions complemented and crosschecked the answers. 
With this information it was possible to estimate households income (see table 
A6.14 in the Appendix). 
Finally, section 7 focused on recording information on preventive and coping 
strategies that households put into practice in order to deal with external shocks and 
reduce their vulnerability (for further details on these variables, see table A6.15 in 
Appendix). 
It is important to acknowledge here the difficulties of getting accurate data, 
particularly in relation to income and profits. This constraint can cause estimation 
errors. This was initially pointed out by Morgenstern (1963) who identified three 
main sources of data inaccuracy: 1) inappropriate design of instruments of data 
collection, including unclear questions and definitions (referred hereafter as the 
designing problem); 2) inadequate training of field interviewers (the collecting 
17 The term causation refers here to what Mosley (1998) has described as misspecification of 
underlying causal relationships, which could emerge from e. g. credit officers who encourage 
borrowers to sell assets or borrow from moneylenders to repay the loan in time. 
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problem), and 3) since data on income and profits can be highly sensitive to 
household members, they may have motives to hide or under report data (the 
motivation problem). These three factors often diminish the quality of the 
information. 
In order to reduce this constraint, I follow different research strategies: to address 
the designing problem, I tested the quantitative and qualitative components of the 
interview during a pilot process, in which I checked language, concepts, and order 
of questions, as suggested by Silverman (1999) and Yin (2003). Since I personally 
administrated the survey, the collecting problem is believed to have been 
substantially reduced. However, the motivation problem is potentially the main 
source of errors. In order to address this problem, I administrated, when possible, 
the interview to programme participants and their partner or other member of the 
household. The flexibility of the interview allowed me to triangulate and crosscheck 
the answers to, as suggested by Arksey and Knight (1999); Berg (2003) and Creswell 
(1994), increase the reliability of the data. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the problem 
of data reliability. 
6.8 Data entry and analysis 
Primary data obtained from the sample survey was inputted in a rectangular format 
using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), version 12. Variables were 
coded and labelled according to their level of measurement, i. e. continuous (e. g. 
income, profits, revenues and costs, etc); nominal (e. g. categories such as gender, 
marital status, occupation, etc. ); ordinal (e. g. health status, perceptions of financial 
situation, etc), and strings (e. g. alphanumeric codes for each household participant). 
For further details on the codes of each variable, see Appendix 6. 
When the dataset was completed, I carried out a refining process to validate and 
check for consistency, i. e. to verify missing data in the dataset as well as to remove 
errors (Miller et al 2002). Data manipulation, including recoding, weighting and 
grouping was undertaking in order to produce new variables that were used 
afterwards for econometric analysis of the impacts of credit. Prior the econometric 
analysis, a descriptive statistical analysis including cross-tabulations, was carried 
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out in order to measure the degree of association between treatment and control 
groups in relation to the variables of interest. This analysis was carried out using 
SPSS. For the econometric analysis (presented in Chapters 7 and 8), 1 selected the 
Stata Package, version 8, for its structural advantages in cross-sectional analysis. 
Finally, for qualitative and narrative analysis, I used a complementary thematic 
analysis technique (Boyatzis 1998), in which transcriptions of important accounts 
were organised by themes according to the subjects of interest. In Chapter 7 and 8, I 
included narrative evidence to back the empirical findings. 
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Chapter 7 
The impact of credit on income 
poverty 
Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss the econometric modelling as well as the results from 
estimating the impact of credit on income poverty in the context of urban Mexico. 
Traditionally, the discussion about methods and approaches aimed to analyse 
poverty impacts range from quantitatively based (Pitt and Khandker 1998a, 1998b; 
Hulme and Mosley 1996; Morduch 1998; Coleman 1999) to qualitatively related 
(Hashemi, Schuler et al 1996; Osmani 1998; Rahman 1999; Wood and Shariff 1997). 
Frequently, the analytical method is selected based on the conceptualisation that the 
researcher embraces with regards to human deprivation. 
Our approach clearly acknowledges the multidimensional nature of poverty that 
goes beyond the boundaries of income deprivation, where the lack of economic 
opportunities and essential capabilities such as education, health and nutrition as 
well as restrictions on people's choices including freedom, dignity and self-respect, 
are dominant (Sen 1981,1985; Anand and Sen 1994; UNDP 1997; World Bank 2000). 
However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the analytical advantages of the income 
variable allow us to, for example, identify critical thresholds in the form of poverty 
lines and carry out statistical analysis in a straightforward manner (Ravallion 1992). 
For analytical purposes, the econometric estimation procedure in section 7.2 focuses 
on the effects of credit on income changes as a mean to reduce poverty. Taking 
advantages of the analytical properties of our model, we discuss in section 7.3 the 
determinants of household borrowing as an introductory section to the effects of 
programme participation on the level of household income (7.4), which connects to 
the final section (7.5) that discusses the findings with regards to the poverty 
impacts. 
The challenge of assessing poverty impacts has proved to be a difficult task, in 
particular due to the characteristics and sample size of the available data; however, 
our findings confirm what some scholars have found elsewhere. It is important to 
bring to the reader's attention the fact that in Chapter 8 we discuss the impacts of 
credit from a wider perspective, looking in particular at factors that affect 
household well-being such as asset accumulation, housing improvements, 
children's schooling, and labour. 
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7.1 The econometric estimation procedure 
To begin with, our exposition considers the case where household i decides to 
participate in a credit programme in order to finance any specific productive 
activity. The amount of capital supplied is exogenously determined by the lender L, 
who set up this maximum threshold according to level of participation in the 
programme. The lender is expected to exploit several screening, incentive and 
enforcement devices to deal with the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection that are related to borrowers' behaviour (Akerlof 1970; Besley and Coate 
1995; Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). Some of these devices are, inter alia, progressive 
lending, compulsory savings schemes, and periodical repayment schedules. 
Given the particular environment in underdeveloped credit markets, the demand 
for credit is assumed to be rationed by the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), and 
endogenously determined by household's characteristics such as the stock of 
human capital, individual preferences, attitude towards risks, etc. Our primary 
concern is to estimate the effect of credit on the outcome to be investigated Y, 
which is observed through the income variable. As a point of departure for the 
analysis, we consider the following model 
Y, = X, ß+I; S+u; (7.1) 
where X, is a vector of exogenous households characteristics and Ii is a 
dichotomous variable with value I =1 if household i is a programme participant, 
1= 0 otherwise. The model measures the impact of programme participation by 
the coefficient of the parameter estimate, J. An important assumption here is that 
programme participation is always voluntary. The variable I, cannot be treated as 
exogenous if we assume a potential problem of selection bias, i. e. if the decision of a 
household of whether or not to participate in the credit programme depends not 
only on the effort, abilities, preferences, and attitudes towards risk. that generate 
individual self-selection (a demand-related bias), but also on the selectivity 
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discrimination made by credit programmes (a supply-related bias)'. An illustrative 
example of the latter appears when credit officers at Fincomun screen out 
applicants with no previous business experience, or when village-bank's members 
at CAME, or Promujer reject new applicants who do not live in the same 
neighbourhood. We consider, thus, a specification equation in the form: 
Y; = X11ß , +I 15+u,; (for programme participants) 
(7.2) 
Y2; = X21ß2 +u2i (for non participants) (7.3) 
I. = Z1Y1-C. (7.4) 
Iz = Z2Y2 -E (7.5) . 
where I; is defined by two components: 1 refers to the decision of a household of 
whether or not to participate in a credit programme, and IZ refers to the decision of 
the credit officer or group members of whether or not to accept such applicants. In 
this sense, 
I, =1 if household i chooses to participate in the credit programme 
I, = 0, otherwise 
IZ =1 if household i is accepted by group members or the credit officer 
I2 = 0, otherwise 
A problem emerges here when we cannot observe households that choose either to 
participate or not, and households that are either accepted or rejected by credit 
officers or group members, i. e. I= Il +I2, but just as a single indicator 1= I, " 12. As 
a result, what we observe is household i self-selecting to participate in the credit 
programme and being accepted by the lender. Thus, we can only specify the 
distribution of households who have been accepted to participate in the programme 
(I2) and then estimate the parameter y2, if these households have previously self- 
1 The problem of selectivity has been widely discussed in several fields, in particular labour 
markets [Heckman (1974,1979); Cogan (1980); Lee (1978); Abowd and Farber (1982), among 
many others]; however, just recently it began to be addressed in the literature of 
microfinance. Some examples are Khandker and Pitt (1998a, 1998b) and Coleman (1999). 
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selected (I =1). Our estimation strategy therefore will focus on households who 
have satisfied the condition I= I1 " IZ (see figure 6.1 in Chapter 6, section 6.3). 
Maddala (1999) suggests to define IZ over the whole population i. e. identify 
households with business activity or living in the same neighbourhood, and then 
analyse the model from the truncated sample where the parameters yl and 72 can 
be estimated by maximising a likelihood function, e. g. Probit or Tobit. The 
argument, Maddala (1999: 261) says, is that, in principle, 12 exists even for the non- 
applicants. Thus, the observed Y, can be defined as Y=Y, if I1 =1, and Y= Y2j if 
I. = 0, where the participation decision function is given by Ir = Zr y=E,. In 
another paper, Maddala (1977) derives the covariance matrix as follows: 
all 012 0 
Cvv(u,;, uu, ei)= a12 022 ß2E 
Oft a7 1 
(7.6) 
that enables us to evaluate the impact of programme participation on the outcome 
of interest, Y, by comparing the expected outcome for treatment and control groups. 
Notice that both groups are participants with a time-variance difference that 
accounts for the length of membership. Consequently, control groups are integrated 
by households who just joined the credit programme. We follow the specification: 
Yi = X1ß1 + u,; (for treatment groups) (7.7) 
YY; = X; ß2 +u2; (for control groups) (7.8) 
and 
E(YII, =1)-E(YII, =O)=X, (/, -ß2)+d 
0(ZrY) 
0(ZrY)+v 
(7.9) 
where a* =(62E-Qj, ), and 0 (") and c() are the density of the distribution 
function and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, 
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respectively, and E(V) = 0. Under self-selectivity, 6>0, therefore equation (7.9) 
will report greater coefficients. In other words, households with comparative 
advantages will benefit more from the credit programme than disadvantaged 
households. However, since we surveyed households that satisfied the condition 
I =11.12 >_ 0 (see section 6.3 in Chapter 6), we believe to have considerably 
reduced the selection problem. 
7.1.1 Using the Heckman procedure with I; as endogenous regressor 
Despite the fact that we believe that our sample strategy addresses the problem of 
self-selectivity, we may still encounter a problem of endogeneity in the model of 
programme participation if the explanatory variable I, is correlated with 
unobservable factors that are relegated to the error term u; . In other words, ui may 
contain an omitted variable that is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables 
except I,. In order to control for the potential endogeneity problem we follow a 
Heckft estimation procedure (Heckman 1979) with an identifying instrumental 
variable (IV)2. This Maximum Likelihood method follows the model 
Y, = Xrß,, +115+u; (7.10) 
I, = Xf3, +Zjr+u; (7.11) 
where X; is anxK vector of household characteristics that capture not only 
conventional variables such as age, sex, and the dependency ratio, but also elements 
related to the level household capital endowments such as years of formal 
education (human capital); housing ownership and the state of the property 
(physical capital); and the number of household members at work and the number 
of years in business as proxy variables for the characteristics of the labour market. 
We introduce an exogenous regressor Z, in equation (7.11) as the identifying 
instrument that will not be included in equation (7.10). Z; is an observable variable 
distinct from those in X, that affect I, but not the outcome of interest Y 
2 See Wooldridge (2002), Greene (2003) and Maddala (1999) for a detailed discussion on the 
properties of the identifying instrument. 
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conditional on I,. In other words, the instrument must be partially correlated with 
Ii, i. e. the coefficient on Z, must be nonzero, y*0, so Cov(Z,, u, ) * 0, whilst Z, 
must be uncorrelated with Y,, so Cov(Z,, u; ) = 0, where the projected error, 
E(u. ')=0, is uncorrelated with Z,. Selecting an appropriate instrument becomes a 
crucial, but also a complex task for our estimation. 
The Heckft procedure also allows us to test for the assumption of no self-selectivity 
by estimating the inverse Mills ratio, A(. ) _ resulting from the relationship 
between the density of the distribution function, q("), and the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal, cb (") in equation (7.11). As suggested 
by Heckman (1979), we can estimate consistently the parameters X131 and y by 
exploiting the properties of the first stage Probit estimation and then get the 
A 
estimated inverse Mills ratio, A. In the second stage we obtain the parameters ßß,, 
and S from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with the inverse Mills ratio added to the 
regressors as follows: 
Y =X; ýý, +I, 9y+1; 8+AM+u; (7.12) 
where we have also included L that is anxK vector of credit market 
characteristics, which captures the effect of banks and indigenous credit agents such 
as moneylenders and ROSCAS that compete in the market with microfinance 
organisations. The rationale behind incorporating these variables into 4 rely on the 
assumption that if we do not control for the effect of other intermediaries on the 
outcome of interest Y,, then the parameter S that captures the effect of programme 
participation may be inconsistent, i. e. we could wrongly attribute some outcomes to 
microfinance organisations when in fact they come from for example, ROSCAS. 
This is what we refer to in section 6.1 as the attribution problem. 
The two-stage Least Square (2SLS) procedure yields consistent estimates in the 
parameter of interest 5 (Wooldridge 2002) where M and A are the inverse Mills 
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ratio and its parameter estimate, respectively. A simple way of testing for self- 
selectivity is under the null hypothesis of no selection bias, Ho : A= 0, using the 
usual 2SLS t statistic. When A#0 we may have a problem of self-selectivity. 
7.1.2 Selecting the instrumental variable 
In order to select our instrumental variable, we analysed instruments used by other 
researchers. Pitt and Khandker (1998a), for example, have exploited a particular 
exogenous rule that organisations such as Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh 
have set up in order to restrict programme participation by non-poor households. 
This exogenous rule is related to landownership, and has been defined as households 
owning more than one-half acre of land. This observable variable may contain good 
properties for the specific lending characteristics of rural Bangladesh where 
markets, infrastructure and demographic attributes are predominantly rural; 
however, in the context of urban Mexico, this instrument would be inappropriate. 
Firstly, microfinance organisations in Mexico are not imposing any asset-specific 
restriction for programme participation, although they target deprived (mainly 
urban) and frequently highly populated areas, where markets are potentially large. 
Secondly, unlike the context of rural Bangladesh, agricultural activities in the 
surroundings of Mexico City are non-existent, and these areas have become, to a 
certain extent, dormitory towns where people travel to the city in search of job 
opportunities or to carry out self-employment activities. Thirdly, landownership is 
not a reliable indicator of well-being in the urban context. Locations such as San 
Miguel Teotongo and the Chalco Valley in the eastern periphery of Mexico City 
began as densely populated and irregular slums in community-owned land (known 
in Mexico as Ejidos), where entire families with two or more households live in the 
same residence. These houses are normally built gradually on land with no title 
deeds, and it was not until recent years that the local authorities began a legal 
process to regularise these settlements. 
Finally, the maximum likelihood estimation method followed by Pitt and Khandker 
(1998a) was designed to use village fixed effects to control for the endogeneity 
problem of programme placement since the specific characteristics of the quasi- 
experimental household survey conducted in Bangladesh covered households in 
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villages with access to microfinance programmes and households in villages with 
no access to programme services, as control groups3; however, the concept of a 
village in itself is inappropriate and impractical in the context of urban Mexico, 
where the areas under study are highly populated and socially different from small 
rural communities. For that reasons, our quasi-experimental survey design followed 
a different approach: 
1. As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, we collected information at household level, 
from treatment and control groups, where the latter were identified as those 
households who had just joined the programme but who had not received a 
loan by the time the survey was conducted. This procedure was essential to 
avoid potential problems of selection bias. 
2. Our quasi-experiment only covered treatment and control groups who lived in 
the same location. The high density of population in the areas under study as 
well as the homogeneity of household deprivation allowed us to collect primary 
data that satisfied the requirements for our analysis. We surveyed for example 
households borrowing from Fincomun who lived in San Miguel Teotongo 
(treatment group) and households who had just joined Fincomun and who also 
lived in the neighbourhood (control group). The same procedure was repeated 
in the Chalco Valley and in Tula, Hidalgo, where CAME and Promujer operate, 
respectively. In this sense we have three locations, one for each microfinance 
organisation, and two groups of households, treatment and control, for each 
case-study organisation. 
3. The sampling strategy was implemented using a multistage procedure in the 
form of clusters (see Fink and Kosecoff 1985, and Creswell 1994): first, I had 
access to a list of programme participants (both treatment and control) from the 
case-study organisations (the clusters), and who lived in the selected areas. 
Participants with loans in arrears were also included in the list in order to avoid 
biased results and strengthen the internal validity. In the second stage, both 
treatment and control groups were selected at random. 
3 The authors used a weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood-limited 
information maximum likelihood-fixed effects (WESML-LIML-FE) approach. 
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Other researchers have employed instrumental variables that attempt to control for 
the problem of endogeneity, but at the village level. For example Quach et al (2005) 
have used three identifying instruments in the context of rural Vietnam: the 
availability of funds; the credit allocation pattern and the level of competition 
between lenders. Zaman (1999) on the other hand, has used the number of eligible 
households to participate in microcredit programmes in the context of rural 
Bangladesh. The problem with these instruments is that they are aimed to work at 
the village level; however, since we follow an empirical estimation at the household 
level and in the urban context these potential instruments were ruled out from our 
estimation. Given the particular characteristics of urban lending in Mexico, it is 
reasonable to assume that the level of programme participation, I;, is exogenously 
determined by the lender, i. e. microfinance organisations require from applicants a 
set of minimum requirements in order to participate in the programme. Thus, we 
decided to concentrate on the supply side in order to identify the instrument Zr. 
Initially, an obvious identifying instrument was the price of the endogenous 
variable i. e. the rate of interest paid to the lender. Fincomun and Promujer, for 
example, charge an interest rate of 72% on annum basis whilst CAME charge a rate 
of 66%; however, since these microfinance organisations charge fixed rates that do 
not vary across the sample, this policy made it impossible to use the interest rate as 
an identifying instrument. Then we considered another potential instrument that 
could provide us with sufficient information on the costs associated to programme 
participation. As discussed in Chapter 6, microfinance organisations demand 
periodical repayments (normally on a weekly basis) that take place in the branch of 
the institution (in the case of Fincomun and Promujer) or in the house of one of the 
group members where periodical sessions are arranged (in the case of CAME). For 
simplicity, hereafter we refer to these locations as "the branch". 
Weekly compulsory meetings, in particular for participants at CAME and Promujer 
can be highly time-intensive and implicitly costly for programme members. In the 
beginning we considered an observable variable with computational values that 
varied from household to household and which reflected the heterogeneity of the 
utility cost of programme participation. We computed this variable by estimating the 
cost of transportation per credit cycle, CT, in which we attempted to capture the 
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physical and geographical characteristics of the accessibility to the branch, in 
addition to the opportunity cost of borrowing, CO , as a proxy of the income forgone 
for attending weekly meetings and other activities, per credit cycle. We transformed 
the values (in pesos) of the utility cost of programme participation into logarithmic 
form, (coded as LGCOSTBORROWPC = log CT +log C°) in order to test for the 
underlined assumption of no correlation between the identifying instrument and 
the income variable as follows: 
LGINCOMEPC = ßi AVEDU; + P2 HOWNER; + P3 HESTATE; + P4 TIMEBUS; 
+ ßs W WORKER, + ß6 DEPENDRATIO; + ßr AGE; + ß8 WOMAN; 
+ ß7 MARITAL; + 01 ROSCAS; + 02 FORMALCREDIT; + 03 MONEYLENDERt +S 
LGMAXCREDJT, +y LGCOSTBORROWPC; 
We find that in the case of Fincomun the coefficient r of LGCOSTBORROWPC 
reported p-values of the t statistic that rejected the null of Ha : 7= 0 at 5% level of 
significance (see table 7.1), throwing out any possibility of using this variable as the 
identifying instrument to be exploited in the impact estimation for the three 
institutions participants in the study as a whole 4. 
Table 7.1 Identifying equations on functional form 
Logarithm of the cost of borrowing (LGCOSTBORROWPC) as identifying instrument 
Dependent variable in (7.11): logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
(LGMAXCREDIT) 
Dependent variable in (7.12): logarithm of monthly income per adult equivalent 1 in pesos of 2004 
(LCINCOMF. PC' 
FINCOMUN CA ME PROMUJER 
Equation equation equation equation equation equation 
7.11 7.12 7.11 7.12 7.11 7.12 
LGCOSTBORROWPC 1.574 0.325 1.705 0.082 1.458 0.055 
(21.18)"" (2.05)'" (10.74)' (0.62) (14.61)* (0.50) 
Observations 55 55 46 46 47 47 
_R -squared 
0.44 0.49 0.41 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; " significant at 5%; "" significant at 1% 
Note: For the full results of the estimation regression, see table A7.1 in the Appendix to chapter 7. 
We also tried to exploit the first component of LGCOSTBORROWPC, as the 
identifying instrument i. e. the logarithm of the cost of transportation per credit 
cycle, log Ci , (referred here as LGCOSTRANSPC). Our argument here relies on the 
4 We tested the y# 0 condition in (7.11) and (7.12) by simply computing a 
heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic after OLS estimation. 
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idea that there is a correlation between programme participation and accessibility 
but we do not see how this instrument may affect the income variable. We wish to 
consider the assumption that the correlation between log Cr and I, emerges from 
two sources: 1) microfinance organisations may decide to set up lending restrictions 
to households living a considerable distance from the branch due to the transaction 
costs implicitly related to the monitoring and enforcement processes. 
Regarding this particular issue, the Managing director of Fincomun mentioned in 
an interview that one fundamental criterion for the organisation is to operate in a 
geographical radius that do not exceed a journey of 30 minutes walking or by public 
transport to house of the applicant. He added: Fincomun bases its operation on the 
principle of having small and modest branches close to the borrower and several credit 
officers per branch to cover the local market. This strategy is one of the main institutional 
innovations in the country (Interview with Vicente Fenoll, Managing Director of 
Fincomun (code 03052004, minute: 11: 04) 5. 
2) We should expect a process involving individual choice where households 
reporting high transaction and opportunity costs of participation would either have 
high incentives to borrow the largest amount of capital accessible in order to 
compensate these costs or may simply decide drop out or not to participate in the 
first place. 
Our survey collected information on the cost of transportation per week given the 
periodicity of the group meetings; however there were a substantial number of 
missing values in the data that reflected the individual choice of walking to the 
branches rather than using public transport (see table 7.2). Since several programme 
participants walk to attend periodical meetings, we decided to explore the 
attributes of the time dimension that captured the information about the distance 
from the residence (or businesses) of the programme participant to the branch, as a 
proxy of accessibility, in substitution of log CT. 
5 In fact, this policy appeared to be a common practice amongst MFls in Mexico. For 
example, the mean value for a time-dimensional variable that measured the distance from 
the household's residence to the branch was 20 minutes for the case of Fincomun (only 
outward journey); 21 minutes for CAME and 25 minutes for Promujer. 
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Table 7.2 Cost of transportation per credit cycle 
Sample Mean 
Figures in pesos of 2004 
Maximum Minimum Missing values 
FINCOMUN 55 99.78 1280 0 39 
CAME 46 29.91 320 0 39 
PROMUJER 47 60.60 320 0 32 
Pooled sample 148 65.62 1280 0 110 
Our survey collected information on the time (in minutes) that participants spent 
since they left home (or business) until they arrived at the branch. This variable was 
weighted when public transport was used in order to capture the time that they 
would had consumed if they had walked to the branch6. We coded this identifying 
instrument as DISTANCE. When we estimated the reduced form equation (7.11) 
with DISTANCE as identifying instrument Z; for each of the microfinance 
organisations, the p-values of the t statistic for the coefficient y rejected the null of 
Ho: y=O, i. e. it reflected the statistically significance correlation between 
accessibility and participation; however, when we included Zt in equation (7.12), 
the parameter estimate y accepted the null of no correlation against the outcome of 
interest Y (see table 7.3). As a result we were able to use DISTANCE as the 
identifying instrument for the Heckit procedure. 
Table 7.3 DISTANCE as identifying instrument 
Dependent variable in (7.11): logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
(LGMAXCREDI T) t 
Dependent variable in (7.12): logarithm of monthly income per capita in pesos of 2004 
(LGINCOMEPCI 
FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation 
(7.11) (7.12) (7.11) (7.12) (7.11) (7.12) 
DISTANCE 0.028 -0.000 0.073 0.005 0.066 -0.005 
(1.88)** (0.09) (2.15)** (0.94) (1.92)* (1.57) 
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; " significant at 5%; """ significant at 1% 
t The Heckman procedure transforms LGMAXCREDIT into a dummy variable for treatment group -1 
if 1; > 0. For more details on the regression estimations see table A7.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 7. 
One of the reasons for choosing the Heckit procedure is due to its structural 
qualities. On the one hand, it enables us to test for the assumption of no self- 
selectivity by exploiting the non-linearity properties of the inverse Mills ratio 
(coded in the regression equation as MILLS). As discussed above, we conducted the 
quasi-experiment in a way as to reduce the problem of self-selectivity; however, we 
6 In order to estimate these weights, we asked programme participants about the 
approximate distance they travel to attend group meetings. 
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needed to test the hypothesis of no selection problem, Ho :A=0, (allowing I, to be 
A 
endogenous) by using the 2SLS t statistic for A. in equation 7.12 (Wooldridge 2002). 
The results accepted the null of no self-selectivity, confirming that we followed an 
appropriate methodological procedure during the data collection. 
On the other hand, the Heckit procedure allows us to test for the quality of the 
identification variable, and provides us with important information about the 
robustness of our estimation. In order to do so, the identifying instrument 
DISTANCE was included in (7.12) alongside with the other exogenous variables, 
including the inverse Mills ratio. The identification is achieved by exploiting the 
properties of the inverse Mills ratio that result from the non-linear relationship of 
the exogenous variables in the reduced form equation (7.11). The coefficients and 
significance levels of LGMAXCREDIT and MILLS are reported in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Robustness of DISTANCE as instrumental variable 
Endogenous explanatory variable in (7.12): Logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
(LGMAXCREDIT) t 
Dependent variable in (7.12): logarithm of monthly income per capita in pesos of 2004 (LGINCOME 
FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation 
(7.12) on (7.12) with (7.12) on (7.12) with (7.12) on (7.12) with 
functional DISTANCE functional DISTANC functional DISTANCE 
form as form E as form as 
identifying identifying identifying 
Instrument instrument instrument 
LGMAXCREDIT 0.591 0.595 0.103 0.088 0.629 0.582 
(2.48)** (3.39)*** (0.59) (0.90) (1.98)* (1.88)" 
MILLS 0.258 0.653 0.089 0.043 -0.053 0.261 
(0.58) (157) (0.67) (0.15) (0.14) (1.05) 
DISTANCE 0.002 0.006 -0.006 
(0.32) (1.13) (1.06) 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; """ significant at 1% 
t The Heckman procedure transforms LGMAXCREDIT into a dummy for treatment group -1 if Ii >0 
After running the identification equation, the coefficients of the endogenous 
explanatory variable in the estimation equations as well as the Mills ratio for each 
organisation under study remained stable. The consistency of the results confirms 
the robustness of DISTANCE as the instrumental variable in our estimation. 
7 In order to test for potential problems of collinearity, we decided to adopt Lawrence Klein's 
rule of thumb (1962), and regress the identifying instrument DISTANCE on the remaining 
explanatory variables and then compute the R. Klein suggests that collinearity may be 
problematic if the R' obtained from the auxiliary regression is greater than the regression of 
I, on the exogenous variables. Only in the case of Fincomun the auxiliary regression 
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7.2 Results of the first-stage probit estimation: the determinants of household 
participation 
Despite the fact that our primary interest focuses on the impact of household 
participation on income levels, we obtain interesting information from the first- 
stage probit estimation. Notice that the Heckit procedure relies heavily on the 
distributive nature of the probit model that takes the following form: 
Prob(I =1I X, ) = 
Lß q(t)dt = 4'(X jßß) (7.13) 
where 0 (") and 0 () are the same density of the distribution function and the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal derived in equation (7.9). 
We assume that at least a group of independent variables contained in X, explain 
the decision of households to participate in the programme, (I =1) . It is important 
to stress that the parameters 8 do not capture the marginal effects (or elasticities) 
of the model8. We can derive the effect of one unit change in the explanatory 
variables on the probability of households' participation by estimating the marginal 
effects as follows: 
aE[IIX, ]_a(D 
_ ax, = ax, - O(XI)6), o (7.14) 
where the rates of change are computed in STATA at the means of the independent 
variables, i. e. computed for a variable whilst the rest are held constant (Long and 
Freese 2003). The results are presented in table 7.5 below. 
reported a greater R'(0.37) than the one obtained from the main regression (R'= 0.33), 
suggesting a potential problem of collinearity; however, we did not find evidence of serious 
collinearity when we repeated the procedure for CAME (R2 = 0.45 vs. R'= 0.33) and 
Promujer (R2 = 0.44 vs. RZ = 0.16). We believe that the possible collinearity found in 
Fincomun essentially emerges from micronumerosity in the survey. In fact, when we pooled 
the individual samples surveys in a single data set the collinearity problem disappeared. 
8 For a detail discussion of the derivation of marginal effects for a Probit regression equation 
see Greene (2003), Johnson and DiNardo (1997), Maddala (1999) and Wooldridge (2003). 
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7.2.1 The identifying instrument 
To begin the analysis, we turn our attention to the identification variable 
DISTANCE. Surprisingly, the marginal effects of the parameter estimates for this 
instrument are positive for each of the three organisations under study. In the case of 
Fincomun, for example, an increase in say, 10 minutes of transportation from the 
branch to the business (or residence) increase the propensity to participate in the 
programme by 8%, ceteris paribus, and this percentage increased up to 22% and 23% 
in the cases of CAME and Promujer, respectively. 
Table 7.5 The first-stage probit estimation: the determinants of households' participation 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed (LGMAXCREDIT) t 
FINCOMUN 
Coef 
ax, 
Coef 
CAME 
ax, 
PROMU)ER 
Coef 
caýD 
fix, 
POOLED SAMPLE 
Coef 
0,10 
ax, 
AVEDU 0.076 0.022 -0317 -0.096 -0.122 -0.043 -0.05 -0.019 
(1.15) (1.15) (3.16)**" (3.16)" (1.50) (1.50) (1.44) (1.44) 
HOWNER 0.477 0.150 2.287 0.679 -0.166 -0.058 0.252 0.095 
(0.77) (0.77) (3.12)" (3.12)"" (0.33) (0.33) (0.99) (0.99) 
HESTATE 0.439 0.133 0.639 0.226 0.898 0.334 0.448 0.172 
(0.89) (0.89) (0.59) (0.59) (1.50) (1.50) (158) (1.58) 
1TMEBUS 0.094 0.026 -0.058 -0.018 -0.080 -0.028 0.001 0.000 
(1.41) (1.41) (0.84) (0.84) (2.13)"" (2.13)** (0.06) (0.06) 
W WORKER, -0.310 -0.087 0.279 0.084 -1.449 -0.510 -0.157 -0.058 
(1.13) (1.13) (0.57) (0.57) (2.13)" (2.13)** (0.95) (0.95) 
DEPENDRA710 0.746 0.210 -1329 -0.401 3.538 1.246 0.200 0.074 
(0.82) (0.82) (0.75) (0.75) (133) (1.53) (0.35) (0.35) 
AGE -0.007 -0.002 -0.161 -0.049 0.053 0.019 -0.014 -0.005 
(0.27) (0.27) (3.01)"* (3.01)'" (2.15)*" (2.15)" (1.11) (1.11) 
WOMAN 0.177 0.050 0.488 0.159 0.184 0.069 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.71) (0.71) (0.69) (0.69) 
MARITAL -1.725 -0.340 2.248 0.739 1.172 0.429 -0.093 -0.034 
(2.03)" (2.03)" (321)" (3.21)" (1.47) (1.47) (0.33) (0.33) 
ROSCAS -0.031 -0.009 0.686 0.192 0.457 0.157 0.155 0.057 
(0.06) (0.06) (1.17) (1.17) (0.84) (0.84) (0.67) (0.67) 
FORMALCREDIT 0.162 0.043 -2.953 -0.816 -2.078 -0.662 -0.558 -0.218 
(0.21) (0.21) (2.38)*" (2.38)" (2.74)*** (2.74)'"* (1.30) (1.30) 
MONEYLENDER -0.494 -0.161 -1.048 -0.380 -0.972 -0.367 -1.10 -0.417 
(0.67) (0.67) (1.06) (1.06) (1.51) (1.51) (2.87)1 (2.87)'" 
DISTANCE 0.028 0.008 0.073 0.022 0.066 0.023 0.028 0.010 
(2.58)" (2.58)" (2.56)" (2.56)** (2.29)" (2.29)" (5.08)" (5.08)1 
CONSTANT -0.510 4543 -4.477 -0.071 
(0.29) (1.80)" (2.11)" (0.08) 
Observations 55 46 47 148 
LR Chi-squared 23.13 30.83 23.59 37.97 
Prob > chi2 0.0401 0.0036 0.0231 0.0003 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3295 0.4962 0.4514 0.1553 
Log Likelihood -23.770 - 15.511 -1 7.725 -83.711 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; "* significant at 5%; "" significant at 1% 
t The Heckman procedure transforms the LGMAXCREDIT variable into a dummy variable for 
treatment group =1 if li >0 
Initially, as discussed in section 7.2.1, we were expecting a negative relationship 
between DISTANCE and the propensity of programme participation given the 
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policies that microfinance organisations have set up to reduce the transaction costs 
implicitly related to the monitoring and enforcement processes; however, these 
policies have been focusing on the geographical boundaries of the place of 
residence of programme participants. When we analysed the economic activities 
that households carry out, we found that: 
"A large percentage of treatment groups were engaged in self-employment 
activities (97.2%, 78.6% and 100% in the cases of Fincomun, CAME and 
Promujer, respectively), where retail commerce played an important part of 
these activities. 
" Since a large percentage of households were selling their products and 
services at street markets or owned (rented) premises (for example, 30.6% of 
programme participants at Fincomun were trading at street markets -in 
comparison to 5.6% of control groups, and this percentage increased up to 
50% in the case of members of CAME and Promujer9), households with 
higher mobility and able to sell their products in areas economically more 
dynamic, far from their place of residence reported a higher propensity to 
borrow from microfinance organisations, independently that both treatment 
and control groups lived in the same neighbourhood. 
" Treatment groups at Fincomun spent on average, 78 minutes in a return 
journey from their place of work to the branch, whilst the control groups did 
the journey in 42 minutes. Treatment groups at CAME and Promujer 
travelled during 65 and 82 minutes, respectively, whilst the control groups 
travelled for 45 and 54 minutes, respectively. 
Thus, it is plausible to argue that mobility and accessibility to better markets are 
important determinants that increase the probability of borrowing from 
microfinance organisations. We believe that this is particularly true in the urban 
context where the poor often travel long distances in search of sources of livelihood. 
9 We conducted cross-tabulations to measure the statistical association between treatment 
and control groups that engaged in self-employment activities at street markets. We find that 
this association was significant at 0.01 levels for the case of CAME. For further details of the 
results of the cross-tabulations see the Appendix to Chapter 6. 
194 
An important issue arises here from mechanisms such as periodical repayment 
schemes that microfinance organisations extensively employ as a monitoring device. 
CAME and Promujer, for example, request programme participants to attend 
meetings on a weekly basis where subjects of collective interest are discussed e. g. 
loan instalments, deposits, loan applications, loans in arrears, etc. For those 
organisations, periodical repayment schedules are fundamental in order to reduce 
the informational costs and the expected rate of loan default'; however, as pointed 
out by Stiglitz (1990), these informational costs are transferred to the borrower, and 
can generate an opportunity cost for group members who are economically more 
active, since they have to forego potential earnings as a consequence of attending 
meetings that often last for several hours. In that perspective, we wish to consider 
the following proposition 
Proposition 1: Borrowers with access to better markets face a higher opportunity cost of 
borrowing from periodical repayment schedules in group meetings; however, due to the 
monopolistic characteristics of credit markets, borrowers remain in the credit programme 
in order to take advantage of progressive lending and minimise this cost. 
Note that as long as the interest rate remains constant, a change in income will shift 
the household budget constraint to the right, and since the alternative choice for the 
household is the moneylender, credit from the microfinance organisation will 
perform as a normal good, and an income effect will be observed. This behaviour will 
continue as long as the percentage change in the loan size is larger than the 
percentage change in earnings from income-generating activities, i. e. progressive 
lending is available, and the credit market remains monopolistically concentrated. 
In order to test this proposition, an auxiliary Tobit regression was estimated as 
follows: 
C, =a, +X, Ak+C°-82. +lie, +u; (7.15) 
10 Since Fincomun relies mostly on individual lending, it does not require periodical 
meetings but just weekly instalments. Fincomun has recently widened the options for loan 
repayment by opening an account at the HSBC where borrowers can deposit their weekly 
instalments at any of the branches of this bank. This initiative has benefited borrowers by 
reducing transaction and opportunity costs of travelling to the branch. 
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where C, measures the maximum amount of credit borrowed during the last credit 
cycle, expressed in logarithmic form. C' captures the opportunity cost of borrowing 
per credit cycle whereas Xi and 4 are, respectively, the same vectors of household 
and credit market characteristics derived earlier in (7.12). 
We have computed CO in logarithmic form (coded as LGOPPORTCOSTPC) by 
estimating the time spent in each compulsory group meeting, tim, plus the time 
spent on travelling to attend such meetings, t; . The sum has been weighted 
by the 
estimated earnings forgone, based on the actual values reported from income 
generating activities, Tt,, and the outcome multiplied by 16, given the number of 
periodical repayments meetings per credit cycle, i. e. C-° =1 6Z[(tT +t; '), T; 
]. 
In this sense, a borrower spending, for instance, one hour in a return journey to the 
branch plus two hours in a group meeting session, and reporting a mean weekly 
household income in the order of 1750 pesos from 40-hours work in an income 
generating activity, will absorb an average opportunity cost of 130 pesos per week, 
which multiplied by the number of periodical repayments meetings in a credit 
cycle, represents almost one-tenth of the estimated household earnings, ceteris 
paribus. 
It is important to point to the fact that we could overestimate the opportunity cost 
of borrowing if other household members cooperate with the borrower and work in 
the business whilst attending group meetings. When we analysed the dataset we 
found that about 45% of programme participants reported to have been engaged 
with one (or more) member(s) of the household in income generating activities, 
suggesting that for that sample subgroup we could actually be overestimating the 
opportunity cost of borrowing. However, we also found that a large percentage of 
borrowers (about 47%) worked alone, and about half of those were single mothers 
having their business as the only source of household income. If we take into 
account the risk associated to the income loss and if the time in which group 
meetings are arranged takes place during the prime selling hours of the business, 
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then we could be underestimating the opportunity cost of borrowing. We 
acknowledge, nonetheless the possibility of being overestimating this cost. 
Based on proposition 1, we expect from equation 7.15 a large (and positive) 
responsiveness in the demand for credit as a result of a percentage increase in the 
opportunity cost of borrowing, i. e. an elasticity 2 1. The econometric results are 
presented in Table 7.6. As predicted, a one percent change in the opportunity cost of 
borrowing gives rise to a 1.614 percent change in the amount of credit demanded 
from borrowers at Fincomun, ceteris paribus, and this figure was 1.716 and 1.513 for 
participants borrowing from CAME and Promujer, respectively. 
Table 7.6 Tobit estimation equation with L. GOPPORTCOSTPC as explanatory variable 
Dependent variable in (7.15): Logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
(LGMAXCREDIT) 
FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
LGOPPORTCOSTPC 1.614 1.716 1513 
(21.10)*" (10.96)"* (13.51)"" 
Observations 55 46 47 
Left-censored 19 18 21 
Absolute value oft statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; "significant at 5%; "'significant at 1% 
For more details about the Tobit regression equation see table A73 in the Appendix to Chapter 7. 
Note that due its correlation with the income variable, the opportunity cost of 
borrowing will observe an increasing trend once households achieve better living 
conditions. Ours results show the necessity of improving the existing lending 
technology in group lending contracts in order to reduce this cost. This could 
eventually benefit both active borrowers and microfinance organisations, by 
increasing the likelihood of programme participation with effects on institutional 
outreach and market coverage. 
722 The variables contained in li 
We turn now our attention to the variables contained in L,, the vector of credit 
market characteristics, which capture the effect of formal and informal credit agents 
that compete with microfinance organisations. To begin with, the choice of 
borrowing from institutional lenders such as banks and non-banking financial 
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institutions" (variable coded as FORMALCREDIT in Table 7.5) has a significant 
negative impact upon participation. In the case of programme participants at 
CAME (-0.816) and Promujer (-0.662), the parameter estimates show, not 
surprisingly, a substitution effect between the credit products offered by 
institutional lenders and microfinance organisations. In other words, borrowing 
from e. g. savings and credit co-operatives reduce the probability of borrowing from 
microfinance organisations, ceteris paribus. It is important to say, however, that the 
level of substitutability may be relative. A limited percentage of households (only 
28% of treatment groups at Fincomun and 21% and 50% at CAME and Promujer, 
respectivelyu) had applied for a loan to institutional lenders and just about a third 
of the applicants got the credit. 
The individual choice of a large percentage of households of not applying for a loan 
to institutional lenders was not necessarily due to elements related to the 
characteristics of the credit market (e. g. interest rate or collateral demanded), but 
due to the negative expectations about the final outcome (rejection of the 
application in this case), which in part reflected the lack of information and 
knowledge about the process of borrowing as well as the risk-averse behaviour 
amongst households that was evident by common expressions of lack of trust in 
these intermediaries (see figure 7.1). 
The negative perception about institutional lenders deepened in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of December 1994, when many non-banking financial 
institutions, in particular credit unions, were investigated by the National Banking 
and Securities Commission for allegations of white-collar fraud. In the end, the 
Mexican government was forced to implement a rescue plan to guarantee deposits 
that ended up costing tax payers approximately 4.4 billion dollars13. Some 
households participants also reported having experienced daylight armed robberies 
outside the branches of commercial banks after they had withdrawn cash, and in 
several occasions the police found that credit officers had been in collusion with 
11 Non-banking financial institutions include Savings and Credit Associations; Credit Unions; 
Savings and Credit Co-operatives, and Solidarity Associations. 
12 The reason of the increase of loan applications amongst households living in Tula, 
Hidalgo, is due to the number of Savings and Credit Co-operatives operating in the area. 
Several of these intermediaries are targeting low-income households and have become 
natural competitors for microfinance organisations. 
" For further details about this issue, see Chapter 3 
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criminal organisations. This kind of criminal behaviour has seriously undermined 
the reputation and collective confidence in institutional lenders, in particular 
amongst households living in the Metropolitan area of Mexico City. 
Figure 7.1 Reasons for not applying for a credit 
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In relation to the variable that captures the choice of borrowing from moneylenders 
(coded as MONEYLENDER) in the probit equation (7.11), we are not certain about 
the level of its effect since the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
The only information reported suggests that there might be a negative effect of 
these agents on the probability of borrowing from microfinance organisations; but 
we cannot make any final conclusion about it. We might infer, however, that the 
statistically insignificant levels of the parameter estimates of MONEYLENDER 
reflect the small number of households who borrowed from these informal agents 
(16`iß, ) despite the fact that the lenders do not require physical collateral to back the 
loans; they instead, exploit other mechanisms such as physical intimidation to 
guarantee repayment, and charge substantially higher rates of interest than 
microfinance organisations: the average interest rate charged by these informal 
agents was 145% on annum basis (in comparison to 71% charged by Fincomun; 66% 
by CAME, and 72 by Promujer), and some households sampled had paid rates as 
high as 240% per annum. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that two thirds of the households who had borrowed 
from moneylenders had problems in repaying the loan, and amongst those, half 
were forced to sell some of their assets to pay off the loan. A central question 
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emerges here: why do households borrow from moneylenders when they already 
have access to the microfinance organisation? We found that more than half of these 
households used this source of informal funding in order to cope with unexpected 
events, destabilising shocks such as robberies, ill-health, accidents or the 
death of a 
family member. These informal agents exploited their comparative advantages by 
offering quick cash and flexible schedules of repayment to those households in 
need. In this sense, any institutional effort to make available services such as 
emergency loans, insurance and voluntary savings to programme participants who face 
external shocks, could substantially contribute to reduce households' vulnerability. 
A similar statistical uncertainty emerged from the effects of households' 
participation in rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAS) on the 
probability of borrowing from microfinance organisations. The positive signs in the 
cases of CAME and Promujer might suggest a complementary dynamic between 
borrowing from these organisations and using informal savings mechanisms, but 
the effects are insignificant. In fact, the wide participation of households in 
ROSCAS (e. g. 58% of treatment groups and 63% of control groups at Fincomun 
participated in ROSCAS, whereas these figures where very similar at CAME and 
Promujer. 54% and 50%, and 42% and 48%, respectively), may reflect the severity of 
credit constraints that emerge from credit rationing imposed by the lenders. 
The vast majority of participants in ROSCAS made periodic deposits 5 200 pesos 
during 11 weeks, and when the funds where given to individual participants, they 
were used, on average, to buy household assets (45%); for consumption smoothing 
(30%), and as preventive mechanisms against external shocks (20%) (for more 
details see the Appendix to Chapter 6). Despite their popularity and their heavy 
reliance on trust amongst participants, ROSCAS were seen as a risky mechanism of 
deposit when individual reputations were dubious or when participants had 
uncertain information about new entries. 
7.2.3 The variables contained in X, 
We focus now on the components contained in the vector of household 
characteristics X, that are related to the level of household capital endowments, in 
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particular human capital and physical capital14. Firstly, we analysed the marginal 
effects of the variable (AVEDU) that measures the number of years of schooling, as 
a proxy of the stock of human capital. AVEDU shows a negative relationship, and 
statistically significant levels on the probability of borrowing from CAME. More 
precisely, it shows that an increase in one year of formal education reduces the 
probability of borrowing from CAME by 9.6%. These results tell us that households 
with higher levels of human capital are more likely to access other sources of 
funding. We cannot make any definitive conclusion about participants at Fincomun 
and Promujer since the coefficients of AVEDU are not significantly different from 
zero. 
We might expect, however, a negative relationship since the levels of human capital 
amongst programme participants are low. In fact, the average years of schooling 
amongst treatment and control groups at Fincomun were 7 and 5 years, 
respectively, whereas these figures were 7 and 8 years at CAME and 7 and 9 years 
at Promujer. The homogeneity of these results is partially explained by the levels of 
deprivation in the areas under study. For example, 83.3% of treatment groups and 
100% of control groups at Fincomun reported a combined primary, secondary and 
tertiary enrolment ratio below the local average of Mexico City. 60.7% of treatment 
households and 61% of control groups at CAME reported a combined enrolment 
rate below the local average in the state of Mexico, whilst at Promujer 61.5% and 
24% of treatment and control groups, respectively, fell behind the average 
enrolment rate in the state of Hidalgo. 
We observed that the homogeneity of households' deprivation was extended to 
variables that capture the effects of the levels of physical capital endowments on the 
probability of household borrowing: HOWNER (housing ownership), and 
HESTATE (housing under construction). For example, 73.7% of treatment 
households and 86.1% of control groups at Fincomun who were living in San 
Miguel Teotongo held title deeds of their properties, and these percentages went 
down to 55.6% and 60.7%, and 61.9% and 61.5% for participants at CAME (living in 
the Chalco Valley) and Promujer (living in Tula, Hidalgo), respectively. 
" See section 522 for a theoretical exposition. 
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As discussed in Chapter 6, San Miguel Teotongo and the Chalco Valley began as 
irregular settlements in communal land and it was just recently when the local 
authorities began to regularise these properties. The low percentage of title holdings 
partly stilects this situation. 
The positive sign, but statistically insignificance levels of the marginal effects of 
HOWNER and HESTATE (with the exception of housing ownership for 
participants at CAME) are not giving us enough information to confirm a positive 
relationship between these two variables and the probability of borrowing from 
microfinance organisations. 
We discuss now the results from the group of variables that capture intra- 
household characteristics in equation 7.11: the dependency ratio (coded as 
DEPENDRA'TIO); the age (AGE); sex (WOMAN), and marital status (MARITAL) of 
Programme participants. We begin the analysis by turning our attention to the 
dependency ratio. We computed this variable, 
DEPENDRATIO = 
(CA +`'; by dividing the number of household's 
Hi 
members economically inactive, i. e. children (Ch), students (St), and the elderly (Rt) 
over the household size (11). The average size of households' participants was four, 
although 73% of treatment households borrowing from Fincomun had more than 5 
members, About half of households' participants had two members actively 
working in the labour market and one-fourth of women borrowing from Promujer 
were head of the family. The data collected from the quasi-experiment did not 
provide us with enough information to make definitive conclusions about the effect 
of the dependency ratio on the probability of borrowing from microfinance 
organisations, since the statistically significant levels of the marginal effects of this 
variable were not different from zero. 
We observed the same statistical insignificance in the parameter estimates of the 
dunInly 
variable WOMAN for the cases of Fincomun and CAME. Given that 
Prom'qer 
lends exclusively to women, we excluded this variable in the estimation 
tuadon for Promujer. To have included it in the probit model, would have caused 
pert Predictability. Despite the fact that a large percentage of women were 
bo'o 
g from CAME (79%) and to a lesser extend from Fincomun (53%), the 
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homogeneity between treatment and control groups might explain the positive 
signs but statistically insignificant levels of the coefficient estimates of WOMAN. 
For that reason, we cannot make any final conclusion about the effect of this 
variable on the probability of borrowing from microfinance organisations. 
Regarding the last two variables under analysis, i. e. years of age (continuous 
variable coded as AGE), and marital status (dummy variable coded as MARITAL 
that takes the value 1 if the borrower is in a relationship and zero, otherwise) we 
observed the following in relation to the former. the Probit estimation reported 
statistically significant levels different from zero in the case of CAME and Promujer, 
although the signs of the coefficients were opposite to each other. In this sense, 
whereas the effect of an increase in one year of age on the probability of borrowing 
from CAME was negative (-5%), in the case of Promujer this effect was positive 
(2%). Since the marginal effects are computed at the means, ceteris paribus, we 
believe that this condition might be influencing the results. In other words, given 
that programme participants at Promujer were younger than participants at CAME, 
we could expect that a woman at the age of 39 was on average more likely to 
borrow from Promujer when she turned 40 than a woman at the age of 43 
borrowing from CAME when she turned 44. 
Opposite signs and statistical significance were also observed in the parameter 
estimate of the variable MARITAL More precisely, to be in a relationship had a 
negative effect on the probability of borrowing from Fincomun whereas the effect of 
the same variable was positive in the case of CAME. When we look closely at this 
variable we find a statistically significant association at 0.01 levels between 
treatment and control groups (see the Appendix to Chapter 6). This association was 
caused by a large number of participants in the control group who were involved in 
a relationship (95%), in comparison to the participants in the treatment group (61%). 
Finally, we tried to capture the conditions of the labour markets in the areas under 
study by incorporating two variables in the vector of household characteristics Xj 
that reflected, on the one hand, the number of households' members with wage- 
earning jobs (variable coded as WWORKER) and, on the other hand, the number of 
years being self-employed (variable coded as TIMEBUS), as a proxy of the level of 
households' involvement in self-employment activities. 
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In relation to the first variable, WWORKER, a small percentage of households' 
participants (21%) had wage-earning members, and in most of the households there 
was just one wage-earner. For example, in the case of Fincomun, 78% of treatment 
households and 63% of the corresponding control groups had one wage-earner, and 
in the cases of CAME and Promujer, the figures were 57% and 100%, and 93% and 
80%, respectively. The low levels of formal instruction amongst those households 
explain the relative low wages. In particular, 89% of wage-earners living in San 
Miguel Teotongo (where Fincomun operates), and 80% living in the Chalco Valley 
(where CAME do business), reported monthly wages 5 3627 pesos (about 360 US 
dollars), and this percentage went down to 50% in the case of workers living in Tula 
Hidalgo. 
The improvement in wages in Tula, Hidalgo, can be linked to the effects of the oil 
refinery that Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX) operates in the region, and where several 
husbands of the participants at Promujer are employed. These elements may 
explain the negative and statistically significant levels of the parameter estimate of 
WWORKER in the probit regression. The results show that one additional wage- 
earner in households living in Tula, Hidalgo reduces the probability of borrowing 
from Promujer in 51%. 
The second variable related to the labour market, TIMEBUS, provides us with 
interesting information. Firstly, we analysed households' businesses by type of 
activity. We found that a large percentage of households' participants were heavily 
involved in self-employment activities in the retail commerce sector. For example, 
almost 60% of treatment households at Fincomun and 43% and 85% at CAME and 
Promujer, respectively, were employed in that sector, whilst the involvement in 
industrial activities was restricted to fewer households. In the case of Fincomun and 
CAME, 22% and 14% of treatment households were working in industrial activities 
whereas at Promujer, this percentage was rather modest (3.8%). Regarding the 
services sector, 19% of households at Fincomun, 21% at CAME and 12% at Promujer 
were engaged in activities such as car repair shops, shoe repairs, restaurants, etc. 
Secondly, we observed amongst control groups at Fincomun (61.1%) and CAME 
(44%) a high concentration of entrepreneurs with a few years of experience in their 
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business (5 2 years) whilst more experienced entrepreneurs were found amongst 
treatment households. Our findings were expected in particular in the case of 
Fincomun since the organisation requested that loan applicants had a minimum of 
one year of business experience in order to be creditworthy. In fact, we found in a 
cross-tabulation a statistical association, significant at the 0.001 levels, between 
treatment and control groups in relation to the number of years of experience in the 
businessu. 
Thirdly, an important issue emerged from the probit regression. The parameter 
estimates of TIME BUS reported a small effect with statistical significance, although 
with a negative sign, in the case of programme participants at Promujer. More 
precisely, one additional year of experience in the business reduced the probability 
of programme participants to borrow from Promujer in 2.8%. The small and 
negative marginal effects of the same variable for participants at CAME, although 
statistically insignificant, might suggest a similar behaviour. We believe that the 
negative sign of TIME BUS can be linked to the upper limits of progressive lending 
that organisations such as CAME and Promujer have traditionally imposed. 
The problem is that these upper limits cause micro-rationing, which might affect in 
Particular experienced borrowers who are more likely to borrow the largest amount 
of capital. As soon as these borrowers reach the upper limits, they are forced to 
search for other sources of funding, or continue borrowing at a suboptimal level. In 
this sense, policies aimed to open up (or even eliminate) the upper limits of 
progressive lending would be beneficial to borrowers as well as to lenders since the 
latter would be able to cut down monitoring and enforcement costs by keeping good 
borrowers in the organisation and by doing so, the expected rate of default that 
dummy impact the loan portfolio at risk. It is reasonable to argue that microfinance 
organisations that impose upper limits to incentive devices such as progressive 
lending and pursue policies of graduation amongst old borrowers are potentially 
losing the best clients! Any attempt to diversify services and open up loan 
restrictions to reach down and up the market could benefit the institutions' 
operational and financial performance. 
is For further details of the results of the cross-tabulations, see the Appendix to Chapter 6. 
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Additionally, organisations such as CAME and Promujer that rely their operations 
on rigid monitoring devices such as periodical repayment schedules, can be facing a 
mismatch between loan repayments and households' income. This mismatch could 
cause serious distortions in the market since poor households not only have low 
income but insecure income, which can vary dramatically from season to season. 
For example, cobblers and carpenters know that from January to the end of 
February it is a bad season for their businesses whereas toy and gift shop owners 
expect high earnings in the same period. Income variability can also constrain loan 
size: for example, we should expect that a household with four members that have 
monthly earnings of 4000 pesos in bad seasons and 7000 pesos in good seasons will 
rather prefer to borrow capital based on how much they can afford to repay in bad 
seasons (4000 pesos) than on the average earnings (5500 pesos). In this sense, 
borrowers with seasonal income will end up with a credit limit below the optimum 
level. 
Since the rigidity of loan contracts can substantially increase the transaction and 
opportunity costs of borrowing, it may actually be keeping good borrowers from 
borrowing. In fact, we recorded empirical evidence from households interviewed in 
the Chalco Valley suggesting that borrowers at CAME were dropping out the 
programme in order to avoid going into default. Frequently these borrowers were, 
ironically, excellent clients. In this sense, flexibility possesses two great advantages: 
On the one hand, flexible contracts can increase client retention and thus 
help 
organisations to expand and deepen their operations; on the other hand, 
flexibility 
can significantly increase the impact of credit, since it can prevent households 
having to take actions that might affect the rate of return on investment. 
As we 
discussed earlier, the opportunity cost of borrowing (that emerges 
from rigid 
periodical meetings) is positively correlated with the level of household income. If 
microfinance organisations succeed in reducing this cost, by designing innovative 
technology and flexible contracts, this could ultimately benefit household welfare 
and reduce the level of deprivation. We discuss in the next section the results from 
the second-stage Heckit estimation, which precisely focus on the impact of credit on 
household income. 
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7.3 Results of the second-stage Heckit estimation: the impact of programme 
participation on household income 
We now turn the attention to the results from the estimation of the impact of 
programme participation on household income presented in table 7.8. We have 
estimated Y in (7.12) by employing the logarithm of income per capita and three 
different definitions of income per adult equivalent as the dependent variable. The 
use of adult equivalence scales is generally justified given the fact that children 
normally have lower consumption expenditure than adults and therefore they 
should be given a lesser weight. Some studies (e. g. Dreze and Srinivasan 1997) 
suggest that additional adults should be weighted less than the first adult after 
taking into account economies of scale. 
Poverty rates can be sensitive to equivalence scales and thus, alter the conclusions 
reached on the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction. In this sense, it 
becomes important to look at this particular issue. There have been recent attempts 
to incorporate weights to the distribution of wealth in developing countries by 
assigning adult equivalencies to household members according to their age and sex 
[e. g. May, Carter and Posel (1995) in South Africa and Hentschel and Lanjouw 
(1995) in Ecuador]; however, given the lack of a general guideline regarding the use 
of equivalence factors in the context of Mexico, we decided to follow, as discussed 
previously in Chapter 4, the approach adopted by Rothbarth (1943). 
The equivalence factor takes the form el, =(A,, + 4)K,, )*, where eh is the 
equivalence factor for household h, A. is the number of adults (from age 18 to 65) 
and KI, is the number of children in household h. The parameter 0 is equal to 1 and 
( has different values corresponding to the age and sex of every child. In this sense, 
boys in the range 0-5 years have a cb value of 0.661 while girls have one of 0.609; 
boys in the range of 6 to 12 years have a parameter (D of 0.750 while girls have one 
of 0.664; young men in the range of 13 to 18 years have a parameter of 0.633 while 
young women in the same range of age have a weight of 0.635. Finally elderly men 
and women (65 years of age and older) were assigned values of 0.553 and 0.570, 
respectively. For the purpose of our analysis, we will refer to this measurement as 
equivalence factor 1 (IAE1). 
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We also include in our estimations other equivalence factors in order to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis. We follow, therefore, the adult equivalence scales developed by 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998) where it is given the parameters fi and 0 in 
equation (7.16) a value equal to 0.75 and children are defined as those aged less 
than 14 years. We refer to this measurement as equivalent factor 2 (IAE2). 
Additionally we employ the OECD modified equivalence scale based on Hagenarrs 
et al, (1998) which weights the first adult with 1, additional adults with 0.5 and 
children aged 14 and less with a weight of 0.3. In our analysis we refer to this 
product as the income per adult equivalent 3 (IAE3). Although we are aware of the 
fact that the use of income per capita (IC) does not take into consideration intra- 
household allocation of resources, which could undermine problems of household 
inequality, we decided to include this definition as another proxy of household 
distribution of wealth for comparative purposes. 
Table 7.7Intra-household distribution of income by equivalent factors 
Figures in pesos of 2004 FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER 
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Average household income per 9 899 4,831 6,567 5,219 6,339 6,663 
month , 
Household income as a% of 100% 49% 100% 79% 100% 105% treatment group 
Average monthly IC 2,338 1,372 1,707 1,473 1,711 1,503 
IC as a% of treatment group 100% 59% 100% 86% 100% 88% 
Average monthly IAEI a/ 2,684 1,533 1,963 1,699 2,010 1,766 
IAE1 as a% of treatment group 100% 57% 100% 87% 100% 88% 
Average monthly IAE2 b/ 3,545 1,945 2,524 2,106 2,546 2,364 
IAE2 as a% of treatment group 100% 55% 100% 83% 100% 93% 
Average monthly IAE3 c/ 4,208 2,271 2,982 2,474 3,040 2,836 
IAE3 as a% of treatment group 100% 54% 100% 83% 100% 93% 
a/ Income per adult equivalent 1 follows the approach developed by Rothbarth (1943), 
B/ Income per adult equivalent 2 follows Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1998). 
C/ Income per adult equivalent 3 follows the OECD modified equivalence scale based on 
Hagenarrs et. at, (1998). 
As we were expecting, after taking into account distributional factors, the level of 
individual welfare was substantially affected by the weights given to households' 
members, with income per capita being the measurement that most over-stated the 
level of deprivation. For example, the average income per capita amongst treatment 
households at Fincomun was reported to be in the order of 2,338 pesos whilst the 
same variable substantially increased when equivalent scales were introduced, e. g. 
2684 pesos using IAE1; 3545 using IAE2, and 4208 employing IAE3 (see table 7.7). 
For analytical purposes, we primarily focus on the income per adult equivalent 1. 
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We have also pooled the individual sample surveys into a single 
data set. In order 
to do so, we employed the Kruskal-Wallis test to compare the statistical 
difference 
of the income variable between the three samples Le. households 
living in the 
lztapalapa District, in the Chalco Valley and in Tula, Hidalgo. The KW statistic 
takes the following form: 
N+llz 
_ 
12 (R. KWL 
N(N+1) ;ý2 
where k represents the independent samples of size n,,..., nt, 
N is the total number 
of all n,, and I. is the average of the ranks of the observations 
in the V* sample. 
Under the null hypothesis, the KW test states that the k distribution 
functions are 
equal. In order words, the income variable between the samples yields similar 
values. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the sample populations 
tends to yield larger values than the other sample populations. We reject the null 
hypothesis that all k distributions are the same if KW > fK-1. 
Test for Equality in the income variables 
Income per capita 
I Income per adult 
equivalent 1 at 
Income per adu] 
equivalent 2 b/ 
per adult 
lent 3 c/ 
Method 
Med. Chi-square 2352468 03084 1.694794 0.4285 
Ad1" Med. Chi-square 1.699714 0.4275 1.198024 05494 
1Guskaf-Wallis 1.281291 05270 1.847889 03970 
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj 1.281718 05268 1.847971 03969 
1.258431 0ä330 
0.834387 0.6589 
2.075369 03543 
2075442 0.3543 
2.037339 0.3611 
1.441233 0.4865 
7-18ä005 03354 
2.185297 0.3.353 
MFI Median Mean Rank Median Mean Rank Median Mean Rank Median Mean Rank 
FINCOMUN 1600 78.49091 1899540 7830000 2501.090 78.79091 3047.620 78.22727 
CAME 
1 
1400 68.89130 1606535 67.41304 2105520 67.04348 2425.000 66.75000 
PROMUJER 1400 75.31915 1636.160 76.98936 2188.450 76.77660 2666.670 77.72340 
AU 1488 74.50000 1681.930 7450000 2149.480 7450000 2563.495 74.50000 
a/ It fulbws the approach developed by Rothbarth (1943); b/ follows the approach developed by Wagstaff and van 
)borslaer (1998) and c/ follows the OECD modified equivalence scale based on the work of Hagenarrs et. al, (1998). For 
more detail, see chapter 4. 
The p values obtained from the KW test accept the null of equality between the 
three samples for each of the income variable definitions (see table above). These 
results allowed us to pool the three individual samples into a single data set for 
comparative purposes. The econometric results of the impact of programme 
participation on individual income are shown below in table 7.8. 
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The parameter estimate 8 of the impact variable, I;, in (7.12) reports the difference 
in the mean log income per adult equivalent of treatment households relative to the 
control group. The slope coefficients show a positive sign for each of the three 
microfinance organisations; however, the coefficients were only statistically 
significant different from zero in the case of Fincomun. Since in the earlier analysis 
on the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio revealed no evidence of selection bias 
(see section 722 above), we were able to concentrate on the least square estimation. 
In order to calculate the percentage change of income per adult equivalent of 
treatment households relative to the control group, we take the antilog of the 
parameter estimate 1, and compute (e6 -1)x100 (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
For example, if we estimate the antilog of S when the logarithm of monthly income 
per adult equivalent 1 was derived as the dependent variable we obtain 
e° = 1.7297, suggesting that ceteris paribus, the median income per adult 
equivalent of treatment households with at least one year of programme 
participation at Fincomun was higher than that of the control groups by about 73%. 
We observed nevertheless a degree of variability in the coefficient of I, when 
different definitions of income per adult equivalent were introduced, suggesting 
that the impact analysis of credit might be sensitive to intra-household distribution 
of welfare. Surprisingly, the parameter estimate 8 in the regression equation was 
positive but not significantly different from zero in the case of CAME and Promujer. 
In other words, although there might be a positive effect of programme 
participation on individual income, there is no evidence to confirm this 
relationship. 
The starting point in examining the reasons of the insignificant levels of S was to 
see the degree to which it might be related to the severity of deprivation amongst 
households' participants. In fact, some researchers have found that very poor 
borrowers are more likely to report low income impacts not only because they are 
engaged in low-return self-employment activities (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Husain 
1998; Zaman 1999; Wood and Shariff 1997)16 but also because in the process of 
decision making, the vulnerable have attitudes that indicate they are more risk- 
16 Self-employment represented 85% 65% and 71% of the income sources, for treatment 
households at Fincomun, CAME and Promujer, respectively. 
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averse (see e. g. Ravallion 1988; Sinha and Upton 1999). The problem is that the 
estimation procedure provides us with information on the impact of programme 
participation at the mean of the dependent variable; however, it does not tell us to 
what extent those participants are actually poor. Furthermore, notice that the 
parameter 8 measures the average impact of programme participation on Y; 
however, it does not take into consideration the effect of credit over time. Treatment 
households with say five years of membership are expected to report a greater 
impact than those households with just one or two years of membership. This is in 
part due to the effect of progressive lending that continuously increases the credit 
limit of borrowers. In order to address the latter issue we extend the Heckman 
procedure to a Tobit selection equation in section 73.1, before we concentrate in 
section 7.4 on finding out to what extent CAME -and the other two organisations- 
were actually reaching the poor. 
73.1 Substituting the Heckit procedure for a Tobit selection equation: the impact 
of credit on households income 
As mentioned above, the parameter S measures the average impact of programme 
participation on the level of income per adult equivalent; however, it does not take 
into consideration the effect of credit over time. In order to address this problem, 
we replace the treatment dichotomous variable I, in equation (7.11) by a 
continuous variable, C,, that measures the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
during the last credit cycle. We assume that C, is exogenously determined by the 
lender L, who set up this maximum threshold according to level of participation in 
the programme. Thus we have the following specification equation 
=X, ß +z; y+ui (7.16) 
where 
C, = max(0, C) , i. e. 
(7.17) 
C, = Cj if C, >0 (for treatment group) (7.18) 
C, =0 if C, S0 (for control group) (7.19) 
and 
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ui IXi _ Normal (0, ß'2 
Consequently, CC takes a maximum value and a lower threshold zero in the form of 
a censored Tobit model (Tobin 1958) with a C, >0 for treatment groups and C, =0 
for control groups'7. In this way we believe to be capturing a more precise measure 
of the impact of programme participation by using Ci in the reduced form 
equation, where Snow measures the impact of credit per additional unit of capital 
borrowed. Notice that the use of OLS for the sub-sample for which C, >0 will 
produce inconsistent estimators of ßc and y, since we are using only the data on 
uncensored observations (Wooldridge 2002), causing a downward bias result 
(Greene 2003)18. Thus, the Tobit model implies that the probability of observing 
Ci >0 and C, =0 are 0 (") and p(CC < 0) = 4'(0), respectively, where 0 () and 
4 () denote the same density function and the cumulative density function of the 
standard normal analysed above in section 7.2. These assumptions are very similar 
to those implied in the Probit selection equation, but now the log-likelihood 
function takes the form 
1nL=E(-1nQ+1no(C`-Xlß' +ýlnl1-(D 
xißc' 
(7.20) 
Q)`Q C, 
which generates three conditional mean functions19: one of the latent variable Ci , 
which can be used to understand the unobservable factors (e. g. individual 
preferences, attitudes towards risk or entrepreneurship) that affect the propensity to 
borrow from microfinance organisations; one of the observed dependent variable C,, 
which can be used to understand the determinants of the level of borrowing by 
treatment and control groups alike; and one of the uncensored observed dependent 
17 Since we have a data-censoring case demanding the variable Cr to follow a homoskedastic 
normal distribution, we use a logarithmic transformation in our estimation strategy to make 
this assumption more reasonable. 
18 Goldberger (1972) and Greene (1981) have proved that the ratio of the OLS estimates to the 
maximum likelihood estimates get close to the proportion of data uncensored. 
19 For further details on the derivation of the conditional mean functions, see Greene (2003). 
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variable Cj I C, > 0, which can be used to understand the determinants of the level 
of borrowing by treatment households alone. 
We are particularly interested in looking at the conditional mean function of the 
observed dependent variable C, that is censored at zero for control groups, and have 
disturbances normally distributed. In other words, we are interested in examining 
the observed factors that affect the level of household borrowing between treatment 
and control groups. This is actually the fundamental reason of using a standard 
Tobit specification. If no censoring had occurred, to use a Tobit model in our 
estimation procedure would be inappropriate (Maddala 1999). In order to interpret 
the estimation results, we follow (Greene 2003) to derive the marginal effects of X, 
on Cj as follows: 
aE[aß (xýc 20 (7.21) l 
We can estimate now a borrowing function for the level of programme participation 
(including the intercept), which is determined by the maximum amount of capital 
lent during the last credit cycle as follows: 
C, =a, +X, j6, +Z, y+LO, +u; (7.22) 
where Xi is anxK vector of household characteristics; Z, is a set of observable 
variables distinct from those in X, that affect C, but not the outcome of interest Y 
conditional on C, that plays the role of the identifying instruments; Zy is a vector of 
credit market characteristics; a,, /3,, y and 6, are the intercept and the unknown 
parameters, respectively whilst u, is the error term that captures unmeasured 
household characteristics that determine borrowing levels. It is important to 
acknowledge the fact that microfinance organisations are not only lending 
20 McDonald and Moffitt (1980) have decomposed equation (7.21 into two parts to obtain the 
effects of a change in X, on the conditional mean of C, and on the probability that the 
observation will fall in the part of the distribution where C, > 0. 
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organisations. In the case of Fincomun, the organisation is legally authorised to 
receive deposits, whereas the internal fund at CAME has become an important 
saving mechanism for village bank members. Nevertheless, given that credit 
remains the primary product of interest that motivates households to join the 
organisations21, we consider the maximum amount of credit as the best indicator to 
measure the impact of programme participation on household welfare. The function 
for the outcome of interest Y, i. e. income per adult equivalent, conditional on the 
level of programme participation Cf takes the form 
Y= ay +X1ß +LBy +GS+u; (7.23) 
where a., 8,, B' and S are the intercept and the unknown parameters 
respectively, whilst of is the error term reflecting unmeasured determinants of Y, 
that vary from household to household. Given that we are including C, as the 
explanatory variable in (7.23), we may expect some level of endogeneity emerging 
now from the lenders' policy-specifics that affect the maximum amount of credit 
borrowed and not only the accessibility to it, as discussed earlier when the Heckman 
procedure was estimated. 
To select an identifying instrument for the Tobit selection equation, additional to 
DISTANCE, becomes once again an essential and difficult task. This instrument 
must satisfy the same conditions as in section 7.2 to enable us to estimate a 2SLS 
Tobit procedure, the type of method that Amemiya (1984) has referred to as Type III 
Tobit model. We derive this estimation equation as follows: 
Y=ar+X; ßy+110Y +C, S+RRU+er (7.24) 
where RR and v are the predicted Tobit residuals and its parameter estimate, 
respectively, and e; = u' - E(u; 
IA. ), where (et, R, ) are assumed to be independent 
21 In interviews, the majority of participants said that credit was the main product of interest, 
nevertheless 36% of members at CAME said that the internal fund was an important incentive 
to join the organisation, whereas 62% of borrowers at Promujer described the periodic 
training sessions as useful instruments of education and empowerment. 
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of X;, i. e. E(et IXj, R) = 0. The predicted residuals from the Tobit equation are 
estimated when C, >_ 0 in (7.22) and then included as another regressor in (7.24) to 
yield consistent and efficient estimators (Wooldridge 2003). The null of no selection 
bias is tested in similar fashion as the Heckit procedure; however, we now use the 
2SLS heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic on the predicted residuals: when v00 we 
encounter a selection problem. 
In order to identify the additional instrument contained in Z,, we analysed the 
incentive and enforcement devices that the case-study organisations employ, and 
which are expected to affect C, but not the outcome of interest Y,. We explored two 
variables as identifying instruments: the length of membership (coded as 
MEMBERSHIP) and the amount of compulsory savings requested by the 
organisation in logarithmic form (coded as LGSAVINGSMFI). The former 
instrument was related to progressive lending, a device employed by microfinance 
organisations in order to deal with the problem of moral hazard and reduce 
operational costs in the long run; this instrument was computed as the number of 
years of programme participation. The latter instrument was linked to compulsory 
savings schemes that lenders request in order to be eligible to participate in the 
programme, and which are designed to reduce the problems of moral hazard and 
the expected default rate. 
Initially we tried to exploit the information contained in LGSAVINGSMFI to be 
used as instrumental variable; however, we faced two fundamental problems 
during the estimation process: firstly, some concerns emerged in relation to the 
identifying instrument since the level of compulsory savings might be correlated, to 
some degree, to the level of income. Secondly, the three case-study organisations 
required applicants to deposit an amount equal to 10% of the size of the credit. In 
this sense, the percentage share of the variable LGSAVINGSMFI did not vary too 
much from household to household causing a potential problem of collinearity. For 
those reasons we decided to focus on the variable MEMBERSHIP. 
When we estimated equation (7.22) with DISTANCE and MEMBERSHIP contained 
in vector Z, as identifying instruments for each of the case-study organisations, the 
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p-values of the t statistic for the coefficient y rejected the null of Ho : y=0, i. e. it 
reflected the statistically significance correlation between the maximum level 
borrowing, C,, and the two instruments contained in Z,; however, when we 
included Z; in equation (7.23), the parameter estimate y accepted the null of no 
correlation against the outcome of interest Y (see table 7.9). We also followed 
Klein's rule of thumb (1961) to test the instruments for potential problems of 
collinearity. None of the auxiliary regressions with DISTANCE and MEMBERSHIP 
as dependent variables reported a higher R2 than the one obtained from the main 
regression equation (7.22), rejecting any serious problem of collinearity. As a result 
we were able to use DISTANCE and MEMBERSHIP as identifying instruments for 
the Tobit selection procedure22. 
Table 7.9 Identifying instruments for the Tobit selection equation 
Dependent variable in (7.22): logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
(LGMAXCREDIT) 
Dependent variable in (7.23): logarithm of monthly income per adult equivalent 1 in pesos of 2004 
(LGINCOMPPAF. 11 
FINCOMUN CA ME PROMUJER 
Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation 
(7.22) (7.23) (7.22) 7.23 (7.22) (7.23) 
MEMBERSHIP 2.235 -0.024 2.074 0.018 5.487 -0.003 
(6.80)*** (0.19) (6.78)"* (0.29) (10.36)'"" (1.22) 
DISTANCE 0.060 -0.001 0.058 0.004 0.042 0.340 
(2.60)** (0.41) (1.76)" (0.88) (2.84)* (1.65) 
ADsomte value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
For more details about the regression equation see table A7.5 in the Appendix to chapter 7 
The econometric results of the impact of credit on individual income using 
equivalent factors are shown below in table (7.10). Notice that the predicted 
residuals from the second-stage Tobit selection equation report statistically 
insignificant levels in the parameter estimates v, confirming - as before in the 
Heckit procedure - the assumption of no selectivity. It is possible to argue that the 
decision process that involves increasing levels of borrowing is largely a function of 
the policy-specifics that are exogenously determined, and linearly correlated to 
progressive lending (captured by the length of membership). 
22 The first-stage Tobit results, contact me at m. nino@sheffield. ac. uk. 
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We found little evidence to suggest that it is a function of unobservable factors that 
are related to individual choice, preferences, or entrepreneurship. In order to 
confirm the assumption of exogeneity we decided to exploit the qualities of the 
Hausman's procedure (Hausman 1978) by testing under the null hypothesis that the 
asymptotic covariance matrix of the OIJS estimator is not systematically larger than 
the 2S-Tobit selection equation. In order words, we examined under the null if 
p lim d=0, where d= b2S_Tobu- Bam , whereas under the alternative, p 
lim d#0. 
Following Greene (2003: 83) we computed the Hausman statistic in STATA as 
follows: 
H= (bzs-Tobst - 
4, ) '{ Est. Asy. Var [b2S-Tobit ]- 
Est. Asy. Var[Bas]}-1(BOLS -b2S-Tobit) a X2 (j) 
When we estimated the Hausman statistic for the pooled data we found that the 
X2 (13) = 0.09, whereas in the sample surveys of Fincomun, CAME and Promujer, 
the , (13) = 0.24, , (13) = 0.13, and 
f (12) = 2.11, respectively. Consequently, we 
could not reject the null for each of the individual samples surveys that the 
Bols 
and b2S_r,, b; l were both consistent, and 
BoLs efficient relative to b2$-Tob;, . 
When the Hausman procedure was estimated using the pooled sample, we could 
reject the null only at the 0.1 level. In this sense, although we recognise the 
possibility of selectivity bias in the process of borrowing, we have evidence to reject 
a significant effect of unobservable factors on our results, allowing us to concentrate 
on the OLS estimation. The parameter estimate 5 of the impact variable, C,, 
reported as expected a positive sign for each of the three microfinance 
organisations; however, the coefficients were only statistically significant different 
from zero in the case of Fincomun. More precisely, the econometric results suggest 
that if the maximum amount of capital borrowed by treatment households had 
gone up by x%, the income per adult equivalent 1 had increased in the order of 
0.064x% relative to the control group, ceteris paribus. 
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This result is important for two reasons: First, it confirms that our findings are in 
line with the statistically significant impacts that we reported in equation 7.12; 
however, by substituting CJ for It we have managed to discount the effects that 
older borrowers have on the mean value of the impact equation, allowing us to 
obtain a more accurate estimation. Second, our results confirm the findings of other 
researchers (e. g. Morduch 1998; Coleman 1999) in relation to the small (or 
insignificant) effects that credit has on the level of individual income. To illustrate 
this consider the following case study: 
Case study 71 
Mrs S has been a member of Fincomun since 2002. By the time we interviewed her 
(code int2-14012004) she had borrowed 5 credits from an initial loan of 3,000 pesos 
(about US $270) that progressively increased up to 10,000 pesos (US $897). She runs 
a small grocery in San Miguel Teotongo where she invested the credit to pay 
suppliers and buy some assets that she needed to improve her sales. 
We had evidence to believe that Mrs S was suffering from micro-rationing since she 
had repeatedly taken the maximum amount of capital available, which increased at 
a rate of 30% in every credit cycle, after the incentive of progressive lending that 
Fincomun put in place. In fact, Mrs S expressed the intention to borrow 13,000 pesos 
in the subsequent credit cycle, information that matched with our expectations. Mrs 
S reported a monthly household income of 3000 pesos that after being weighted by 
the equivalent factors yield an individual disposable income (after loan instalments) 
of 904 pesos. 
Based on the results from the regression equation, we can predict that a percentage 
increase of 30% in the loan size (i. e. 3000 pesos additional to the previous 10000) 
will have an impact on the level of Mrs S's income of about 904 x 0.064(0.30) = 17.36 
pesos (US $1.56), ceteris paribus23. In other words, an absolute change in the level of 
income, coming from a proportional change in income relative to a change in the 
maximum amount of credit borrow will be marginal and heavily dependent on the 
level of initial welfare of Mrs S and her family. 
Based on the evidence reported from Hulme and Mosley (1996), we consider the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 2. Organisations reporting poverty impacts have the largest effects amongst 
those who are closest to, or above, the poverty line. 
23 Unfortunately, the picture of a sustained virtuous circle of growth in capital, production 
and income experienced by Mrs S tell us just one part of the story. In reality, several 
borrowers reported that their project had failed their projects, and for many of them growth 
had been flattened. Similar behaviour is reported in Hulme and Mosley (1996) 
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We test this proposition in section 7.4 by looking at the relationship between the 
severity of deprivation amongst programme participants and the poverty impacts 
of the case-study organisations. 
7.4 The impact of credit on poverty reduction 
To begin the discussion, we proceed to calculate the incidence of poverty and 
poverty gap amongst household members by computing four different monetary 
thresholds of income deprivation. We also include the Human Development Index 
for comparative purposes: 
Poverty line 1 (PL1). It measures the incidence of extreme poverty, and has been 
calculated at 784.5 pesos per month. 
Poverty fine 2 (PL2). It measures the incidence of poverty, and has been computed at 
1507.5 pesos per month. 
Poverty fine 3 (PI3). It measures the incidence of moderate poverty and has been 
calculated at 1881 pesos per month 
World Bank's poverty line, which is fixed at US$ 2a day 
The use of several critical thresholds of human deprivation is justified for two 
reasons: firstly, there is a widespread recognition that the conventional absolute 
poverty line of US $2 a day is too low for the existing domestic prices in Mexico. 
Underestimating the magnitude and severity of poverty amongst programme 
participants could tell us a wrong story about poverty impacts. Secondly, by 
computing several poverty lines we were able to analyse how deep the case-study 
organisations were reaching the poor, and to measure the magnitude of the poverty 
impacts by levels of deprivation. We followed the Sedesol (2002) criteria to identify 
PL1 as the lowest threshold of income required to fulfil the minimum nutritional 
requirements to have a healthy living. A food-based poverty line. PL2 includes the 
basket of basic goods plus other components such as health care and basic 
education. A capabilities-based poverty line. PL3 measures moderate poverty and is 
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referred to as an asset-based poverty line. These poverty lines have been derived for 
the urban context24. 
The estimation of the incidence of poverty and poverty gap are presented in table 
7.11. Incidence and depth of poverty are particularly important for the evaluation of 
these microfinance programmes. The former has been computed as the percentage 
of programme participants whose income per adult equivalent 1 was below the 
selected poverty line. In other words, the incidence of poverty (also known as 
headcount index) shows the share of households that could not afford to buy the 
basket of basic goods that was previously selected by the INEGI-ECLAC (1993). We 
observed a larger incidence of poverty amongst treatment households at CAME and 
Promujer than at Fincomun when PL2 and PL3 were employed. 
Table 7.11 Poverty and human deprivation amongst programme participants 
Figures in percentages 
Concept Sample 
size 
FINCOMUN 
Control Treated 
CA 
Control 
ME PROMUJER 
Treated Control Treated 
Overall 148 34.5 65.5 39.1 60.9 44.7 55.3 
Human Development Index 
Below the index at local level 145 100 97.2 94.4 96.4 100 100 
a/ 
Below the index at country 139 100 86.1 83.3 96.4 100 100 
level b/ 
Incidence of extreme 
poverty (PL1) cl 
5 784.5 pesos per month 10 15.8 11.1 112 00 
3.9 
Poverty gap 43.4 28.2 13.5 00 5.1 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 341 221 106 00 43 
Incidence of poverty (PL2) 
515075 pesos per month 60 63.2*** 27.8 50.0 42.9 33.3 38.5 
Poverty gap 38.1 36.2 35.0 20.2 17.5 21.2 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 574 545 527 304 263 319 
Incidence of moderate 
poverty (PL3) 
51881 pesos per month 87 73.7" 36.1 77.8 67.9 61.9 53.9 
Poverty gap 44.8 39.3 34.1 25.4 23.3 30.6 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 842 738 642 477 439 576 
World Bank's poverty line 
SUS$2aday 7 15.8 8.3 5.6 00 0 
Poverty gap 33.6 23.7 1.1 00 0 
Depth of poverty (in pesos) 225 159 7 00 0 
The statisticall y significant association in the cross-tabulations are indicated by the Chi-square values for the cell as a whole at 0.001 (*); 0.01("); 0.05 (""); and 0.1('""") levels of significance. 
a/ The HDI was estimated at 0.891,0.795 and 0.755 points for Mexico City, the state of Mexico and the 
state of Hidalgo, respectively; b/ The HDI was estimated at 0.801 points for the country as a whole; c/ 
Poverty lines are derived using income per adult equivalent 1 
Sources: UNDP 2002, Sedesol (2002), World Bank (2000) and the author's sample survey 
24 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion on these poverty lines 
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For example, although 43% and 39% of treatment households at CAME and 
Promujer, respectively, reported earnings that were below the minimum 
requirement to satisfy their basic needs according to poverty line 2, in comparison 
to 28% at Fincomun, only in the case of Fincomun we could find a statistically 
significant association at 0.05 level between treatment and control groups in relation 
to the incidence of poverty. More precisely, the empirical evidence may suggest a 
positive cause-effect relationship between programme participation and poverty 
reduction. It is also clear that the case-study organisations were reaching the poor at 
different levels of deprivation. To illustrate this, take the case of the depth of 
deprivation amongst poor borrowers (see figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2 The relationship between average borrower 
income and the length of membership 
911 
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Average income per adult equivalent 1 as a% of poverty line 2 
The computed poverty gap showed a longer distance between poor borrowers and 
the poverty line amongst participants at Fincomun than at CAME and Promujer. 
Poor borrowers at Fincomun had to cover, on average, an income shortfall of 545 
pesos per month in order to cross the PL2, whereas poor borrowers at CAME and 
Promujer had to cover only 304 and 319 pesos, respectively. As suggested before, 
we might have the case here where some organisations (e. g. Fincomun) are more 
effective at reducing the number of poor households but only by lifting those who 
were closest to the poverty line, with low impacts on the poverty gap. 
Other organisations (e. g. CAME and Promujer) might be more effective in reaching 
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the extreme poor but by doing so, they report low impacts on the overall incidence, 
bringing the extreme poor closer to the poverty line but still below it. One way to 
find out whether our assumptions are correct is by estimating the marginal effects 
of credit across the poverty lines. In order to do so, we ran a probit estimation 
equation in the form 
PI4 =a. +BC, +u; (7.25) 
where the dependent variable PL, is a binary variable that takes the values 
1 if ih household is below the poverty line PL; _ 0 otherwise 
and C; is the same continuous variable in equation (7.22) that measures the 
maximum amount of credit borrowed in logarithmic form. We have run (7.25) with 
Pls adopting different poverty lines and using by default the definition of income 
per adult equivalent 1. In this sense PI, was coded as POORPLI when households 
were below the incidence of extreme poverty, PL1; POORPL2, when households 
were below the PL2; POORPL3, when households were below PL3, and POOR2US 
when households were below the World Bank's 2 US dollar a day poverty line. For 
comparative purposes, we have also run 7.25 with It as a substitute for Ci where I, 
is the dichotomous variable previously defined with value 1=1 for treatment 
households and I=0 for control groups. 
By estimating the marginal effects of Cj we were able to capture in 5 the impact of 
a relative change in the amount of capital borrowed by a poor household on the probability 
of staying below the poverty line. Alternatively, if we included 11 in the Probit 
equation, we were able to capture in 5 the impact of the individual choice of a poor 
household to participate in the micro, finance organisation on the probability of staying in 
poverty. We present the results in table 7.12. Our findings reveal interesting 
information regarding the level penetration of the case-study organisations and 
their poverty impacts: 
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As we were expecting, the slope coefficient of C; reported negative signs when 
POORPL2 and POORPL3 were included as dependent variables, but they only 
showed statistically significant levels when we estimated the Probit equation for 
programme participants at Fincomun. Other things held constant, the effect of a 
relative change of x% in the level of borrowing by poor members at Fincomun was a 
decline in the probability of staying below that poverty line of about -0.038x%, and 
the magnitude of this impact was marginally greater (-0.043x%) when better off 
households were included in the estimation, i. e. when POORPL2 was replaced for 
POORPL3. 
Table 7.12 Probit the effect of programme participation on the probability of staying in poverty 
Explanatory variable in (7.25): with C,: logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed 
(LGMAXCREDTT); In (7.25) with 1,, LGMAXCREDIT is transformed into a dummy variable =1 for 
treatment households 
Dependent variable: FINCOMUN CAME PROMUJER Pooled sample dummy variable =1 if 
household i reports an (7.25) (7.25) (7.25) (7.25) (7.25) (7.25) (7.25) (7.25) 
LAM 29 the derived 
with I with C with C, with 1, with C with I with I with C, poverty line a/ j , , , , 
Coef -0379 -0.051 -0.350 -0.419 World Bank (0.82) (1.12) (0.98) (1.08) 
poverty line 5 US M) -0.074 -0.009 -0.036 -0.003 
$2 a day (0.82) (1.12) (0.98) (1.08) 
ax 
Incidence of Coef -0.217 -0.029 
0.178 -0.229 -0.027 
(0.49) (0.66) (5.83)*** (0.72) (0.79) 
extreme poverty 
PLl 5 784.5 pesos -0.046 -0.006 
0.003 
*** 
-0.031 -0.003 
per month X 
(0.49) (0.66) (5.83) (0.72) (0.79) 
Incidence of Coef -0.925 -0.100 -0.180 -0.019 -0.137 -0.013 -0.327 -0.390 (2.49)** (2.58)*** (0.47) (0.47) (0.36) (0.29) (133) (1.67)* 
poverty 
PL2 51507.5 pesos DO -0.353 -0.038 - 
0.071 -0.007 -0.051 -0.005 -0.127 -0.015 
* 
per month 
(2.49)** (2.58)*** (0.47) (0.47) (0.36) (0.29) (1.53) (1.67) 
ax 
Incidence of Coef -0.989 -0.108 -0.301 -0.030 -0.206 -0.029 -0.467 -0.055 
moderate poverty 
(2.61)*** (2.73)"*" (0.72) (0.70) (0.55) (0.64) (2.15)*" (2.31)** 
P1.3 51881 pesos -0.375 -0.043 -0.099 -0.010 -0.080 -0.011 -0.178 *" 
-0.021 
** 
per month 
(2.61)*** (2.73)*** (0.72) (0.70) (0.55) (0.64) (2.15) (2.31) 
ax 
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; " significant at 5%; "'significant at 1% 
a/ Income per adult equivalent 1 (IAE1) follows Rothbarth (1943) 
Note: Equation (7.25) could not be estimated neither using the World Bank's poverty line nor the Poverty 
line 1, due to the fact that we did not observe treatment households at CAME, and control groups at 
Promujer whose income was below the thresholds of extreme deprivation. The immediate consequence of 
that was to face a typical case of perfect predict probability. 
Although the parameter 8 reported negative signs when the extreme poor was 
included in the estimation (e. g. POORPL1 and POOR2US), it was not significantly 
different from zero. In other words, we could not find statistical evidence to confirm 
a poverty impact from Fincomun at the lowest point of deprivation, where the 
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extreme poor are grouped. The result support the proposition regarding the idea that 
poverty impacts are more likely to be observed at the upper limits of deprivation, 
amongst those dosest to the poverty line. As Hulme and Mosley (1996: 109) state: 
"this should not be unexpected given that those with higher incomes have greater range of 
investment opportunities, more information about market conditions and can take on more 
risk than the poorest households without threatening their minimum needs for survival". 
Interestingly, Promujer reported positive signs and statistically significant levels in 
the slope coefficient of Cj when POORPL1 was computed as dependent variable. 
This suggests that, other things held constant, a relative change in the loan size of 
an extreme poor woman borrowing from Promujer will increase the probability of 
staying poor. The fact that the slope coefficient of C, reported negative but 
insignificant levels when POORPL2 and POORPL3 were included in the estimation, 
suggests that Promujer might be effective in reaching the extreme poor but by doing 
so, the organisation is reporting impacts just on the poverty gap and not on the 
overall incidence, which may also explain the considerably smaller poverty gap 
reported by the organisation compared to that of Fincomun (see table 7.11). 
Surprisingly, although the slope coefficient of Ci showed negative signs, we could 
not find any statistical significance to confirm poverty impacts from CAME at the 
estimated thresholds of deprivation. 
The empirical evidence discussed in section 7.3 points to a linkage between 
insignificant poverty impacts and lending technology. The link can be tracked to 
some devices that microfinance organisations have traditionally employed to deal 
with screening, monitoring and enforcement problems. In particular, we refer to the 
opportunity costs that periodical repayment schedules, which demand weekly 
compulsory meetings, generate to programme participants. The results from 
equation 7.15 showed a large and positive responsiveness in the demand for credit 
as a result of a percentage increase in the opportunity cost of borrowing. In fact, 
CAME reported the largest elasticity between the three organisations. This reflects 
the direct effect that weekly compulsory meetings have on income, in particular 
when households economically more dynamic experience an increase in the rate of 
return to investment and are forced to forego earnings for being required to attend 
sessions that quite often last for several hours. To illustrate this, we estimated the 
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opportunity cost of borrowing per credit cycle, just as we did in equation 7.15. We 
find, for instance, that borrowers at CAME absorb, on average, an opportunity cost 
of participation that represents about 17% of the capability-based poverty line for 
urban areas (PL2). This issue is of great significance to poor households. 
It is known that not always the investment finance by microfinance programmes is 
successful; it largely depends on the ability of borrowers to generate value through 
production or commercialisation, and the demand for such products. These two 
preconditions explain why poor borrowers are frequently engaged in more than 
one project at the same time; they diversify the risk associated to the production of 
one product by producing (or selling) another. The problem is that economic 
constraints of local markets shape a low demand curve that force poor 
entrepreneurs to search for better markets in the City, in areas faraway from their 
place of residence. If we add the transaction costs to the opportunity cost of 
borrowing, it should not be surprising to expect that rigid repayment schedules 
exacerbate the expected rate of return to investments in income-generating projects. 
Narrative evidence collected through several interviews validates our concerns. 
Take the following case studies: 
Case study 7.2 
Mrs T lives with her husband and youngest son in a modest house in the Chalco 
Valley. She has been member of CAME for 7 years. Over the last 3 years, she alone 
(her husband and son are waged workers) has been engaged in the business of 
selling shoes at street markets that are usually held on particular days of the week. 
For that reason, she has to travel from square to square across Mexico City. She 
works 6 days per week, and on average, 8 hours per day. After reporting total 
revenues and costs, we were able to estimate a level of business profitability in the 
order of 4640 pesos per month. 
Once a week, Mrs T is required to attending compulsory group meetings that last, 
on average, for one hour and a half, although in various occasions, these meetings 
were reported to last for several hours. Based on the level of business profitability 
and the time spent on attending these meetings, including travelling, we estimate 
an opportunity cost of programme participation for Mrs T in the order of 6% 
relative to total profits that represented 16%, of the capability-based poverty line (or 
PL2) estimated for urban Mexico. When we asked her opinion about CAME she 
said: "I cannot make repayments every week, I don't have problems with the interest rate 
but I don't like when they (CAME) force us to come every week. I have a business to attend, 
you know, and it is faraway... " Interview with Mrs T; code: lnt2-1 1 032004, Minute 
24: 05. 
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Case study 7.3 
Mrs C, married and with three small children, lives in Tula City, in the state of 
Hidalgo. She began to sell home products with relatives and friends, and at street 
markets with an initial 1300 pesos credit from Promujer. She works alone in the 
business, being her husband a waged worker employed by Mexican Petroleum. 
Since she is in charged of childcare, she is able to work only 2 hours per day, 6 days 
per week, although she stated her desire of spending more time on her business. 
Based on revenues and costs data, we estimated a level of business profitability in 
the order of 750 pesos per month. Once a week, Mrs C is required to attend 
compulsory group meetings that last, often, for several hours. 
Based on the time spent on group meetings, including travelling, we estimate an 
opportunity cost of programme participation in the order of 12.5% relative to total 
profits, which represented about 6% of the capability-based poverty line. Although 
the monetary value of the opportunity cost of programme participation for Mrs C 
was lower than the estimated value for Mrs T, the social burden could be higher for 
the former given the household structure. When we asked Mrs C to tell her opinion 
about Promujer she said: "What I don't like from Promujer is that we have to come every 
week and wait hours and hours for some comrades that come late. I have lots of problems to 
be sitting here waiting for them (group-members). And now because of the meetings I 
cannot pick up my children from school. To be honest with you, I will leave the group as 
soon as the cycle ends... " (Interview with Mrs C; code: Int5-06042004, Minute 23: 45 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
We have discussed in this chapter the relevance of conducting an appropriate 
strategy of data collection in order to reduce the potential problems of self-selection 
and endogeneity that emerge from the implicit nature of the object of study. The 
population density as well as the homogeneity of households' deprivation in poor 
urban areas in Mexico has allowed us to survey households that satisfied the 
condition 1=1, * /, in a relatively straightforward manner, and the results frone the 
Heckit and Tobit selection models confirmed the efficacy of our method. 
The use of income per capita in poverty assessments is still the mainstream 
approach for intra-household distribution of welfare. However, the empirical 
evidence suggests that poverty-impact analysis can be sensitive to the weighting 
factors adopted by the researcher. In this sense, appropriate equivalent scales 
should be considered in future evaluations in order to evade misleading results. 
228 
Furthermore, the use of poverty lines should be carefully decided on the grounds of 
domestic prices and patterns of consumption in order to avoid under (or over) 
estimating the magnitude and severity of deprivation. 
Our results suggest that the rigidity of screening and monitoring devices such as 
periodical repayment schedules in compulsory group meetings substantially 
increase the utility cost of borrowing, particularly when the distance that the poor 
have to travel, and the time spent on long group sessions are taking into 
consideration. As we discussed in section 7.5 this cost is highly correlated with the 
level of income. We remind the reader that although programme participants live 
close to the branch of microfinance organisations, they often work faraway where 
they find better markets and sources of income. This characteristic seems to 
distinguish the urban poor from the rural poor. Rigidity in loan contracts can also 
cause market inefficiency by keeping households with large seasonal income from 
borrowing at the optimum level. 
Narrative evidence actually suggests that this rigidity explain why good borrowers 
decided to leave the credit programme. The empirical results also show that 
incentive devices such as progressive lending cause micro-rationing in credit 
markets particularly when upper limits of progressive lending are imposed through 
policies of graduation. In this sense, lending innovations aimed to reduce the 
rigidity of loan contracts could help, on the one hand, organisations to increase 
client retention and expand outreach; and on the other hand, improve poverty 
impacts, by preventing poor households to take actions that could affect their 
returns to investments. In that perspective, government interventions such as 
PRONAFIM, could go beyond the narrow objective of expanding outreach and 
facilitate research activities and experimentation that could potentially improve 
market efficiency and poverty impacts. 
Our results also reveal that microfinance organisations reach the poor at different 
levels of deprivation; however, although reaching the poor has its own merits, it 
does not necessarily lead to poverty reduction: those organisations that base their 
credit operation on group lending technology (CAME and Promujer) report 
insignificant impacts on the overall incidence, and they just closed the distance of 
the poverty gap. Only one organisation (Fincomun) reports statistically significant, 
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but small poverty impacts at the upper limits of the poverty line, where the 
moderate poor is located, suggesting a strong relationship between the level initial 
welfare and the magnitude of the poverty impacts. However, we find no evidence 
of credit impacts on extreme poverty. Our findings are similar to the evidence 
reported in Hulme and Mosley (1996), and question the ability of credit 
programmes to reduce extreme poverty, as the Campaigners of the Microcredit 
Summit suggest (see e. g. Daley-Harris 2005). 
This has important policy implications. In Mexico, for instance, the government's 
safety net programme Oportunidades targets the extreme poor in rural communities. 
However, one-third of the extreme poor in Mexico remain excluded from 
Oportunidades for the simple reason of living in urban areas. Our results show that it 
would be desirable to extend the benefits of Oportunidades to urban areas, where 
resource allocation for nutrition, health care and other social services could be more 
effective in order to avoid extreme deprivation. In that context, credit could play a 
complementary role in a wider strategy of extreme poverty reduction. In the next 
chapter, we analyse the impacts of credit from a wider perspective, looking at the 
effects on business and household assets, as proxies of physical capital 
accumulation; children's schooling and health status, as proxies of human capital 
enhancements, and labour. 
230 
00 
12 
Oo 
'M 
C4 
-W 
N 
M r. Uy N x 
"d 
4 
t Lei a0 . -ý 
N 
r-I 
Ö 
0 
"ßä 
x 
CL. b 
0 
CD 
O 
tb 
> 
'b 
w CA (n 
1f) In -4 
p 
may 
~ 
M 
~ M 
OCG' L 
to 
b ar 
bO 
ýW+ 
"Q' 4 'dý lý 1.0 
(1) 
fn (n 
ý 
M 
I: p 
. 
0O 
0 
N 
" oll 
IQ 
In 
p 
d 
n 
, w cu i ý r 
QO {' 
'Ly 
o z z 
CY, 
IT I 
'D 
00 00 ;° 
Go q %D 
all C14 
v 
u ö ;, N 4 
0i 
u ö oý _, 
`ßn9' D 
p.. 
a 
r c 
pp w 0 
w 
u . ti ý. A Cl) 
a 
,ý + 
'A 10 
ä 
A" 
p, a, 
ö 
c 
rý 3 ö v v . -. 
v ö R 
y7 
0 
tý 
O 
"o 
cu 
äD 0 
ö 
ü 
ö 
.0 4 
$ 
ä 
3 
. C1 = V 
m W ý i 
61 
' 0 
w 
"" a, 0 C 
0 
O 
a 
p p i 0_ 
oý 
a_ 0 
ä 
w 
-0 
r' 
0 
E O 
" uN b u oN w' 
4 
(D (U 0 (U 1 
O b a 
. 
91 M . 
CL. 
t öý 0 
0 
V) ä 
0 Ü ä S ý 
8- w o d cC 
tn U) (n (n 0 
°00°° 
>4 zzzzz 
°z °z °z °z °z °z 
cNý 
N 
0 cJ 
V 
M 
I in .2 5. 
Q, X °1 
v p, ý x 
I 
ro :2 
` ö x cO O 
Cl o A 
.ý 
üd O 
0 
vO E vÄ . ä bc (U 
30a te ° ;pO m , 
t 
v 
- 
w a 
v0 
b 
ö 
p 
.. r 
ý Oý ; ý' f1) 
